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1Introduction
The representativeness of social partners provides
legitimacy for their various roles in industrial relations,
whether through the vehicle of social dialogue,
collective bargaining or involvement in government
policymaking or implementation. Their
representativeness entitles the social partners to act on
behalf of their members or, in some cases, all
companies and the entire workforce. This report
explores the different ways in which the
representativeness of social partners is defined at
national, European and international level. 
Policy context
Almost all EU Member States have some kind of legal
framework that defines how representativeness
operates for social partner organisations. The role that
legislation plays in national concepts of
representativeness, however, differs vastly. This role
can include setting the conditions to allow them to
engage in collective bargaining or conditions to extend
the resulting agreements, making them generally
binding. Another way in which legislation can shape
representativeness is by imposing thresholds, in terms
of membership, organisational density, or as a
minimum outcome of elections. There is also great
variation in the extent to which legislation can play a
role. In some countries, conformity with legal
requirements is crucial, while in others mutual
recognition is more important, or the only basis for
representativeness. Today, while employers and unions
in certain Member States still rely on self-regulation
through mutual recognition to establish
representativeness, most have a legal framework that
regulates the representativeness of social partners. In
some countries, ongoing clarifications are still taking
place. 
At EU level, the concept of representativeness was first
delineated by the European Commission in 1993 and
defined more clearly in 1998.1 Representativeness forms
the basis for allowing European social partner
organisations to be included in the list of organisations
to be consulted by the European Commission as set out
in Article 154 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), and for providing legally
binding implementation of their agreements as laid
down in Article 155 of TFEU. An analysis of the European
concept of representativeness can contribute to the
discussion on whether elements of Eurofound’s
methodology in its representativeness studies need to
be adjusted.
Key findings 
Representativeness has various meanings across the 28
Member States and Norway. In practice, few national
systems correspond to an unalloyed form of either
mutual recognition or legal conformity. Member States
employ a combination of these principles, applying a
mix of both formal and informal criteria. 
In addition to the fundamental dichotomy of the
representativeness concept – based on compliance with
legal requirements or based on mutual recognition – the
report looks at three elements or drivers with the
potential to contribute in different ways to
representativeness of social partners: electoral success,
organisational strength in terms of the scope of
membership, and the capacity to negotiate. 
Thresholds, where they exist, are less common for
employers than for trade unions. Employer thresholds
are either a requirement for the extension of collective
agreements or a criterion permitting access to tripartite
bodies. 
Four models of representativeness
This report argues that four models of
representativeness coexist in Europe: 
1. Social partner self-regulation: a social partner self-
regulated system of mutual recognition, associated
with negotiating capacity and social strength
drivers and with very little state regulation on
representativeness.
2. Mixed social partner and state regulation: a mixed
model, combining elements of social partner
mutual recognition and of state regulation and
legal conformity. 
3. State regulation membership strength: a state-
regulated system of legal conformity, where ‘social
strength’ is used as a legal measure of
representativeness.
Executive summary
1 European Commission (1993), ‘Communication concerning the application of the agreement on social policy’, (COM(93)600 final) and (1998)
‘Communication from the Commission adapting and promoting the social dialogue at Community level (COM(98)322 final).
24. State regulation electoral strength: a state-
structured system of legal conformity in which
electoral success primarily determines
representativeness. 
The discussion regarding the concept of
representativeness at international level dates back to
an advisory opinion in 1922 of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. In 1956, the Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR) evoked the concept of
representativeness for the first time, stating that ‘the
representativeness of the parties must be substantial’.
According to the CEACR’s current list of conditions for
representativeness, the criteria for representativeness
need to be: a) objective; b) precise; and
c) predetermined. The European Committee of Social
Rights of the Council of Europe stipulated in 2006 that
criteria of representativeness need to be: a) reasonable;
b) clear; c) predetermined; d) objective; e) laid down in
law; and f) subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Pre-conditions for representativeness
In 1993, the European cross-sector social partners
tabled a detailed list of the conditions to be met by
organisations to be consulted by the European
Commission. According to this list, they must be:
£ organised horizontally or sectorally at European
level;
£ composed of organisations that are themselves
regarded at their respective national levels as
representative of the interests they defend,
particularly in the fields of social, employment and
industrial relations policy; 
£ represented in all Member States of the European
Community and, possibly, of the European
Economic Area, or have participated in the ‘Val
Duchesse’ social dialogue; 
£ composed of organisations representing employers
or workers, membership of which is voluntary at
both national and European level; 
£ composed of members with the right to be
involved, directly or through their members, in
collective negotiations at their respective levels; 
£ instructed by their members to represent them in
the framework of European Community social
dialogue.
Frames of reference
The study identified four different frames of reference
for the assessment of the representativeness of the EU
social partners:
1. Setting up of the European sectoral social dialogue
committees (legal conformity).
2. Consultation based on legal conformity.
3. Negotiation based on mutual
recognition/bargaining autonomy.
4. Implementation of European framework
agreements by Council decision.
Conclusions
£ There is little debate, by and large, about the
concept of representativeness at national level.
£ In line with the 1993 Communication on the
application of the Agreement on Social Policy, there
is still a diversity of practice in the different Member
States and no single model has emerged in the past
20 years – hence making a European concept based
on common and harmonised criteria difficult to
achieve.
£ In its assessment of the representativeness of the
EU-level social partners based on their membership
strength, Eurofound might want to take into greater
account the different concepts used at national
level.
£ In light of the different legal frameworks for
representativeness at the different junctures of
European social dialogue, the question arises as to
whether the transparency of EU social dialogue
polity could be improved by harmonising these
frameworks.
£ In line with the statement from the Presidency of
the Council of the European Union, the European
Commission and the European social partners at an
event in Brussels on 27 June 2016 ‘Declaration on a
new start for a strong social dialogue’, the
European social partners should work towards
improving ‘membership and representativeness of
trade unions and employers’ organisations, and
ensure that there is a capacity to enter into
agreements with an appropriate mandate’.
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3Social partner organisations were established in most
western European countries during the 19th century,
and gained a solid legitimation of their role in society
throughout the 20th century. For Member States that
joined the EU in 2004, the role and legitimacy of their
social partners has changed with the transformation of
the political systems in those countries. Differences in
social and historical developments in each of the 28
Member States explain varying understandings
regarding the perception of the representativeness of
social partners, and how this has been recently
changing in some countries. The first part of this report
aims to give an overview of this national diversity, and
to show how different forms of representativeness can
be grouped into categories. 
The representativeness of social partners provides
legitimacy for their various roles in industrial relations,
whether through the vehicle of social dialogue,
collective bargaining or involvement in government
policymaking or implementation. Their
representativeness entitles the social partners to act on
behalf of their members or, in some cases, all
companies and the entire workforce. This report
explores the different ways in which the
representativeness of social partners is defined in
different countries and at different levels.  
Objectives 
This report forms an integral part of a wider research
project, which aims to analyse the concept and criteria
of representativeness at both EU and national level. The
purpose of this report is to discuss representativeness
at an individual country level in the EU Member States
and Norway. Specifically, the objectives are to:
£ map, analyse and assess differences in the concept
and criteria of representativeness at national level
in the 28 EU Member States and in Norway;
£ identify common features and differences in the
above; and
£ propose elements that could be used in a common
definition of representativeness.
The challenge of this research was to find ways of
mapping the full meaning and outcomes of
representativeness in the 28 EU Member States (plus
Norway), as well as the changes taking place in those
countries, and to identify the common trends.
Methodology
A questionnaire was completed (between February and
May 2015) by Eurofound’s Network of European
correspondents (composed of 29 national
correspondents covering all EU Member States plus
Norway – see annex A1). A combination of open and
closed questions covered the definition of
organisational representativeness. In addition to the
questionnaire, open-ended questions were sent to the
same 29 correspondents on the following themes: 
£ the concept of representativeness (four questions); 
£ its definition (four questions); 
£ its impact (four questions); 
£ any additional comments on the actors and
processes that shape representativeness (four
questions); and
£ the current views of the employers and unions (four
questions). 
The text responses were analysed using the NVivo
qualitative data analysis program.
Most of the 61 closed questions in the questionnaire
asked respondents to rank, on a scale of one to five
(from not relevant to most important), employer
associations at two levels (peak and sector) and trade
unions at three (peak, sector and workplace or
company). The impacts of representation were covered
in a further 60 questions. The actors and processes that
determine representativeness were examined through a
further 36 closed questions and a final 32 questions
focused on the numbers of representative
organisations, their bargaining capacities and the
relevance of different levels of bargaining. These data
were then entered into Excel for analysis and graphing.
A comparative analysis of countries was carried out,
using both an EU ‘average’ constructed from the 29 sets
of questionnaire responses and a review of the relevant
literature. The data sources, however, are not
straightforward – the findings provide only a heuristic
indication of interest representation trends in Europe
today. 
First, there are some problems of interpretation. Efforts
were made to ensure that the definition of interest
representation used, and its alternatives, was broad
enough to enable all the national correspondents to feel
they could answer all the questions. A few, however,
assumed that they were being asked only about the
legal framework of ‘representativeness’ and its
implications. In some cases, where there was no such
framework, or where there was one that did not fully
correspond to the industrial relations reality, the
Introduction
4answers were narrower than had been intended. In
these cases, supplementary questions were asked in an
attempt to obtain further information.
Second, there are problems in the over-reliance on
answers to single closed questions, particularly those
involving a subjective ranking by the national
correspondent. In order to address this, findings are
presented by combining or juxtaposing the averages of
two or more linked ranking variables, when it is possible
to do so. This approach can provide greater consistency
and reliability in making comparisons between
countries. This initial approach towards calculating
representativeness had to be re-directed towards an
approach of trying to understand the different
meanings and appreciate how representativeness can
bring about the legitimacy of social partners in the
different Member States at different levels. As this is the
first time this research has been conducted, these
findings are of an explorative nature.  
Finally, it is problematic to use data covering entire
countries that are based on the views of one
correspondent. For this reason, the national
correspondents were asked to provide bibliographic
references and to consult the comparative literature. 
It should be stated at the outset that the report does not
set out to map all aspects of representativeness in each
of the EU Member States and Norway. Its added value is
that it clarifies the different ways of interpreting
representativeness in a range of industrial relations
contexts.
Different approaches to
representativeness
At European level, the issue of representativeness has
been a conundrum of EU social policy since its inception
in 1993. According to the Court of Justice of the
European Union, it is the duty of the European
Commission and the Council to verify the
representativeness of the signatories to an agreement.
Primary EU law never refers to the notion of
representativeness, and the Commission first used this
criterion in its 1993 Communication concerning the
application of the Agreement on Social Policy
(European Commission, 1993) in annex 3 entitled ‘Main
findings of the social partners’ study
(Representativeness)’, where it defines the criteria for
representativeness in the consultation phase of social
dialogue. Thus, ‘management and labour’ in the sense
of Article 154 TFEU are to be understood as the
European social partners, organised at cross-sector or
sectoral level. The Commission has drawn up a list of
the organisations it consults under Article 154 TFEU.
This list, which is regularly revised, currently consists of
87 organisations. In 1993 this number stood at 28, rising
to 44 in 1998, 55 in 2002, 60 in 2004 and 79 in 2010
(European Commission, 1993–2010). Over the last 22
years, the total number of EU social partner
organisations to be consulted by the European
Commission under Article 154 TFEU has more than
tripled.
Decision 98/500/EC defines the criteria for
representativeness of the European social partners,
according to which it should:
£ relate to specific sectors or categories and be
organised at European level;
£ consist of organisations, which are themselves an
integral and recognised part of Member States’
social partner structures and have the capacity to
negotiate agreements, and which are
representative of several Member States;
£ have adequate structures to ensure their effective
participation in the consultation process (European
Commission, 1998b). 
At national level, an interesting development in some
countries has been the emergence in the wake of the
2008 financial recession of new social movements and
industrial relations actors in Greece, Portugal, Romania,
Spain and Slovenia. These movements aim to support
workers who have been hit by the economic crisis, but
who are not represented, or who are underrepresented,
by trade unions – principally migrant workers, young
workers and precarious workers. The new social
movements have questioned the political institutions,
established parties and social partners. In 2002, the
Commission concluded in its White Paper on European
Governance that ‘civil society plays an important role in
giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering
services that meet people’s needs’ (European
Commission, 2001b, p. 14). Against this background,
some academics have proposed that trade unions
should engage in a more pronounced societal dialogue
with civil society, ‘as means of promoting improved
social and ecological standards in the world of work’
(Schmidt, 2005, p. 449). However, even if social dialogue
and societal dialogue were to cooperate more closely in
the future, the problems arising from the demands of
representativeness and accountability would still have
to be tackled accordingly by the actors in this field. Civil
society organisations, which often represent the very
particular interests of society as a whole, are certainly
not to the same degree as representative of their
affiliates as employer and worker organisations are
(EESC, 2006). The European social partners, the
European Commission and the ILO are of the opinion
that the European social dialogue and civil dialogue
should be kept separate, and that social dialogue is not
susceptible to being opened to other actors:
‘Employers’ and workers’ organisations are distinct
from other civil society groups in that they represent
clearly identifiable actors of the real economy and draw
their legitimacy from the members they represent’
The concept of representativeness at national, international and European level
5(ILO, 2013a, p. 16). The European Commission
concludes that, ‘because of their representativeness,
trade unions and employer organisations have a
particular role’, different from that of civil society
actors, when it comes to consultation processes at EU
level (European Commission, 2002c, p. 6).
Chapter 1, on national concepts of representativeness,
comprises five sections. The first section presents the
role of legislation in representativeness: it distinguishes
between countries that grant representativeness
through the mutual recognition of social partners and
countries where representative status is obtained
through conforming with legal requirements. It reviews
three other elements that can contribute to the
representativeness of social partners: electoral success,
organisational strength in terms of the scope of
membership, and the capacity to negotiate. Once
representativeness status is acquired, it may have
certain impacts or consequences for social partner
organisations and these are looked at in the next
section of chapter 1. After classifying the different
approaches towards representativeness into four
categories or models, the last part of the chapter draws
some conclusions on diversity regarding the concept of
representativeness at different levels across the 28 EU
Members States plus Norway.
Chapter 2 is based on a literature review that examines
academic literature as well as policy documents of the
ILO, Council of Europe, EU institutions and the
European social partners. It analyses the concept of
representativeness at international and European level,
before going on to present and appraise Eurofound’s
current methodology of assessing representativeness,
which has been used since 1996. It discusses whether
some elements of this approach should be revisited,
refined or modified, after almost 10 years of application
by Eurofound, in light of developments in the concept of
representativeness, as mapped at international (ILO)
and European level (Council of Europe, European
Union).
Introduction

7Role of legislation and mutual
recognition 
Almost all EU Member States have some kind of legal
framework that shapes how representativeness is
endorsed by social partner organisations.2 The role that
legislation plays in national concepts of
representativeness, however, varies considerably. This
role can include setting the conditions to allow social
partner organisations to engage in collective bargaining
or to extend the resulting agreements, making them
generally binding. Another way that legislation can
shape representativeness is by imposing thresholds, in
terms of membership, organisational density, or as
minimum outcomes in elections. There is a great deal of
variation regarding the extent to which legislation can
play a role. In some countries, conformity with legal
requirements is crucial, while in other countries mutual
recognition is more important, or the only basis for
representativeness. 
This section of chapter 1 outlines the two main
principles of legal conformity and mutual recognition,
examines the legislative trends and forms of thresholds,
and summarises the formal and informal criteria that
have been reported as articulating with the main
principles. It begins by presenting the legal frameworks
regulating representativeness and how they developed
over time. It goes on to consider collective bargaining
regulations and to analyse legislative thresholds for
representativeness. This is followed by a comparison of
countries where mutual recognition is the basis for
representativeness to those countries where
representativeness is more dependent on conformity
with legal requirements, before focusing on
representativeness based on mutual recognition.
Finally, it draws conclusions on the role of both
legislation and mutual recognition for
representativeness.
Legal framework for representativeness
In defining representativeness in 1993 the European
Commission argued that: 
For collective bargaining, in most countries mutual
recognition is the basic mechanism, but additional
formal or legal requirements may have to be fulfilled.
In several countries there are mechanisms (for
example quantitative criteria established by law or
otherwise) to make a distinction between
organisations with (the most) substantial
membership and those which are less representative. 
European Commission, 1993, p.39
Interest representation, the European Commission
acknowledged, may be constituted and measured in
terms of a proportion of a population of employees or
enterprises, but it may also reflect the capacities of the
social partners, and the extent to which these are
acknowledged or recognised by others. 
Today, while employers and unions in certain Member
States still rely upon self-regulation through mutual
recognition to establish representativeness, most have
a legal framework regulating the representativeness of
social partners. In some countries, like Spain, it is
mentioned in the constitution. Some countries have
stable legal settings that were established or finalised as
far back as 40 years ago. This is the case in Belgium
(1968–1972), Spain (1978–1985), Austria (1974), Sweden
(1976–1987), Norway (1958), and largely in Germany
(1949–1990).
Over the last two decades, changes have been
introduced in national legal frameworks. This happened
in Latvia (2014), Hungary (2102), Ireland (2013), Portugal
(2012), Croatia (2012), Greece (2011) and France (2008–
2010 and 2014–2017). In Germany, court decisions have
created firmer criteria on which to judge the
representativeness of agreements. In some countries,
like Poland (2015), clarifications are still taking place.3
Representation is not, however, just a top-down
process. Usually, the organisations that seek to speak
for their members or affiliates must also have secured
recognition or support from non-members as well.
1 Representativeness at
national level
2 Denmark is an example of a country without a legal framework to regulate the representativeness of the social partners, as this is based on mutual
recognition. There is, however, legislation on when and how industrial action can be organised, which has implications for the representative role of trade
unions. Cyprus is another example of a country without legal criteria for representativeness. However, it cannot be said that Cyprus has no legal framework
regarding representativeness: the trade union laws of 1949 include the provision that in order to be allowed to register, each union must have over 20
members, except in cases where fewer than 20 workers are employed in a specific occupation. In addition, the tripartite Labour Advisory Board, which
advises the Minister of Labour on work-related issues, is regulated by a 1960 law (chapter 182 on hours of employment), although no criteria are included
determining who can participate in this.
3 In Poland, the representativeness of social partner organisations is determined by legislation on three levels: the tripartite dialogue at national level; the
sector or multi-company level; and the company level. Debate was followed by changes in 2015 concerning the institution for tripartite dialogue at national
level; the Tripartite Commission for Socio-Economic Affairs was replaced by the Social Dialogue Council, as referred to in the Act of 24 July 2015.
8Mapping interest representation systems across Europe
must involve considering both the formal and informal
mechanisms and processes that lead to exchanges
between the social partners, and the outcomes of the
processes of collective consultation and bargaining that
such involvement brings. 
Focusing first on formal criteria, this part of the report
aims to identify trends in legal framework
developments. For this, Eurofound’s national
correspondents were asked to ‘provide the year and
name of the three main pieces of national labour law
that refer to representativeness (or to its alternative
notion) in employment relations’. Following this, the
body of 75 laws referred to by the correspondents was
analysed, with the aim of answering the following four
questions.
£ Do they provide for the right to form collective
organisations and/or regulations on their
formation?
£ Do they focus on the conditions for participating in
tripartite arrangements?
£ Do they primarily describe collective bargaining or
consultative arrangements that include employee
representatives?
£ Do they lay down in law or labour codes detailed
criteria that employer organisations or trade unions
should fulfil in order to gain the advantages of
representative status?
It must be stressed that the correspondents were only
asked to identify what they saw to be the three most
relevant laws. In cases where their text commentaries
referred to other significant pieces of legislation, that
information was also included. Some correspondents
only listed one or two laws. They were not asked for a
complete history of labour law, merely a heuristic
overview of the key laws on interest representation.4
An overview of this historical and content analysis is
presented in Table 1 below. This table does not claim to
contain all laws related to representativeness, only
The concept of representativeness at national, international and European level
4 This report does not set out to include all laws regulating aspects of representativeness; it only indicates different ways in which legal frameworks define
representativeness. A more complete overview of changes in labour law can be found in Clauwert and Schömann (2012).
Table 1: Legislation affecting representativeness in EU Member States, 1946–2015   
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents, February 2015 
Laws and roles on
forming collective
organisations
Legislation on tripartite
representativeness
Regulation regarding collective
bargaining or consultation of
worker representatives
Recognition criteria or
thresholds determining
representativeness
1946–1952 FI  1946
LU 1948
DE 1949
CY 1949
CY 1960 IE 1946 BE 1952
1968–1980 IT 1970
NL 1970
SE 1976
BE 1972 BE 1968
NL 1971
AT 1974
ES 1978, 1980
1985–1995 ES 1987
EL 1990
LT 1991
UK 1992
HU 1990
CZ 1995
DE 1990
HU 1992
EE 1993
ES 1985
LT 1992
SI 1993
1998–2007 UK 1999
EE 2002
FI 2007
LV 1998
HR 1999
NL 2000
MT 2001, 2002
PL 2001
SK 2007
EL 1999   
UK 1999
FI 2001    
IT 2001
LT 2002
CZ 2006   
SI 2006
IE 2006
LV 1999, 2001
PL 2000
RO 2003
LU 2004, 2005
2008–2015 EL 2011
SL 2013
HU 2011
RO 2013
NL 2015
HU 2009   
DE 2009
SK 2011   
EL 2011
PT 2012   
DE 2012
HR 2012  
PT 2012
SK 2013   
IE 2013
DE 2015
FR 2008, 2010
RO 2011
BG 2012 
HU 2012
HR 2014  
PT 2014 
LV 2014 
9those indicated by Eurofound’s national
correspondents as being mostly relevant to the concept
of representativeness at national level.
The most significant pieces of legislation, as identified
by the correspondents, are mainly concentrated within
four periods: the years following the Second World War
(1946–1952); the period of industrial unrest in western
Europe (1968–1980); political change in Central and
Eastern Europe (1986–1995); and one long period
marked by decentralisation, which can be separated
into before (1998–2007) the Great Recession and after it
(2008–2015).
Legal changes have affected some of the strong ‘mutual
recognition’ countries and all of the strong ‘legal
conformity’ countries. Between 1999 and 2001, the UK,
Italy and Finland all introduced measures that framed
collective bargaining rights slightly more specifically;
while between 2003 and 2015, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Romania and Slovakia all tightened
their legal frameworks. Overall, countries with
representativeness based on mutual recognition are
less likely to have experienced recent changes to the
legal contexts of representativeness than those for
whom representativeness is strongly based on legal
conformity.
The most recent period stands out (2008–2015), with a
particularly high density of significant legal measures on
interest representation being reported since 2011.
Between 1998 and 2015, most changes to legal
frameworks for representativeness were reported from
Member States that joined the EU after 2004.
Representativeness in legislation on
collective bargaining 
In some countries, the legislator has taken on the
responsibility of deciding which organisations may
participate in collective bargaining and the mechanisms
by which collective agreements are deemed to cover
groups of workers and employers. The principle of
conforming to the law confers representative status and
the rules by which it is achieved on the partners or on
the agreements they reach. Whether or not a social
partner in a particular workplace or sector, or at
national level, is considered to be a useful and effective
interlocutor by another social partner is largely
irrelevant from this perspective. A subjective judgment
cannot influence the achievement of ‘representative’
status, which may allow the organisation to sign a
collective bargaining agreement, or to get such an
agreement extended. 
Table 7 in annex 2 summarises the national
correspondents’ reports of legislation that directly or
indirectly provide a procedural basis for collective
bargaining by the social partners. It suggests that,
before 1989, making detailed demands on the social
partners to ‘prove their credentials’ was a rare
occurrence. Subsequently, the practice has become
more common. This trend has reflected the redesign of
industrial relations systems in the Central and Eastern
European Member States, and the ‘perforations’ or
‘pull-downs’ of sectoral agreements referred to by
Marginson (2015). In particular, it reflects a response to
unease expressed by some employers at the traditional
extension of collective bargaining agreements to cover
employers (and workers) who were not directly involved
in or who did not mandate the negotiators.
The reports of Eurofound’s national correspondents on
key legislation on representativeness for collective
bargaining suggest the following trends.
There is a high rate of recent change.5 Eleven national
correspondents reported that between 1999 and 2015,
one or more of the most relevant legal measures
affecting ‘representativeness’ were enacted. In a further
nine countries, new legal measures had affected
‘collective bargaining capacity’. 
The extension of sector agreements based on sector-
wide collective bargaining legitimacy appears to be
coming under threat. In Greece, for example, there used
to be a requirement that for a collective agreement to
be extended, the employer signatories should cover
over 51% of those employed in the sector. In 2011, it
was decided that agreements would no longer be
extended at all; only members of the signatory
employer organisations would be covered.6 In 2015, the
Greek coalition government promised to restore the
earlier legislative framework that permitted the
extension of agreements; however, at time of
publication of this report (in 2016), this has yet to take
place. In Portugal, the economic adjustment
programme brought the requirement in 2012 that
extensions can only be requested when the employers
organise half of all employers in a sector, making
extensions less likely. In June 2014, this criterion was
altered; now, extensions can be requested if SMEs make
up 30% of the members of an employer organisation
signing the agreement.7
Representativeness at national level
5 Eurofound’s national correspondents were asked, in question two of the questionnaire, to provide three main pieces of national labour law referring to
representativeness in employment relations. The possibility that more recent changes occurred here first, and were thus more likely to be reported than
earlier changes, cannot be excluded.
6 In the context of the economic adjustment programme agreed with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary
Fund.
7 This means that most sector agreements now meet the conditions for extension, as 99% of firms in Portugal are SMEs. See: European Semester Country
report 2016, p.33-footnote 12, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_portugal_en.pdf
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New conditions of representativeness are appearing.
The Italian legislation of 2001 represented the first time
any numerical indicator of representativeness entered
Italian law. Its 5% threshold was extended to the whole
private sector by social partner agreements in 2011 and
2014. This followed the withdrawal of car company Fiat
from the employer federation in 2010 and its move
towards bargaining exclusively at company division or
plant level. In Germany, the 1990 Reunification Act
confirmed how judicial endorsement of ‘collective
bargaining capacity’ is shaped by ‘social strength’,
measured by a wide and case-by-case set of variables.
But there is now a clear shift towards a more
numerically-based concept of representativeness. In
2009, 2012 and 2015, with a new law of that year, a
‘streamlining’ of collective bargaining agreements has
taken place: employers are now only required to
implement the ‘majority’ agreement.
Decentralisation of bargaining appears to be
undermining some earlier sectoral arrangements. The
2013 ‘unconstitutional’ ruling in Ireland on the
requirement of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 that
registered agreements should be negotiated by
‘substantially representative’ social partners opens the
door to potentially ‘unrepresentative’ agreements at
workplace level. The 2015 German reform may enable
employers to pick and choose which agreements they
wish to apply at workplace level.
The concept of representativeness at national, international and European level
Table 2: Representativeness in collective bargaining legislation, 1946–2015   
Year Country Legislation Criteria for collective bargaining
1946 Ireland Industrial Relations Act, 1946 Social partners must be ‘substantially representative’ of workers and
employers when registering employment agreements.
1968 Belgium Law on collective labour
agreements CAO-CCT 
Capacity to make lasting commitments; mandates from members before
signing; the results of the four-yearly social elections in companies with
more than 50 workers, which determine the recognition of their
representativeness at national level, and hence their acceptance at sectoral
level. Extended to enterprise level in 1972.
1971 Netherlands Wage Act 
(Wet op de loonvorming)
Specifying the social partners who would contribute to discussions on wage
setting within the tripartite Social Economic Council. When social partners
file a request for extension of a sector collective agreement, the employers
that are party to the agreement have to employ 55% or more of the
employees in the sector.
1974 Austria Labour Constitution Act
(Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz), in
particular §4
Capacity preconditions: independence; extensive occupational and
territorial membership coverage; major economic importance in terms of
the absolute number of members and business activities in order to be in a
position to wield effective bargaining power.
1978 Spain Constitution ‘Most representative trade union organisations’ cover minimum of 10% of
elected workers’ delegates and works council members at national level or
15% at regional level; other unions are ‘representative’ if within a specific
sector they meet those criteria. ‘Most representative’ employers cover 10%
of employers and workers nationally, or 15% regionally; ‘representative’
employers meet these criteria at sector level and can sign sector
agreements.
1980 The Statute of Worker’s Rights
(Articles 87 and 88 and the 6th
additional disposition Royal
Decree 2/2015 statute of
workers’ rights) is the reference
norm in Spanish collective
bargaining.
1985 Organic Law of Trade Union
Freedoms 
1990 Germany Reunification Treaty ‘Collective bargaining capacity’ (Tariffähigkeit) is grounded in the 1949
Constitution (freedom of coalition) and the Collective Bargaining Act from
1949. But it is detailed in case law, where judges apply the term
‘representative’ to collective agreements rather than to the actors
concluding them. In September 2012 the Federal Labour Court determined
that sectoral agreements covering more than half of all employees of a
sector were ‘representative’. The acknowledged capacity to bargain
therefore rests on various social and political indicators, including the
criterion of social strength (Soziale Mächtigkeit). This is needed to bring the
other social partners to the bargaining table and to guarantee the
enforcement of agreements. It can be proven by information on
membership figures and organisational and administrative capacity. Other
criteria are: compliance with the law; voluntary membership; internal
democracy; financial independence; and multi-organisation membership.
The criterion of social strength is not applied to employer associations;
neither is there a minimum number of affiliates required.
1999 UK Employment Relations Act Statutory trade union recognition provisions establish trade union
‘recognition’ by an employer (usually leading to collective bargaining) where
40% participate in the vote and a majority vote in favour.
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Year Country Legislation Criteria for collective bargaining
2001 Italy Legislative Decree no.165/2001 Unions can participate in national collective negotiations in public
administration (such as those working in universities or the healthcare
sector) if they have 5% of representativeness (an average of the membership
numbers and of the votes that each union had in the election of RSU). This
test was extended by agreement to the private sector in FA 2011 and TU 2014
by the three major union confederations and Confindustria, such that the
extension of a sector agreement now requires a minimum of 51%
(in membership and in votes).
Finland Employment Contracts Act
(55/2001) 
‘The employer shall observe at least the provisions of a national collective
agreement considered representative in the sector in question (generally
applicable collective agreement) on the terms and working conditions of the
employment relationship that concern the work the employee performs or
nearest comparable work.’ Practice is that ‘representative of a sector’ means
about one-half of the employees in the sector work for affiliated employers
to ensure the ‘normal applicability’ (extension) of the agreement. The
‘representativeness’ needed for a collective agreement to be generally
applicable is determined by a commission under the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health. Decisions can be appealed to the Labour Court. 
2006 Ireland Employees (Provision of
Information and Consultation)
Act
Employee threshold of 10% of workforce for representation to come into
effect in respect of negotiations with an employer.
Slovenia The Collective Agreements Act
(Zakon o kolektivnih pogodbah –
ZKP, Ur.l.RS, no. 43/06)
Regulates social partners, content and procedure for signing collective
agreements, its form, validity and termination, settlement of collective
labour disputes and the registering of collective agreements; it differentiates
between representative and non-representative signatories. 
Czech Republic 2006: Act no. 262/2006 Coll.,
Labour Code
When extending high-level collective agreements, social partners have to
meet the quantitative criteria of representativeness that also apply to
participation in the national tripartite organisation, where the law uses both
quantitative and qualitative conditions. The conditions for unions are:
collective bargaining practice; independence; no political activities; uniting
at least three unions from different sectors; nationwide scope; and having at
least 150,000 members. Only trade unions have the right to conclude a
collective agreement. For employer associations, the conditions are similar
except that they must represent affiliated firms with at least 400,000
employees.
2009 Germany Posted Workers Act A new concept of ‘representative agreements’ (repräsentativer Tarifvertrag)
appears. The ‘representativeness’ of a collective agreement can now be
proved by the coverage rate of workers in member companies of the
employer organisation and by the trade union membership figures in the
sector. 
Hungary Act LXXIV on the sectoral
dialogue committees and on
certain questions of mezzo level
social dialogue
Extensions of collective agreements can be applied for by representative
employer associations determined by their number of affiliates, their
economic importance and the number of employees covered. At workplace
level, unions have to demonstrate 10% density to participate in collective
bargaining.
2011 Slovakia Act No. 341/2011, Labour Code.
Applicable only between
September 2011 and December
2012.
A law lasting only a year before it was repealed stated that in order to
conclude a collective agreement covering all employees at an establishment
or in a sector, on request of the management, the trade union(s) should
provide evidence that at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit
were organised by the trade union(s). This provision is no longer in force
since the beginning of 2013.
Greece Law 4024/2011, Article 37 –
‘Collective bargaining
regulations’
The 51% employee coverage requirement for collective agreement
extension was abolished in 2011. Since 2011, only employers who are
members of the signatory employer association have to apply an agreement.
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Legislative thresholds determining
representativeness 
In some countries, securing representative status led to
the social partner being acknowledged as a competent
collective bargaining partner at national or sector level;
and in some countries it was either that
acknowledgement or the gaining of that status in
respect of collective bargaining that permitted the
relevant organisation to participate in tripartite bodies.
Having access to (bi-partite) collective bargaining is of
course different to obtaining membership in tripartite
bodies. Both outcomes of representativeness can be
granted on different criteria, or on similar criteria in
different legal sources.8
Thresholds are usually required regarding the following.
£ Employer coverage: The percentage of employees
or firms covered within a sector by the members of
the employer associations signing the agreement.9
£ Union elections: The union election results in works
council or other forms of periodic workplace or
national work-based or insurance-based social
elections. 
£ Union membership or density: In several countries,
legislation specifies a minimum number of trade
union members or employer affiliates, so to make
the data comparable it has been converted into a
density percentage, by dividing the numbers by the
country’s total number of employees.10,11
The concept of representativeness at national, international and European level
Year Country Legislation Criteria for collective bargaining
2012 Portugal Government Resolution 90/2012
(changed in 2014)
Employer associations requesting extension of agreements must have
membership of one-half of all employers in their sector. In June 2014, this
criterion was altered, so that it is now sufficient if SMEs account for 30% of
employer associations signing the agreement.
Croatia Representativeness for
Collective Bargaining
(OG 88/12)
Determines which unions are entitled to bargain and conclude collective
agreements. A union is only representative if its membership makes up at
least 20% of the unionised employees, to whom the agreement will apply,
either in a single company or organisation or in an industry. Where unions
cover a specific occupation, the membership threshold is 40% of the
unionised employees. 
Germany Public Procurement Act of
North-Rhine Westphalia 
The representativeness of collective agreements in public local passenger
transport is to be based on the membership figures of the collective
bargaining partners and only the agreement concluded by the largest trade
union and employer organisation are considered ‘representative’. The act
also stipulates that the labour minister may decide on the
representativeness of given agreements by ministerial directive with advice
from a consulting committee of trade union and employer representatives. 
2013 Ireland Court judgment ‘Substantially representative’ aspects of 1946 act (above) are ruled
‘unconstitutional’.
2015 Germany Act on Collective Bargaining
Unity (Tarifeinheitsgesetz)
In the case of competing agreements, only the agreement of the majority
union shall be applied and its representativeness shall be proved by
membership figures. From 2009, 2012 and with the new 2015 legislation, a
streamlining of collective bargaining agreements is taking place. Employers
are no longer required to implement the ‘majority agreement’.
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents 
8 In Spain, the Law of Trade Union Freedom says in Article 3 that ‘most representative trade unions are entitled to: a) have institutional representation with
the public administration at both national and regional level; and b) conclude collective agreements. For employer organisations, the Statute of Workers
Right (Royal Decree 2/2015) establishes that those employer organisations that cover a minimum of 10% of employers and 10% of workers at national level
will be able to have institutional representation (6th Additional disposition Royal Decree 2/2015 Statute of Workers Right); and that those employer
organisations that in a particular sector cover a minimum of 10% of employers and 10% of workers in the sector at national level or 15% of employers and
15% of workers of the sector at regional level will be entitled to conclude collective bargaining (Article 87 Royal Decree 2/2015 Statute of Workers Right).
9 The pre-2011 Greek law specifying that for extension, 51% of the employees covered should be affiliates of the signatory employer association, is not
included here. This is because the 2015 government promised to restore this situation, but, at the time of publication of this report in 2016, this had not yet
happened. The German 50% coverage for employers reported was a court decision concerning the construction sector. 
10 The number of employees was provided by Eurofound’s national correspondents.
11 A 2011 law in Slovakia specifying 30% trade union density for representativeness was repealed in 2013. Thus Slovakia has been omitted from the graph. The
UK 25% figures reflect the requirement where there is a legal ballot for trade union recognition in a single workplace or company, half of the workforce must
vote, and those in favour must win a majority.
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Figure 1 shows these three main measures articulated in
the labour laws or custom and practice of the 22
countries that have minimum thresholds for the
representativeness or recognition of trade unions or for
the extension of collective agreements.12
Specific thresholds are less common for employers than
for the trade unions Where thresholds for employers do
exist, they are either a requirement legitimating the
extension of collective agreements beyond the
immediate signatories to all firms within the sector, or a
threshold permitting access to tripartite bodies.
It is also important to recall that many of the countries
where there is no legal threshold do, in practice, use
‘social strength’ – and in particular trade union density –
as an implicit indicator of representativeness. These
tend to be the higher union density, strongly mutual
recognition countries such as Cyprus, Denmark, Norway
and Sweden.
Different thresholds covering the status of a
‘representative social partner’ or the ‘legitimate
extension’ of a collective agreement may be required for
peak-level and sector-level social partners. Table 3
summarises the threshold information provided by the
national correspondents, who refer to social partner
representativeness at peak (P), sector (S), regional (R)
and workplace (W) levels. 
Representativeness at national level
12 Where two threshold levels are mentioned, the lower one is shown in the graph. Thus in Slovenia, peak-level representativeness for trade unions has a 10%
threshold (graphed) while at sector level this is 15%. 
Figure 1: Minimum thresholds (%) for representativeness    
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Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents (February–May 2015) 
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Table 3: Formal representativeness thresholds of coverage, density and membership numbers
at different levels   
Latest
law Country
Employers Unions
Coverage % Numbers Coverage % Numbers
1949 Cyprus 20
1985 Spain 10 (P) 15 (S/R) 10 (P) 15 (S/R)
1993 Slovenia 10 (P) 15 (S)
Estonia (50 13) 5
1999 Latvia 50 (S)
UK half of 40% (W)
2000 Poland 300,000 (P) 10 (S) 300,000 (P), 10,000 (S)
Netherlands 55 (S)
2001 Italy 5 (S)
Finland 50 (S) 50 (S)
2003 Romania 7 (P) 10(S) 5 (P) 7(S)
2004 Luxembourg 20 (P) elections, 10 (S) 
2006 Czech Republic 150,000 (P)
Ireland 10 (W)
2007 Malta 50 (W) 14,15
Slovakia 100,000 (P) 100,000 (P)
2008
2010
2015
France 8 (S & P) 8 (P & S)
10 (W)
2009 Belgium 125,000 (P)
2011 Greece* (51 (S)) 60 (W) 16
Romania 50 (W)
2012 Portugal 50 (S/R)
Croatia 20 (S)
Bulgaria 100,000 (P) 75,000 (P)
Hungary 10 (P)
Germany** 50 (S) 50 (S)
2014 Croatia 100,000 (P) 50,000 (P)
Portugal 30 (S/R)
13 In a not yet adopted proposal from 2015, a new collective employment relations reform is proposed, addressing the issue of representativeness of employer
associations that can conclude extended collective agreements. The proposed reform states that extended collective agreements can only be concluded by
employer associations that represent at least one-half of the employers active in the sector where the collective agreement is concluded or by employer
association representing employers that employ at least one-half of the employees to whom the collective agreement applies. As of 2016, this proposal is
still on hold, and thus has not yet been adopted.
14 In Malta, workplace level representativeness takes the form of collective bargaining by the trade union which is given recognition by the employer on the
basis that its membership comprises more than 50% of the workforce. However, in some corporations some categories of workers have won the right to be
represented exclusively. For example at Air Malta workers are represented by four unions, namely: General Workers’ Union, Airline Pilots Association Malta,
Union of Cabin Crew, Association of Airline Engineers. At the workplace level there have been cases where two trade unions claim majority of membership.
The latest dispute of this kind was between the GWU and the Malta Union of Bank Employees over representation at the Bank of Valletta. As there are no
clear provisions in the law about the right of representativeness, these litigations take time to be settled. The practice being used lately is a verification
exercise conducted by the Director of the Industrial and Employment Relations. The case of the University of Malta in 2004 was referred to the Industrial
Tribunal as the newly established University of Malta Academic Staff (UMASA) requested to have sole representation for academic staff at the University. The
Malta Union of Teachers (MUT) objected to this request as it claimed that it has higher number of members at the Junior College which forms part of the
University. The Industrial Tribunal in 2007 ruled that both unions should conduct collective bargaining jointly.
15 The table includes in principle only ‘Formal’ legal requirements. As in the UK, Malta operates a mutual recognition system that assumes the employer will
recognise the union when it has membership of half or more of the workers – but it is mutual recognition, not a legal obligation.
16 In 2011 the then Greek government introduced the concept of an ‘association of persons’ which, where they represented 60% of the workforce, could
negotiate a workplace collective agreement on terms that derogated from the sector agreement.
Notes: P=peak; S=sector; R=regional; W=workplace. * 2015 Greek government policy is to restore capacity to extend collective agreements where
51% of employees are covered by the employer signatories within a sector. ** The German Federal Labour Court found that in the construction
sector, collective agreements were ‘representative’ if they were negotiated by bodies covering half or more of the employees concerned. Country
shading: Strongly mutual recognition countries are shaded in yellow; strongly legal conformity countries are shaded in green.
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents
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More detailed descriptions of the thresholds and other
requirements for general ‘representativeness’,
‘collective bargaining legislation’, ‘collective rights’ and
access to ‘tripartite arrangements’ are provided in
annex 2.
Analysis of the changing legal context shows that the
bulk of changes referred to took place recently. Only
one of the detailed threshold specifications referred to
was located in the decade following the Second World
War. Only one correspondent (for Spain) referred back
to legislative changes in the 1970s – a decade of
industrial action. Only the correspondent for Slovenia
considered it relevant to refer back to the period post-
1989, when the command economies of Central and
Eastern Europe established new political and social
arrangements. 
In seven countries, the national correspondents referred
to laws passed since 1999, giving weight to the
argument that stability in representative arrangements
has given way to instability for a significant number of
EU Member States. In two countries, recent changes
may limit the ease with which collective agreements can
be extended to all employers and employees in the
sector. In Portugal the employers must, since 2014, have
affiliates of 30% of the SMEs in the sector before the
agreement can be extended. In Croatia, for proof of
union membership, peak unions now require employers
to list the numbers of employees who have instructed
them to deduct union dues from their pay. Reaching
agreement in decentralised bargaining has also been
made more difficult in Hungary (where membership
numbers have replaced electoral support as the
measure of representativeness) and in Romania (where
the membership density threshold has been raised from
33% to 50%).
Representativeness at national level
Table 4: Legislation with thresholds for representativeness, 1952–2014   
Year Country Legislation Criteria for representativeness
1949 Cyprus ‘Trade Union Law (1949)’ The only statutory regulation that might be considered as establishing
criteria of representativeness is the obligation for trade unions to be
registered with the Trade Union Registrar. After submitting a special
application for registration, each union is obliged to register with this
registrar within 30 days from the date it is established. In order to register,
each union must have over 20 members, except for cases where fewer than
20 workers are employed in a specific occupation. Registration became
mandatory in the third of a series of Trade Union Laws, passed in 1949. This
is more about legal registration – it is used by unions to protect their legal
position – than criteria for representativeness.
1952 Belgium Foundation Law of the National
Labour Council (Conseil
National du Travail/National
Arbeidsraad, CNT/NAR)
This relates to national organisations with at least an average of 50,000
paying members (raised to 125,000 in 2009) over the previous four years;
being multi-occupational, covering more than one-half of occupations in the
private and public sector. 
The most representative trade unions meet these four criteria:
£ national and multi-sectoral;
£ representing an absolute majority of the sectors and categories of
workers in private and public sectors that cover at least one-half the
workforce;
£ having at least 125,000 paying members among affiliated and associated
organisations;
£ having as a statutory objective to defend the interests of workers.
2009 Law of 30/12/2009
1993 Slovenia Representativeness of Trade
Union Act (Zakon o
reprezentativnosti sindikatov)
Trade union criteria established: democratic character; at least six months;
independence from state bodies and employers; own funding; and
quantitative thresholds stipulated by the Ministry of Labour – 15% workers
per trade, industry or occupation or workers per firm or, for multi-
occupational trade union (confederation, federation), 10% workers per
trade, industry or occupation.
1999 Latvia Employer Organisations and
their Associations Law
Organisations can sign binding sectoral agreements if they employ over 50%
of employees or provide over 60% of turnover.
2000 Estonia Trade Unions Act According to the Trade Unions Act, a trade union can be founded  by five
employees, a federation of trade unions by five trade unions and a
confederation by five nationwide trade unions.17 There is no criteria set for
employer associations. (The requirement for the establishment of a trade
union is more linked to the legal status of trade unions than to their
representativeness.)
17 This requirement for the establishment of a trade union is, however, linked more to the legal status of trade unions and is not so much about their
representativeness. 
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Year Country Legislation Criteria for representativeness
2000 Poland Labour Code Art. 241(17),
Labour Code of 1974, Art.
241(17), 2000; Act on the
Tripartite Commission for
Socio-Economic Affairs and on
voivodship social dialogue
commissions, Art. 6, 2001.
Trade unions are representative if they are representative for the Tripartite
Commission (‘more than 300,000 member employees and which operates in
economic entities whose core activity is specified in more than half of the
sections of the Polish Classification of Activities (PKD)’; have 10% or more of
all the employees covered and less than 10,000 members; have highest
number of members covered by a given multi-employer agreement. 
2001 Latvia Labour Law A social partner is representative for more than their own members if: it
performs the same activity; is recognised as a leader and by reputation; its
members make up a significant proportion of the whole group, or produce a
significant share; it has the capacity to do so; it is independent.
2003 Romania Labour Code – Law no. 53/2003 Trade unions must have at least 5% of the employed workforce for peak
representativeness, 7% at sector level and at company and workplace level
at least one-third of the total number of employees; organisational and
financial independence; confirmed by a court decision and valid for four
years. Peak employers must cover 7% of all (non-state) employees and 10%
of sector employers.
2004 Luxembourg Collective Employment
Relationships Act 
At national level, trade unions must have won at least an average of 20% of
the votes within the Chamber of Employees at the latest social elections,
and must be able to prove effective activity in the majority of the economic
branches of the country. 
At sectoral level, trade unions are considered representative as soon as they
are powerful in a significant sector; that is, a sector that employs at least
10% of the private employees of the country. They also have to provide
candidates at Chamber of Employees’ elections and gain at least 50% of the
votes of workers who are intended to be totally covered by the CBA or 50%
of the votes at the occasion of the elections of staff delegations in the
relevant sector.
2007 Slovakia Act No. 103/2007 on tripartite
consultations at the national
level and amendments to some
acts (Tripartite Act)
Representatives of social partners on the HSR are nominated by
‘representative organisations’ of employers and of employees.
Representative employer associations unite employers from several sectors
or employers active at least in five (out of eight) regions (higher territorial
units – VUC) and employ at least 100,000 employees. Representative trade
unions have at least 100,000 members in several sectors. Social partners
may be required to provide evidence on their representativeness by the
government or by another social partner.
2008 France LOI no. 2008-789 du 20 août
2008 portant rénovation de la
démocratie sociale et réforme
du temps de travail [Law on the
renewal of social democracy
and reform of working time]
Seven criteria established: respecting republican values; independence; two
years’ existence; number of members relative to other unions; trade union
influence; financial transparency; scores in elections. Trade unions have to
obtain 10% of the ballot votes at the company level; 8% of the ballots vote;
and to have a balanced territorial presence at the sector level; 8% of the
ballots votes and to have a balanced sectoral presence (in industry, services,
building, trade, for example) at the multi-sector national level. 
Similar criteria are laid down for employer associations without the electoral
criteria.
2010 LOI no. 2010-1215 du 15 octobre
2010 complétant les
dispositions relatives à la
démocratie sociale issues de la
loi no. 2008-789 du 20 août 2008
[Law supplementing the
provisions relating to social
democracy from Law No. no.
2008-789 of 20 August 2008]
2011 Romania Law on Social Dialogue no.
62/2011
Threshold for workplace/company representative status raised to 50% of
employees (from 33%). It was reported that only a few trade unions have so
many members, and subsequently ‘a number of 458 trade union
organisations were unable to require representative status’ in accordance
with the new conditions in the 2011 legislative reform.
At national peak level, trade unions need to have at least 5% of the
workforce as members, and employer organisations need to have member
companies with a total employment of 7% of the workforce. At sector level,
this is 7% for trade unions and 10% for employer organisations.
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Legal conformity versus mutual
recognition
The first open question put to Eurofound’s national
correspondents asked them to describe in their ‘own
words the meaning of the concept of representativeness
or indicate the alternative concept that is relevant in
their country of origin and that deals with the social
recognition or social significance and weight of
collective organisations (e.g. mutual recognition,
election results, membership, mandate)’.
Their responses range across a spectrum running from
an informal process of mutual recognition by the social
partners, with little or no legal underpinning, through to
systems that incorporate more legal conditions and can
even appear flexible, to those where formal legal
requirements specify the preconditions for participation
in collective bargaining and binding collective
agreements.
This information is complemented by answers to a
closed question that requested estimates (as explained
earlier) of the relative importance of different factors in
determining the representativeness of certain industrial
relations approaches. Two of the variables were:
‘conformity with legal requirements’, and ‘mutual
recognition’ by the ‘other side’ of the industry of the
benefits of information exchange, consultation or
bargaining. By averaging the two estimates made for
employer organisations (at peak and sector levels) and
for trade unions (at peak, sector and workplace levels)
and then by subtracting the score of ‘legal conformity’
(column C) countries from the ‘mutual recognition’
scores (column B) , a scale was produced (column D)
running from +4 (‘mutual recognition’ is the most
important and ‘mutual recognition’ is not relevant) to -4
(‘legal conformity’ is the most important and ‘mutual
recognition’ is not relevant), as shown in Table 5.
Representativeness at national level
Year Country Legislation Criteria for representativeness
2012 Bulgaria Labour Code (Articles 34, 35, 36) Representative trade unions shall: have over 75,000 members; be present in
25% of sectors with minimum of five members or have 50 affiliates with
minimum of five members from different sectors; represent staff in 25% or
more of local authorities; have a national governing body; be registered as a
non-profit association; have been in existence for three years. Members of
representative employer associations shall employ 100,000 workers or more
(up from 30,000) and be represented in 25% of sectors, with 5% or more in
each sector or a minimum of 10 employers in each. Other criteria are similar
to those for the unions. Representativeness is recognised for four years.
Hungary Act I of 2012 on Labour Code Replaces earlier measure of electoral support in works council elections by a
minimum 10% union membership density threshold.
2014 Croatia Representativeness of Employer
Associations and Trade Unions
(OG 93/14)
Trade union confederations must have 50,000+ members in affiliated
organisations, with at least five unions operating in different sectors, and be
present in at least four regions. They must have offices and employ at least
five workers. Lists of numbers of members signed by the trade union must
be supplied. Employer associations must: have been registered for six
months; bring together 3,000 employers or have affiliated employers
employing at least 100,000 workers; have at least five employer affiliates in
different sectors; have at least four regional offices; and employ at least five
members of staff.
Latvia Trade Union Law Government recognition to be given to those trade unions that have the
highest numbers of members.
Portugal Government Resolution 90/2014 Employer associations requesting extension of agreements must have
membership of one-half of all employers or over 30% of all SMEs in sector.
2015 Netherlands Act on Administrative Extension
and Non-extension of Collective
Labour Agreements (Wet AVV)
The extension of collective agreements has been regulated since the 1937
Act on Administrative Extension and Non-extension of Collective Labour
Agreements (Wet AVV). The revised version of this AVV law that entered into
force in July 2015 aims to avoid periods with no collective agreement, when
delays occur in the renewal or renegotiation of existing agreements.
Membership density plays a role in the extension of collective agreements,
but in a very specific (indirect) way. When social partners file a request for
extension of a sector collective agreement, the employers that are party to
the agreement have to employ 55% or more of the employees in the sector.
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents
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From these ratings given by Eurofound’s national
correspondents, the following observations may be
made.
The 11 stronger ‘mutual recognition’ countries at the
top of the table (with average ratings for mutual
recognition at least one point greater than for legal
conformity) tend to display higher average levels of
trade union density (41%) than the seven stronger ‘legal
conformity’ countries at the bottom (14%). At the same
time, there is very considerable variation in trade union
density across the ‘mutual recognition’ highly rated
countries, ranging from below 20% (Portugal and Spain)
to around 70% (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). As
such, the average figure for this group is to be taken
with caution. Across the countries with
representativeness rated more exclusively on legal
conformity, trade union density varies much less,
between 8% for France and 18% for Germany. 
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Table 5: Relative importance of mutual recognition and legal conformity (based on one expert opinion per country) 
Relative importance of
mutual recognition and
conformity to legal criteria
Trade union density
(% of employees)
Threshold present
Representation Extension
DK In these 11 countries, the
national correspondents
scored mutual recognition as
being more important for
representativeness than
conformity to legal criteria.
69
UK 26 (TU workplace vote)
ES 17 TU elections, EM coverage
CY 51
AT 33
SE 70
IT 34 TU membership, TU elections TU membership, TU elections
PT 19 EM coverage
FI 75 TU/EM coverage
NL 29 EM coverage
NO 51
SI In these 11 countries, the
national correspondents’
scores gave mutual
recognition and conformity to
legal criteria a similar level of
importance for
representativeness.
23 TU density
HR 17 TU/EM coverage + membership
EE 11 EM coverage (proposal 2014)
LT 8
LU 33 TU elections
MT 50 TU membership
IE 28 TU membership
LV 6 EM coverage
BE 66 TU/EM membership, TU elections
EL 28 EM coverage (annulled 2011)
HU 10 TU membership EM coverage
PL In these seven countries, the
national correspondents’
scores gave conformity to legal
criteria greater importance for
representativeness than
mutual recognition.
17 TU membership
BG 14 TU/EM membership
DE 18 TU/EM coverage, TU membership
FR 8 TU elections
CZ 10 TU/EM membership
RO 17 TU membership
SK 14 TU membership (annulled 2013)
Notes: The numbers presented in this table are based on one single expert opinion per country. EM=peak and sector employers; TU=peak, sector and
workplace trade unions. Figures on trade union density were provided by Eurofound’s national correspondents. For some Member States, union
density figures shown may vary from those of other sources, which may refer to all workers, rather than employees, or relate to different periods. For
example, according to the ICTWSS, union density in Belgium was 55% in 2013, and according to European Social Survey, it was 48% in 2012.
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents
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The 11 countries where legal conformity and mutual
recognition are scored more or less equally and whose
average trade union density is 25% (varying from less
than 10% for Latvia and Lithuania, to more than 50% in
Belgium and Malta) divide into two groups:
£ those where the national correspondents
considered neither legal conformity nor mutual
recognition to be significant or important
(Luxembourg, Lithuania and Malta); and 
£ those where the national correspondents
considered both mutual recognition and legal
conformity to be important (Belgium, Croatia,
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, and
Slovenia).18
While all the ‘legal conformity’ countries have legal
thresholds determining either whether the social
partners are ‘representative’ or not, or whether or not
the agreements they conclude can be extended to all
firms within the sector or region, this is the case for only
one-half of the ‘mutual recognition’ countries.
Although not shown in this table, it is also worth
commenting that all the ‘legal conformity’ countries
have experienced legal changes to representation since
1998, while this is the case for only three out of the top
11 ‘mutual recognition’ countries.
The data reported in Table 5 indicate a complex mix of
emphasis between elections and density or
membership on the union side, and employee coverage
or employer membership density on the employer side,
when the democratic credentials of the social partners
are being gauged. It bears repeating that these numbers
are based on one single expert opinion per country – the
views of Eurofound’s national correspondents.
In certain countries, the reality is too complex to be
presented by the national averages across all levels and
both social partners in Table 5. Responses for the social
partners at peak levels may be slightly or totally
different to those for social partners at sector levels, and
their significance may vary between the employers and
the unions. Analysis of the reports of national experts
suggests that assessments of the significance of these
two principles for representativeness between
employers and trade unions are very similar, across
different countries. Ratings for peak employers are very
similar to those for sectoral employers, with more
differences being shown between peak-level and sector-
level trade unions, as discussed further below. 
Despite such similarities, major differences occur across
three Member States, making it difficult to indicate
clearly which is the ‘dominant’ country principle –
mutual recognition or legal conformity. In Germany,
mutual recognition is rated ‘most important’ for the
unions and employers at sector level, but it is irrelevant
for both at peak level, because sector-level collective
bargaining is dominant. In Luxembourg, legal
conformity is ‘most important’ for the peak trade unions
but ‘irrelevant’ at the other levels of employer–
employee interaction.
Mutual recognition
Instead of the state determining which organisations
may negotiate and sign binding agreements, mutual
recognition involves self-regulation by the social
partners. Mutual recognition is a relationship that
matures incrementally over time. The perception of
other social partner organisations as useful and
effective interlocutors can be the basis of mutual
recognition, although it can also be simply the
consequence of the need of a counterpart to engage in
social dialogue or collective bargaining. Legitimate or
‘mutually recognised’ trade unions and employer
associations create their own institutional fora, within
which they collectively bargain or consult on issues of
mutual interest in the employment field. For Hyman
(1997, p. 311) this ‘legitimacy’ is partly about the historic
record of achievement, partly about the strength of the
available ideological resources, and partly about the
capacity of a social partner to inform, explain and win
an argument. 
Membership strength is very important to winning this
argument. Under the mutual recognition principle,
membership numbers are a major means to the end of
securing both the acknowledgement of representative
status and the substantive or procedural improvements
that may follow from concluding collective bargaining
agreements. Yet in the ‘mutual recognition’ countries,
this is not generally a legal requirement. Thus, the main
difference is whether the state or the other social
partner(s) decides most on representativeness.
The national correspondents were asked to rank the
relevance of an understanding of ‘representativeness’
as being ‘mutual recognition’ by the ‘other side’ of
industry regarding the benefits of information
exchange, consultation or bargaining. Analysis of the
national correspondent responses suggests three main
groupings (shown in Figure 17 in annex 3):
£ Thirteen countries (from Hungary to Finland) in
which the national experts consistently rate mutual
recognition as ‘important’ or ‘most important’ for
both peak and sector employer associations and
trade unions.
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18 This is an initial grouping of countries, based on the relevance of legal conformity or mutual recognition. Table 7 adds further factors of representativeness
to the four main models of representativeness. In Table 7, Slovenia is categorised as ‘social partner self-regulation’ (rather than mixed model), and Belgium
is in the state electoral strength model. 
20
£ Nine countries (from Germany to Croatia) that
generally hold the middle ground on the issue of
the mutual recognition principle but where clear
differences, in the assessments of the views of
employer associations and trade unions at peak
and sector level, are likely to appear. 
£ Seven countries (from the Czech Republic to
Lithuania) where the national experts see mutual
recognition  as having little or no relevance for
either trade unions or employer organisations.
But what does ‘mutual recognition’ actually mean? The
key elements described by the 13 national
correspondents who identify mutual recognition as
important or most important in their systems can be
summarised in four points:
£ a relatively low level of state regulation of
employment relations;
£ organisational capacity to act on behalf of a
significant number of social partner organisations
or members;
£ sufficient mutual trust with the other side of
industry to enable collective agreements to be
negotiated and implemented;
£ acknowledgement from the ‘other side’ as having
an equivalent legitimacy as a social actor.
The social partners in ‘strong’ mutual recognition
countries tend to be well embedded, and to possess
organisational coherence and capacity linked to
associational strength and democratically legitimate
forms of policymaking and mandate delivery. These
features are key in determining the role of the other side
of industry in acknowledging representative status;
denial by the other side can even be used as a
sanction.19
The Danish correspondent considers a key element is
the fact that ‘Within the organisations the leaders are
chosen by the members’. The members or affiliates thus
give their negotiators a democratic mandate to make
lasting commitments on their behalf.
The Swedish correspondent considers that 
representativeness mainly means the legitimacy that
arises from custom and practice as well as from the
rate of organisation. This is the case for both
employers’ and employees’ associations and the
practice is based on the mutual recognition of the two
sides.
Both legitimacy and coverage of the organisation are
also emphasised by the Finnish correspondent:
The legitimacy arises from a combination of a variety
of factors, whereof the rate of organisation and
mandate from affiliate and members are among the
most important. Among the peak-level organisations,
a national coverage, encompassing
members/affiliates in the largest and most prominent
sectors, can be seen as a prerequisite.
Mutual recognition usually reflects an understanding of
each other’s capacity to make and keep agreements
between themselves, more than an externally imposed
regulation or formula. The correspondent from Finland
expands the argument:
In the context of the social partners and their ability to
conclude collective agreements, it might be more
relevant to speak of legitimacy, where mandate and
mutual recognition can be seen as the cornerstones.
Hence, legitimacy to a great extent arises from social
dialogue itself. Where the mandate relates to the
formal organisation of the union and rules of internal
democracy, the latter relates to the position of the
organisation in the industrial relations system and the
economy. 
Mutual recognition is also frequently described as being
a key component of a system’s DNA, what could be
described as an ‘industrial relations pathway’. The
Danish correspondent, for example, sees ‘mutual
recognition’ as arising from the processes of
negotiation: ‘Recognition is in principle established the
moment two organisations conclude a collective
agreement’. Arriving at such collective agreements
often involves the prior establishment of trust. 
In the UK, where low levels of trust are widespread
within industrial relations, the national correspondent
indicates that there is significantly less ‘mutuality’
within the award or acknowledgement of ‘mutual
recognition’:
The recognition of unions by employers for collective
bargaining has traditionally been at the discretion of
employers, reflecting factors such as membership
density, industrial pressure exerted by unions and
employer preferences. Hence ‘mutual recognition’ is
the most important factor. Though voluntary
recognition can be withdrawn at any time, it usually
represents a long-term arrangement between the
parties, reflecting the union’s capacity to make
lasting commitments on behalf of employees in the
workplace and giving rise to legitimacy through
custom and practice.’ 
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19 Two unions that broke away from the main Swedish trade union (such as LO) were both refused recognition as legitimate representative organisations by
the employers and by other unions. They are therefore not able to participate in collective bargaining, but are not bound by the industrial peace obligation
it entails.
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Legitimacy arising from custom and practice depends
upon mutual recognition. Custom and practice refers to
the unwritten but respected informal regulations
governing relations between employers and trade
unions and workers. 
Conclusion
Representativeness has various meanings across the 28
Member States and Norway. These meanings depend,
first of all, on which core principle carries the most
weight. Two core principles structure
representativeness systems:
£ Legal conformity: representativeness is shaped by
state regulations that refer to a set of formal
criteria.
£ Mutual recognition: representativeness is
determined by self-regulation of the social partners
on the basis largely of informal criteria.
In practice, few national systems correspond to an
unalloyed form of either mutual recognition or legal
conformity. Most Member States feature a combination
of these principles, applying a mix of both formal and
informal criteria. 
The formal criteria may include one or more of the
following:
£ membership numbers or density for trade unions or
both and numbers of affiliates or share of the sector
employers or of its employees for employer
associations (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia,
Slovakia); 
£ company share of sector turnover, economic
weight (Hungary, Latvia);
£ multi-occupational coverage (Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Luxembourg, Poland); 
£ multi-sector presence (Belgium, Luxembourg);
£ territorial coverage (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain); 
£ electoral success (France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain,
UK); 
£ political values either Democratic (Croatia,
Germany, Latvia, Slovenia) or Republican (France); 
£ financial and organisational independence from
third parties or the other side of industry (Austria,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Romania,
Slovenia,); 
£ material conditions – premises and staff (Croatia);
£ no members from the other side (Germany);
£ length of institutional existence (Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, France, Romania, Slovenia); 
£ official registration (Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, UK).
Informal criteria used may refer to any of the above, but
typically also involve one or more of the following.
£ recognition of ‘leading’ role, ‘reputation’ or
‘influence’ (Cyprus, France, Hungary, Latvia);
£ capacity to reach, sign and implement agreements
(Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden);
£ collective bargaining as a declared objective
(Germany);
£ voluntary membership (Germany);
£ democratic internal structure – in trade unions
(Germany);
£ presence in a significant economic sector
(Luxembourg);
£ existence of mandates from the constituents
(Finland, Italy);
£ ability to influence terms and conditions of
employment or effective activity (Austria, Cyprus,
Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, UK);
£ endorsement of legitimacy by other social partners
(Cyprus, Finland, Hungary);
£ custom and practice (Finland, Sweden, UK).
The full operational definition of representativeness in a
given country thus depends on the articulation between
the two core principles and many formal and informal
criteria. 
Drivers of representativeness
This section of chapter 1 presents other elements that,
according to the national correspondents, drive or
enhance the representativeness of social partner
organisations. These include workplace elections,
membership-based organisational strength and the
capacity to negotiate. This is followed by an exploration
of the consequences of gaining or having representative
status.  
The national correspondents were asked to rate the
meaning of several different drivers for
representativeness on a scale from one to five for
employers and trade unions at national, sector and
local levels. The drivers they rated were: 
£ capacity to mobilise nationally; 
£ capacity to make lasting commitments on behalf of
employers at national level; 
£ transparent financial independence; 
£ electoral success; 
£ mandate from affiliates/members; 
£ legitimacy arising from custom and practice; 
£ capacity to act independently/autonomously.
They were asked to identify any other factors they
considered significant. While this focus on the opinion
of individual experts from each of the 28 EU Member
States and Norway has clear limitations, some tentative
conclusions can be drawn.
Representativeness at national level
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The difference in the meaning of representativeness for
trade unions when compared to employers suggests the
capacity to mobilise is more important for trade unions,
while elections are irrelevant for employer
organisations. Electoral success is only considered
important for representativeness in a small number of
countries, and where this is the case, it is mostly
important at workplace level, as such elections tend to
be organised at that level. When sector level is
compared with peak level, getting a mandate from
affiliates emerges as being more important for
representativeness at sector level. The different
meanings of representativeness in the 28 EU Member
States and Norway can be explained by historical
context, the varying levels at which collective
bargaining takes place in each country and by
organisational density rates.
The previous section distinguished between the
Member States in which the concept of
representativeness mainly relies on mutual recognition
and those that emphasise legal conformity. This section
identifies a number of sub-concepts: electoral strength
(representativeness based on election results),
organisational strength (representativeness based on
membership) and the capacity to negotiate. Following
an analysis of each of these three drivers of
representativeness, this section concludes by
considering how they might be interlinked. 
Electoral strength (representativeness
based on election results)
Representativeness can be based on the results of
employee representation elections in the workplace.
While elections for worker representatives were shown
to contribute to the representativeness of trade unions
in a number of countries, electoral success was not
found to be relevant in most EU Member States.20
Workplace elections were only identified as being
‘significant’, ‘important’ or ‘most important’ for the
unions in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg and France.
From 2017 in these countries, with the exception of
France, they are considered to have little or no
relevance for employers.21
In France, the 2008 reform represented a major shift.
The notion of representativeness moved from a
centralised (top-down) government assessment to a
decentralised one (bottom-up). Unions now have to
exceed electoral thresholds of 10% at company level, or
8% at sector and cross-sector level. Another shift has
been a reduced focus on assessing its ‘genuine’ actions
and presence and a greater focus on the trade unions’
results in the professional elections.22
In Italy, the 2001, 2011 and 2014 laws and subsequent
private sector agreements introducing a 5% minimum
representativeness threshold at sector level mark a shift
towards a more decentralised system. The threshold is
reached by using a formula based on the union’s
average membership across the sector and the
proportion of votes it receives in the elections for
workplace union delegates (rappresentanze sindacali
unitary, RSU).23 It thus combines density measures
(which are returned to below) and electoral audience
measures.
In Spain, the representativeness of the unions relies on
the election results for worker delegates and works
council members at workplace levels. The ‘most
representative’ unions are those that cover a minimum
of 10% of worker delegates and works council members
at national level, or 15% at regional level. 
In Luxembourg, peak trade union representativeness is
ensured when a union exceeds the 20% threshold in the
Chamber of Employees elections; at the sector level
they must still put up candidates in the Chamber of
Employees elections but also garner half of the votes
cast in the representative elections held within the
remit of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The Belgian unions are also subject to the test of
representativeness through special ‘labour’ or ‘social’
elections held every four years. The most recent
elections in 2016, for example, recorded 51% of the
votes going to the Christian trade union confederation,
the ACV-CSC, 35% going to the socialist confederation,
the ABVV-FGTB and 12% to the liberal confederation,
the ACLVB-CGSLB. The outcome of these workplace
elections are important for the trade unions, as
candidates can only stand on an already designated
‘representative’ trade union list.
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20 Q9.6 asked about the relevance of ‘electoral success’ at workplace level to the ‘representativeness’ of the union. In nine of the 29 countries, it was ‘most
important’ or ‘important’; in 15 countries it was ‘irrelevant’ or ‘unimportant’; in four no workplace trade unionism was reported.
21 It should be noted that the most important elections in which the employers voted by direct universal suffrage, the Prud’hommes elections, were suppressed
on 11 December 2014 by the French constitutional court, and replaced by the nomination of employer and employee representatives on the basis of the
representativeness of their organisation. From 2017, French employer associations will have to affiliate 8% of employers within the sector or national
constituency they claim to represent to secure representativeness status.
22 This was challenged locally before the courts on several occasions during the following years, but the Court of Cassation (Cour de Cassation) and the French
constitutional court (Conseil Constitutionnel) confirmed the legislation and thus stabilised the system.
23 Elections for RSU positions were initiated in 1993 following a memorandum of understanding signed on 3 July 1993 (Protocollo d’Intesa) by the unions CGIL,
CISL and the UIL, by Confindustria as employer organisation and by the government.
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Elections are relevant for employers in a few countries
besides France (Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia)
for appointment procedures to secure social partner
delegates in labour courts or arbitration bodies, but
without much relevance for overall representativeness.
Other kinds of ballots, besides those for works council
members and personnel delegates, occur at the
workplace in order to elect representatives to external
bodies. In Germany, where elections to the boards that
run the national social security organisations enable
both employers and unions to draw up lists of
candidates, election procedures are laid down in the
Social Code (IV Sozialgesetzbuch). The representatives
of employers and insured (workers) are elected in free
and secret ballots. The threshold for representation on
the boards of, for example, the public health insurers or
the Federal Employment Agency, is 5% of the votes cast.
But the results, unlike those for the elections of
employment judges in the French Prud’hommes
tribunal system, are not used to help define
representativeness.
The significance of electoral results for
representativeness lies in the outcome of workplace
elections. Electoral thresholds for peak and sector trade
unions, and particularly the recent changes to them, are
indicators of the way legislation may use balloting
procedures to help larger existing trade unions maintain
(and even extend) their representativeness, while for
smaller or newer actors, such thresholds can hinder
them in obtaining ‘representative’ status.
Organisational strength
(representativeness based on
membership)
The capacity of an organisation to represent the
interests of a wider group can depend on its budget, its
human resources in terms of staff, its internal
structures, and its capacity to mobilise and assemble a
mandate from the affiliates. Membership density is a
crucial factor in the representativeness of most social
partner organisations. An organisation’s budget comes
from membership fee income; therefore, the number of
members an organisation has can affect its capacity to
act autonomously and to mobilise. This can be a
relevant factor if several social partner organisations are
competing for members.Organisational weakness or
significant membership decline can have an eroding
impact on representativeness. Finally, the longevity of
being a representative organisation can also enforce
representativeness, as legitimacy arises from custom
and practice.
Membership strength is obviously significant whenever
thresholds have to be reached, but is possibly still more
important when there are no thresholds. This is
because, under the mutual recognition principle,
membership numbers are a means to the end of
securing both the acknowledgement of representative
status and the substantive or procedural improvements
that may follow from concluding collective bargaining
agreements. 
Organisational strength can also be reached through a
capacity to mobilise members, as well as
non-members.24 Trade unions in France for example
find their organisational strength in their capacity to
mobilise (including among non-members) more than in
their membership density.
Membership strength and the capacity to mobilise
appear to be more important in countries where
representativeness emerges with mutual recognition.
Four of the 11 countries rated higher by national
correspondents regarding organisational strength
(mobilisation and membership) – Denmark, Finland,
Portugal and Sweden – also appear among the 10
strongest countries regarding mutual recognition
(Table 5), while only one of them (the Czech Republic)
appears among the seven countries that are strongest
on legal conformity.
Eurofound national correspondents from Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal and Spain reported that the mobilising
capacity of the unions is more important for their
representativeness than it is for the employers. The
Hungarian correspondent described how important this
factor was, even if it was not always achievable:
Capacity to mobilise (make members actively
involved in organisational decision making, in strikes
or protests) is a prerequisite to being accepted as [a]
reliable negotiating partner. However, achieving this
status is one of the biggest challenges. Workers feel
intimidated (especially in the times of crisis – fear of
losing job), while there exists a very low level of
solidarity (also as a general phenomenon across
society).
Capacity to negotiate
The capacity to negotiate involves access to the
bargaining process where an autonomous and
independent organisation can be mandated to make
lasting commitments on behalf of its members. It can
also mean that the negotiating parties are given the
right, based on their representativeness, to conclude
Representativeness at national level
24 It is possible that social partner organisations could also gain representativeness through their internal democratic decision-making structures. Depending
on their tradition of consensus building or voting systems, where a majority puts their views forward against a minority, or on the way the leaderships of a
social partner organisation is elected or appointed, is an aspect of industrial democracy that can enhance its capacity to mobilise, and maybe also its
legitimacy. The internal decision-making or election of an organisation its leadership has not been explored in this study. 
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agreements that are made generally binding, following
the erga omnes principle, so that they apply to those
that are not member of the contracting parties signing
the agreement, as well as members.
In Cyprus, the conditions that need to be fulfilled to
allow trade unions access to collective bargaining are
registration within 30 days of being founded and having
more than 20 members. In Austria, access to collective
bargaining depends on the independence and
autonomy of social partners, their cross-sector and
national coverage and number of members, with
recognition determined through an assessment of the
Federal Arbitration Board. Capacity to negotiate thus
also depends on financial and organisational
independence, and on each organisation’s public
visibility and reputation.
Although ‘negotiating capacity’ is sometimes described
as being almost autonomous, it is better understood as
a combination of factors, which lead towards social
partner dialogue, which, in turn, leads to collective
agreements. Comments from the national
correspondents of countries with ‘more mutual
recognition’ based representativeness support the
argument that such organisational, strength-defined
‘capacity’ is more significant for representativeness for
them. Arguably, the criteria of ‘negotiating capacity’
should be understood as being intertwined with both
‘organisational strength’ and ‘social legitimacy’, and is
therefore more likely to be used in systems based on
mutual recognition.
At EU sectoral level, social partners are required to
prove their capacity to negotiate through a mandating
procedure. But such proof was not specified as a
requirement at national level by any of the national
correspondents, although the German correspondent
considered that ‘collective bargaining capacity is more
than an alternative concept of representativeness, it
defines trade unions’ under a 1964 German
constitutional court decision.
However, 16 national correspondents rated a mandate
from affiliates or members as being ‘important’ or ‘most
important’ at peak and sector level for the trade unions
or employer associations or both. In six countries, a
specific mandate was identified as being irrelevant or
only slightly relevant. In some other countries, it seems
that by becoming a member of a trade union or
employer organisation, the individual is delegating
authority to the union or employer organisation to sign
collective agreements on their behalf.25 Ratings for the
representativeness of employer organisations indicate
that having a mandate is ‘most important’ at peak level
in 10 Member States: Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and
Slovenia. 
Conclusions regarding the drivers of
representativeness
Organisational strength, electoral success and the
capacity to negotiate can each play a role in
representativeness based on mutual recognition as well
as in compliance to standards in regulations. It can also
be that political parties in power try to influence
representativeness status of certain social partner
actors through non-legislative government
interventions. Government ministries or labour
inspectors may play significant roles both in opening up
representativeness to new organisations, or in
determining the timing and procedures by which the
status may be removed when an organisation moves
into decline or crisis.
This influence may come through government political
preference, which is difficult to measure directly.
Eurofound’s national correspondents were asked two
questions that attempted to capture this influence. One
asked ‘Which actors or processes determine whether [a
social partner] conforms to the norms of
‘representativeness’ within your employment relations
system?’, and asked them to rate the significance of a
‘government ministry/labour inspection’ on a five-point
scale. The other question asked them to rate the
significance of ‘the government’ in determining
‘whether [a social partner] ceases to be ‘representative’.
Sixteen of the national correspondents rated the
government role as ‘irrelevant’ or, on average, below
‘slightly relevant’. At the other end of the continuum,
national correspondents representing six countries
indicated a potential government influence on
representativeness for both employers and unions:
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands and
Slovakia. The national correspondent for Luxembourg
reported a possible political influence of the
government on the representativeness of trade unions.
This influence would not be as significant for the
representativeness status of employer organisations in
those countries. For Spain, the influence of the
government only affects employers, while it has no
influence on the representativeness of trade unions.26
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25 How this delegation is done relates back to the question of internal organisational democracy: whether or not internal voice, or influence, is allowed to be
channelled, or if ending the membership is the only option for a member when they disagree with positions taken or with agreements signed by social
partner organisations.
26 Fernandez, R. (2008) states that the Spanish model of representativeness favours the trade unions acting at the political level but reduces its incentives to
act at the workplace level; this, however, does not mean that there is political influence of the government on assessing the representativeness of trade
unions.
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Organisational strength, electoral success and the
capacity to negotiate can also help or hinder the
process of mutual recognition of social partners.
Membership strength and mobilising power may not,
however, be sufficient for a union to secure
representative status. Some employers and some
employer associations may deliberately avoid
negotiating with or recognising a ‘strong’ union in
favour of a ‘weaker’ one. The Portuguese correspondent
describes what can happen:
In most cases the employers’ associations or
companies acknowledge unions based on the
criterion of their ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’. But the
consequences of this are very diverse. In a number of
cases the employers recognise the unions with the
most members and mobilisation capacity as their
partners in negotiations and collective bargaining. In
many other cases, the employers prefer to negotiate
with weaker unions. ... The decisive factor is whether
the employer or the employers’ association come to
the conclusion that it is advantageous or unavoidable
to accept a union as partner.
This evidence, that in certain countries and under
certain circumstances employers may choose which
trade union should be acknowledged as an interest
representative organisation, suggests an association
between ‘organisational strength’ and ‘negotiating
capacity’.
Representativeness outcomes
This section of chapter 1 considers the impacts or
consequences of the acquisition of ‘recognition’ of
representative status, as well as how it can be put to an
end or questioned. 
At peak level, the most important impact from obtaining
representative status is the resulting membership of
tripartite bodies and greater political influence on the
government and on the other side, social partner
organisations. At sector and workplace level, the most
important consequence is that it enables the conclusion
of collective bargaining agreements with enhanced
influence on the other side’s social partner
organisations.  The national correspondents report
these to be the three most important consequences for
both trade unions and employers. 
In almost all countries, tripartite body membership is an
important outcome of gaining representativeness
status. Three Eurofound national correspondents (from
Cyprus, Denmark and Sweden) indicated that tripartite
membership has no relevance to either the employer
associations or to the trade unions in the countries they
reported from. In Cyprus, the Labour Advisory Board is
the tripartite institution, while in Sweden and Denmark
there is no tripartite structure, but only bipartite bodies
and tripartite consultations. As there is no tripartite
body, there are no membership criteria for such a body.
Cyprus, Denmark and Sweden are countries with
strongly mutual recognition-based representativeness. 
To explore cross-country differences, the impacts of
representativeness for social partner organisations, as
reported by the national correspondents, were grouped
into three main themes.
1. Political influence, in terms of greater proximity to
decision-makers, enhanced status and prestige,
entitlement to membership of tripartite bodies and
consultation, improvement in the quality of
information flows with the other side of industry
and greater influence over employment outcomes
and processes.
2. Legal consequences, as when representativeness
permits the legal extension of agreements,
agreements to be concluded, or can make
industrial action lawful.
3. Institutional strength, where the status of
representativeness encourages members to join or
affiliate and improves access to funding. 
The following conclusions on the impacts of
representativeness status are based on the national
correspondent reports as they relate to these three
main themes. 
For more than one-half of European countries, the
important outcomes of achieving representativeness
status for peak social partner organisations largely
relate to gains in political influence, particularly
securing a seat in tripartite arrangements. The nine
countries where political influence is reported to be
least relevant as an impact of representativeness are:
Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Poland, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. Also, in more than
one-half of the countries, the political influence gained
from representativeness status is reported to be
(slightly) more important for employer organisations
than for trade unions.
The legal consequences arising from representativeness
may be significant for both mutual recognition and legal
conformity countries, as well as for both employers and
unions.
Half of the 29 countries see the institutional strength
gained from representativeness as being significant or
important. The national correspondent rated this
institutional strength impact as being strongest in
Estonia, France, Latvia, Romania and Greece. No
institutional strength impact was reported for the Czech
Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Norway or
Slovakia. 
The most significant finding is that there are more and
stronger common features between countries in terms
of the outcomes of representativeness than there are
among the elements helping to drive
representativeness. Once representativeness is
acquired, its implications appear to be more or less the
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same across countries. Of course, as industrial relations
systems differ, the impact of gaining representativeness
also varies; for example, between countries with and
without extension mechanisms for collective bargaining
agreements.
Four main models of
representativeness
Analysis presented in the previous sections suggests
that four models of representativeness coexist in
Europe, ranging between the ideal types of mutual
recognition and legal conformity.
£ Social partner self-regulation: a social partner self-
regulated system of mutual recognition, associated
with negotiating capacity and social strength
drivers and with very little state regulation on
representativeness.
£ Mixed social partner and state regulation: a mixed
model, combining elements of social partner
mutual recognition and of state regulation and
legal conformity. 
£ State regulation membership strength: a state-
regulated system of legal conformity, where ‘social
strength’ is used as a legal measure of
representativeness.
£ State regulation electoral strength: a state-
structured system of legal conformity in which
electoral success primarily determines
representativeness. 
Countries have been assigned to each category
according to the following: their position on the mutual
recognition to legal conformity scale; their scores on the
four-driver criteria groupings discussed above; and the
qualitative commentary made by Eurofound national
correspondents.27 In total, 29 countries are classified
according to one or other dominant combination of
characteristics.
Social partner self-regulated model
This model brings together countries where mutual
recognition is far more important than legal conformity,
at all levels. Here, the implicit criteria of
representativeness presented relate to negotiating
capacity and social strength drivers. Ten countries
(Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta,
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and UK) are essentially self-
regulating at the moment. A further six (Austria,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal)
are a mixture of self-regulation and state regulation.28
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27 A more detailed illustration of how the allocation was developed is shown in Table 13. The heuristic scoring worked well in locating nearly all the 28 Member
States plus Norway, but in the light of the national correspondent commentaries the classification was adjusted in the cases of Austria, Croatia, Germany,
Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain.
28 Lithuania has ‘important’ elections for workplace union representativeness, but in February 2015 there was no state structuring of these or of
representativeness at any other level, although draft legislation was being considered. In 2007, the three national peak trade unions and the two employer
organisations signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition. Although Austria’s ‘heuristic score’ was strongly towards the mutual recognition pole, it is
better understood as a mixed social partner and state representativeness system. Austria’s 1974 law requires a series of ‘capacity’ indicators, and its strong
mutual recognition practices operate within this framework.
Table 6: Classification of Member States and Norway by representativeness model   
Notes: This classification extends the difference between legal conformity and mutual recognition systems by taking into account the drivers and
impacts of representativeness. 
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents 
Representativeness model Countries
Social partner self-regulation Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Slovenia (for employers),
Sweden, the UK.
Mixed model Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (for employers) and
Slovenia (for trade unions)
State membership regulated Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
State electoral strength model Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain.
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Figure 2 illustrates the characteristics of the self-
regulation model for Cyprus and Finland, contrasting
them with average trade union and employer ratings
across all EU28 Member States (shown by a blue line).
The two most obvious observations to be made of this
model are the near total absence of any non-legislative
role for government or for electoral success, and the
near perfect symmetry between the rating by the
national correspondents for the unions and for the
employers in the two very different countries.
The UK provides a good example of the self-regulating
countries where representation is based on the mutual
recognition principle (Contrepois, 2016). Its industrial
relations system is historically based on voluntarism
and single channel representation. There is just one
major union confederation, the Trade Union Congress
(TUC) and, since 1965, just one major employer
association, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
The voluntarism principle implies that the state
intervenes very little or not at all in the regulation of
relations between employers and employees. The
representativeness of the two collective actors are then
based on voluntary mutual recognition, where each side
recognises the legitimacy of the other. In a political
economy dominated by laissez-faire, state regulation
traditionally occupied a limited place in structuring
employer–employee relations.29 Industrial relations are
thus primarily the product of the balance of power
between employers and unions. There are no legal
provisions obliging social partners to negotiate
collectively, while individual relationships are mainly
governed by the employment contract. Collective
agreements are now non-existent at national level and,
outside the public sector, rare at sector level. Without
any obligation to negotiate, only one-third of employees
are now covered by collective agreements.
The single channel representativeness tradition was
embedded when UK unions were strong and could
enforce a closed shop, often obliging those entering
work to join the union. Today it still means that nearly
everywhere the trade union is the sole legitimate
instance of employee representation. Other institutions
and legal structures of employee representation that
exist in other European countries are effectively absent
in the UK. 
Since the late 1970s, voluntarism and single channel
representation have been strongly questioned without
being fundamentally changed. In the 1980s and 1990s,
the Conservative government took many legislative
measures to limit the role of unions, removing the
closed shop and restricting their ability to organise
effective strikes. Thus the Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act (1992) defined trade unions as
‘organisations whose principal purposes include the
regulation of relations between workers and employers
or employer associations’. 
The Conservative government’s restrictive measures
were not repealed by the Labour government (1997–
2010) and still apply today. Besides extending individual
employment rights to include the protections of the
social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, the Labour
government did, however, introduce new regulations
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Note: The numbers presented in this graph are based on one single expert opinion per country. 
Source: Eurofound’s Network of European correspondents (February–May 2015) 
29 Nonetheless, the UK national correspondent pointed to the role of government action in encouraging trade unions to take on representative roles in some
specific periods: ‘Historically, during the early/mid-20th century and especially during the Second World War and the immediate post-war period, UK
governments actively promoted union recognition and the establishment of sectoral bargaining machinery. In the public sector, state influence on the
shape and scope of bargaining/consultative arrangements (including pay review bodies) remains a more significant factor’.
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creating minimal criteria for establishing
representativeness. The 1999 Employment Act included
trade union recognition provisions, as referred to above.
Yet although for the first time the law established a
lengthy process to allow workers to secure trade union
recognition, it did not go further to require employers to
undertake meaningful collective bargaining. Equally,
there is no legislation or legally-binding collective
agreements that confer extensive rights to local trade
unions.
Figure 3 shows the UK national correspondent’s ratings
of the most important determinants for
representativeness. It is nearly a mirror opposite to the
French situation, which is shown in Figure 6.
In answering the supplementary question concerning
actors who are significant in determining
representativeness, the UK national expert identified
the presence of competitor associations or trade unions
as very important, as well as their membership density
and numbers. The law is significant for the unions but
only slightly relevant for the employers, while collective
bargaining is viewed as very important for the unions
and irrelevant for the employers. Trade union capacity
to mobilise, derived from its membership density and
numbers, as well as its physical asset base and longevity
of being a recognised representative institution, all play
a part in establishing recognition by the employers.
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Mixed social partner and state
representativeness model
This model brings together seven countries where
mutual recognition is balanced by some strong
elements of legal conformity at different levels. These
may include thresholds, electoral targets and a role for
government. The implicit criteria of representativeness,
however, still reflect mutual recognition and self-
regulation, and relate to negotiating capacity and social
strength. 
The seven countries are: Austria, Estonia, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. Figure 4
illustrates the characteristics of this model with
reference to Austria and Hungary.
These two countries – one an EU15 Member State and
the other an EU13 Member State from the 2004
accession – illustrate the combination of relatively
strong ratings on the non-legislative government role,
negotiating capacity and social strength scales. (Some
other countries in this group, such as Spain, also place
considerable emphasis upon electoral success for the
trade unions.) 
In Austria, for example, employee and employer
representation is based on a complex articulation
between voluntary organisations and statutory bodies
from which representatives are elected. At peak and
sector level, social partners come from four institutions,
which sit together on a joint national committee, the
Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB). This is the
unique peak trade union organisation recognised as
representative by the government. Membership is
optional. ÖGB had 1,198,489 members and seven
affiliates in 2013. 
The regional chambers of labour (Arbeiterkammern) are
employee representative bodies that have a capacity to
negotiate and that are established by statute law.
Membership is obligatory. In each state (Land), a
general assembly is elected for five years by direct
universal suffrage. All members have the right to vote.
The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKO) and its
numerous (sub)sectoral subunits are employer
representative bodies that have a capacity to negotiate
and that are established by statute law for which
membership is obligatory.
In the Committee of Presidents of the Chamber of
Agriculture, at company level, employees are
represented through a works council for which they
elect representatives by direct universal suffrage. These
representatives have the capacity to negotiate at
company level on the basis of the existing national
collective agreements.
Mutual recognition of the social partner organisations is
a key element for the functioning of the Austrian social
partnership, because – in legal terms – neither party on
the employer or employee side can be forced by the
other side of industry to enter into collective
employment regulation. Since 1945, the social partners
have internalised a strong commitment to the principle
of harmonious cooperation; this commitment finds
expression in a system of industrial relations free from
substantive intervention by the state. The capacity to
make lasting commitments on behalf of their respective
members is essential for the peak organisations on the
two sides of industry, because it means that agreements
concluded by the peak-level organisations are binding
for all their members. 
There is no explicit concept of representativeness
applying to voluntary organisations of labour and
business in Austria. However, in relation to the capacity
of voluntary organisations to conclude collective
agreements, the Austrian labour law (the Labour
Constitution Act) identifies some general preconditions
a voluntary collective interest organisation has to meet:
(financial) independency (in particular, from the other
side of industry); an extensive occupational and
territorial coverage in terms of membership domain,
which means that the organisation must at least be
operative above company level; and a major economic
importance in terms of the absolute number of
members and business activities in order to be in a
position to wield effective bargaining power. The
criterion of representativeness (whereby this term is
non-existing in the Austrian labour law) is thus linked to
the capacity of collective interest organisations to
conclude collective agreements (the right to conclude
collective agreements is conferred by the Federal
Arbitration Board) and hence to their recognition as a
relevant social partner organisation.
When assessing an organisation with regard to its
fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the
capacity to conclude agreements, the Federal
Arbitration Board does not apply across-the-board
thresholds in terms of members or densities; rather it
always assesses an organisation’s ‘representativeness’
in the context the economic sector(s) in which it claims
to be a relevant social partner. For instance, although
an interest organisation usually needs to have a
membership domain and be active in the whole
territory of the country in order to be recognised by the
Federal Arbitration Board as possessing the capacity to
conclude collective agreements, in a few cases
organisations with only regional significance have also
been granted this recognition. This is because the
economic and/or employment structure of a particular
segment of the economy in one particular province
(Land) may differ widely from the national situation; this
may, from the Board’s point of view, justify the
establishment of a separate social partner organisation
(which is deemed ‘representative’ for the employer or
employee side of this segment) to be equipped with the
right to bargain on behalf of this segment of the
economy (in a particular part of the country). 
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In countries where mutual recognition is balanced by
strong elements of legal conformity at different levels,
the crossover between some forms of state structuring
of representativeness and strong traditions of self-
regulation points to the likelihood of greater
state–social partner tension and in some countries a
higher level of social partner political engagement. In all
of these countries, apart from Austria, the legal context
of representativeness has changed since 1998.
State membership regulation
representativeness model
The state membership regulation model brings together
nine countries where the law has very considerable
significance for representativeness. The state has
structured representativeness in such a way that legal
conformity is viewed as being clearly more important
than mutual recognition. The explicit or implicit criteria
of representativeness within this model all relate to
definitions of numbers or density of membership, or to
sectoral or territorial coverage by the social partners. 
These countries are: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia.30 With the exception of Greece, all these
countries are EU13 Member States, which reflects the
influence of the EU transition period in recasting their
industrial relations systems. A strong non-legislative
government role, complementing the legal framework,
is common among countries that fall within this model,
as suggested by the examples of Latvia and Bulgaria in
Figure 5. 
Neither country sees electoral success as being at all
relevant. For these national correspondents, alongside
formal state membership density requirements for
representativeness comes the question of how they are
actually applied in practice. The importance of good
relations with the government is not to be
underestimated. This, in turn, often depends on the
negotiating capacities and social strength of the social
partners. But conformity with the law remains a critical
requirement. 
The Bulgarian model is based on a plurality of social
partners, on both employee and employer sides. Two
main trade union confederations represent employees –
the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in
Bulgaria (CITUB) and the Confederation of Labour
(Podkrepa). Employers are represented by the Bulgarian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and three
confederations – the Bulgarian Industrial Association
(BIA), the Confederation of Employers and Industrialists
in Bulgaria (CEIBG) and the Bulgarian Industrial Capital
Association (BICA).
In Bulgaria, the concept of representativeness is based
on labour legislation. In January 2012, the legislator
adopted stricter criteria for social partners being
recognised as nationally representative. According to
the Bulgarian labour code (Article 34), the following
criteria apply to peak level trade unions:
£ a minimum of 75,000 members; 
£ representation in the economic sectors (active in
more than one-quarter of NACE code-defined
economic activities, with at least five members in
each, or having at least 50 member organisations
with at least five members from different NACE
code economic activities); 
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30 Up to 2011, Greece had a law requiring 51% employee coverage of a sector before an agreement could be extended. Since this date, collective agreements
are only binding on their signatories. However, the existing law conferring representative status on trade unions that secure the highest vote in judicially-
supervised elections in the separate private and public sectors has not been repealed. 
Figure 5: State membership regulation representativeness countries: Latvia and Bulgaria    
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Source: Eurofound’s national correspondents for Latvia and Bulgaria. 
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£ adequate territorial representation, with staff
represented in local authorities across more than
one-quarter of Bulgaria’s municipalities; 
£ having a national managing body; and
£ regarding length of experience, having had the
status of a legal entity, obtained by registration as a
non-profit association, at least three years before
the census.
Article 35 of the Labour Code addresses employer
organisations. Requirements include: 
£ affiliate sector/branch structures and companies to
have at least 100,000 employees for employer
organisations; 31
£ representation in the economic sectors (represent
employers in more than one-quarter of the NACE
code-defined economic activities with no less than
5% of employees in each economic activity, or a
minimum of 10 employers in each activity); 
£ adequate territorial representation, representing
employers in more than one-quarter of Bulgaria’s
municipalities;
£ have a national managing body; and
£ regarding length of experience, having had the
status of a legal entity, obtained by registration as a
non-profit association, at least three years before
the census.
Nationally representative organisations of employers
and trade unions can acquire the statute of
representative, on request from the Council of Ministers,
for a four-year period. Every four years, the Council of
Ministers carries out procedures for the recognition of
the nationally representative peak organisations. The
president of the National Council for Tripartite
Cooperation (a position often held by the Deputy Prime
Minister with responsibility for the Ministry of Labour)
announces the procedure in The State Gazette six
months before the expiry of the four-year term. 
At sector and company level, trade union and employer
organisation representativeness is measured in the light
of the legal definition and mechanism for verification at
national level. But these criteria are not sufficient to
establish representativeness, at either level, for trade
unions and employers organisations that do not belong
to a national representative organisation. 
State electoral strength
representativeness model
This model brings together countries where, according
to the national correspondents, legal conformity is far
more important than mutual recognition at all levels,
but where there is also a degree of ambivalence. The
approach in these countries is not fully top-down, but
involves an element of democratic control: the criteria
used relate to social partners (primarily trade unions)
having electoral success in the workplace or in special
national elections. 
The four countries represented by this model are
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Spain. Figure 6
illustrates its ‘shape’ as exemplified by Belgium and
France.
Representativeness at national level
31 This requirement has been ruled as unconstitutional by the Bulgarian constitutional court.
Figure 6:  State electoral strength representativeness countries: Belgium and France    
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For the trade unions in both countries, particularly in
France, electoral success is a huge driver. By contrast,
for employers this factor is only somewhat relevant in
France and is not relevant in Belgium. Remarkably, the
non-legislative role of the government regarding
representativeness is considered to be ‘most important’
for both trade unions and employers at all levels, in
both countries.
Here, the state clearly does not just intervene to frame
the structures and rules of representation and access to
them. In the state electoral strength model, it also
appears to play a much greater role in supporting both
types of social partner. 
In France, electoral thresholds were introduced in new
legislation in 2008. This country now perfectly illustrates
the state electoral strength representativeness model.
Representativeness for both trade unions and employer
associations has a precise definition, set by acts of
parliament since 1936 (Contrepois, 2011). That
definition became even more precise in 1966, when the
law decreed that five union confederations would have
permanent nationally representative status on the basis
of five criteria (number of members, independence,
membership fees, level and length of experience and
their patriotic attitude during the Occupation in the
Second World War).32
In 1982, this full legal recognition was given to the same
five confederations at company level, even if they did
not have a branch in the firm. Thus until 2008, however
many members they had, and however many workers
voted for them, the five main legally-recognised
confederations effectively held a monopoly over the
right to name trade union representatives and to put up
candidates in the first round of works council and
worker representatives (délégués du personnel)
elections in all companies, without having to prove that
they were representative of a firm’s workers. In
addition, they were officially endowed with a whole
range of responsibilities, principally the elaboration and
implementation of work regulations, as well as the
management of social welfare organisations. As a result
of their participation in these missions, the state, the
jointly-run welfare organisations and many companies
ensured that these unions received the necessary
legally-backed means to carry them out: facility time
paid by public sector firms and large companies was
made available, as well as some funding through grants.
This legal framework gave representatives of these
French unions rights to negotiate agreements on the
terms and conditions of work, covering most
occupational categories or professions and within
companies. 
On 6 November 1996, the French constitutional Court
decided to permit alternative methods of collective
bargaining in companies without union delegates,
although a union role was maintained. Its Council ruled
that ‘workers who had been elected or who held
mandates guaranteeing their representativeness can
also participate in the collective determination of
working conditions as long as their interventions has
neither the object nor the effect of placing obstacles to
the interventions of the representative union
organisations’.
In 2008, a new law abolished the legally-binding
representative status for the five main confederations
and introduced seven required criteria of
representativeness.33 They are: respect for republican
values; union independence; financial transparency; the
length of time the union has existed; its influence; its
number of members; and electoral success. This final
criterion is central to the reform. It will be measured at
every election, forcing all the unions to regularly prove
their representativeness. The status is acquired at
workplace level by the trade unions that obtain a
minimum of 10% of all votes in workplace elections; at
sectoral level by the trade unions that obtain 8% of the
ballot votes and that have a balanced territorial
presence; and at multi-sectoral national level, by the
trade unions that obtain 8% of the ballot votes and that
have a balanced sectoral presence (across areas such as
industry, services, building and trade).
The 20 August 2008 law also includes a section about
the validity of collective agreements. Since 1 January
2009, company-level agreements are only valid if the
unions signing them have secured at least 30% of the
votes in the first round of the relevant workplace
elections. This measure became law in 2012 for sector-
level and national-level agreements.  
This new legislation, which connected a bottom-up
process of establishing representativeness to the
existing top-down process, was reinforced by two new
laws in 2010 and 2014. The 2010 law aimed at organising
the terms of a specific poll to measure the audience of
trade unions in companies employing less than 11
employees at regional level every four years, with
special rules for the agricultural sector.34 The first
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32 The five confederations were: the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT); the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (CFDT); the
Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière (FO); the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC); and (relating to white-collar and
management workers only) the Confédération Générale des Cadres (CGC).
33 Act of Parliament issued on 20 August 2008, relating to social democracy renewal and working time reform.
34 Act of Parliament issued on 15 October 2010, completing the former law on social democracy issued in law no. 2008-789 issued on 20 August 2008.
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elections were organised in late 2012 and attracted only
10% of voters. The second act of parliament issued on
5 March 2014 concerned vocational training,
employment and social democracy. It established six
representativeness criteria for employers: respect for
republican values, independence, financial
transparency, the length of time the association has
existed, its influence, and assistance to its members.
A decree on 13 June 2015 specified that an organisation
had to exist for two years, and regroup at least 8% of the
firms within the sector, counting only those who paid
their subscriptions in the preceding year. Employer
representativeness in France will thus be measured for
the first time in 2017. That year will also mark the
second time trade union representativeness will be
measured.
Figure 7 shows the rankings for employers and trade
unions provided by the French national correspondent,
identifying ‘what does ‘representative’ mean in your
employment relations system?’
When asked to identify ‘the actor, actors or processes
most relevant in determining whether an organisation
of employers or workers conforms to the norms of
“representativity”‘, the national correspondent for
France identified the government and the courts. The
role of the other social partners in terminating
‘representativity’ was rated as ‘irrelevant’. 
Conclusion: Is representativeness
under question?
A summary of the key findings of this chapter is
followed by an overview of how this issue is debated
and/or reflected in the EU Member States, as reported
by the national correspondents. A dichotomy has
emerged between concepts of representativeness
strongly based on compliance with legal requirements
and those strongly based on mutual recognition. This
conclusion also considers why little debate has
occurred concerning the representativeness of social
partners at national level.
Key findings on national concepts of
representativeness
Drawing from questionnaires completed and returned
by 29 of Eurofound’s national correspondents, this
chapter has reported and analysed the different
elements and concepts of trade union and employer
representativeness at peak, sector and (for trade unions
only) workplace and company levels. One limitation of
these findings is that they are solely based on 29 single
expert opinions, each one representing a single Member
State and Norway. Despite this, its value is that it
provides a comparative overview of the different
elements driving representativeness today. 
As was the case when the European Commission last
defined national representativeness in 1993, Europe’s
interest representation systems tend to rely largely on
mutual recognition processes, regulations laid down by
national law, or complex combinations of both. Today’s
representativeness frameworks can still be located on a
spectrum ranging from those where mutual recognition
is most important and there is no legal regulation, to
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Figure 7: What are the most important determinants of representativeness for French employers
and trade unions?    
1 2 3 4 5
Custom and pracce
Mutual recognion
Mobilising capacity
Mandated
Lasng commitments
Autonomous actor
Financial independence
Legal conformity
Electoral success
1 2 3 4 5
Custom and pracce
Mutual recognion
Mobilising capacity
Mandated
Lasng commitments
Autonomous actor
Financial independence
Legal conformity
Electoral success
Employers Unions
Note: The numbers presented in this graph are based on one single expert opinion. 
Source: Eurofound’s national correspondent for France. 
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those where legal regulation is the most important
factor and where self-regulation by the social partners
plays no part at all. 
Most EU Member States do have some kind of legal
framework shaping how representativeness is granted
to or achieved by social partner organisations. The role
legislation plays in national concepts of
representativeness does however differ vastly by
Member State. Legislation can shape
representativeness by imposing thresholds in terms of
membership, organisational density or as a minimum
outcome of elections. It can impose adherence to
certain values or norms. In some countries, conformity
with the legal requirements is crucial, while in others
mutual recognition is either more important than legal
conformity or is the only basis for representativeness.
The countries where representativeness is self-
regulating through mutual recognition by the social
partners can thus be distinguished from countries
where representative status is obtained by conforming
to legal requirements. Three other elements or drivers
also appear to contribute in different ways to
establishing the representativeness of social partners:
electoral success; organisational strength; and the
capacity to negotiate. 
The countries where representativeness is largely
shaped by mutual recognition mechanisms tend to
display higher levels of trade union density. Cyprus,
Ireland, Malta, the UK, and the Scandinavian countries,
are among those countries where representativeness is
based on mutual recognition, with little or no emphasis
on a legal framework. 
All those countries where representativeness is based
more on legal conformity have recently changed the
requirements for representativeness within their legal
frameworks. The Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Romania and Slovakia are examples of countries where
legal conformity based representativeness is considered
to be much more important than mutual recognition. 
In France, seven specific criteria are to be met for trade
unions to obtain representative status. French employer
organisations must meet six, fairly similar, criteria.
Among these criteria are: respect for the constitution;
political and financial independence; having existed for
at least two years; having a certain number of members;
and minimum scores in works council elections. The
authority to grant, question or withdraw representative
status is in the hands of labour courts and government
institutions. 
In the UK, there is no role for government institutions in
the process of obtaining or losing representative
statues. UK labour law only plays a very minor role for
trade union representativeness, and no role for
employer organisations. Legitimacy arising from custom
and practice is associated with mutual recognition, part
of a relationship between organisations over a longer
period of time. Membership strength is a factor in
gaining recognition from a union’s counterpart. The
organisational capacity to act on behalf of its members
and to make lasting commitments, as well as
negotiating capacity and the ability to mobilise, are
further elements supporting the mutual recognition
process, especially for the purpose of collective
bargaining. 
The UK is an example of a voluntarist mechanism with a
low level of state regulation of representativeness.
Trade unions in the UK are the single channel of
employee representation, generally without works
councils elected by the entire workforce. It was reported
that the UK recognition mechanism is not precisely
mutual, as the power to ‘recognise’ lies with the
employers and can be withdrawn by them at any time. 
Once representativeness status is acquired, it can have
certain impacts or consequences for social partner
organisations. These implications or effects can vary,
across peak, sector and workplace levels. At peak level,
the most important impact from obtaining
representative status is the resulting membership of
tripartite bodies and greater political influence on the
government and on the other side, social partner
organisations. At sector and workplace level, the most
important consequence of gaining representative status
is that it enables the conclusion of collective bargaining
agreements with enhanced influence on the social
partner organisations on the other side.
The analysis conducted in this chapter presents a
classification of four models of representativeness that
coexist in Europe, ranging from ideal types of mutual
recognition to legal conformity: 
£ a social partner self-regulated system of mutual
recognition (associated with negotiating capacity
and social strength drivers and with very little state
regulation on representativeness); 
£ a mixed model combining elements of social
partner mutual recognition and of state regulation
and legal conformity; 
£ a state-regulated system of legal conformity where
‘social strength’ is used as a legal measure of
representativeness; and 
£ a state-structured system of legal conformity in
which electoral success primarily determines
representativeness. 
Despite the diversity across Europe, these four models
capture the duality and coexistence of
representativeness, based on mutual recognition or
legal regulation.
Part of the reason for this continuity is the articulation
between lower and higher levels of collective
bargaining, where the representativeness of the higher
level is often transmitted directly to the lower levels,
while different but essentially ‘acceptable’ forms of
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democratic delegation from ‘the bottom’ still give
legitimacy to the representatives at ‘the top’.
Given this core duality and the complexity of
intervening arrangements, it is now even more difficult
(or even impossible) a task than it was in 1993 to
propose any single all-embracing European definition of
social partners’ representativeness at national level.35 If
one is developed, it has to encompass the breadth of
arrangements, from self-regulation to state regulation,
to enable the expression of complex national histories,
and to ensure that it celebrates and encourages the
provision of opportunities for trade union and
employer organisations to be involved in democratising
working lives.
Debate on national concepts of
representativeness
Apart from in France, Italy and Portugal, there has been
relatively little public debate about the intertwined
issues of interest representation and the level of
collective bargaining. In most Member States,
representativeness is present yet there is no debate
around its terms. In some cases, the absence of debate
is because most of the social partners do not consider it
appropriate to question their own (or the other side’s)
legitimacy. Sometimes this is about inertia. The national
correspondent for Denmark described the existing
system as being unchanged and never discussed: ‘It is
laid down in their genes.’ In Portugal, a White Paper on
Labour Relations in 2007 did have a section called ‘The
question of representativeness of associations’. It
proposed drawing up general legal criteria that would
be self-regulated by the social partners. After that,
however, nothing happened until 2012 and 2014, when
the criteria for the extension of collective agreements
were changed; but even then no mention was made of
representativeness.
Yet even in countries where representativeness has had
a relatively short life span, the tendency is to oppose
legal changes that might limit their claims to special
treatment. The Bulgarian Industrial Association
(employers) publicly criticised the introduction in 2012
of new criteria requiring representative employer
organisations to affiliate companies totalling a
minimum 100,000 employees, as did a smaller
organisation, the Union of Private Entrepreneurs, which
lost its representativeness status entirely. Aimed at
trying to strengthen the main Bulgarian employer
associations, the threshold increase from 30,000 to
100,000 employees was subsequently declared
unconstitutional by Bulgaria’s constitutional court. In
Poland, a new draft law on the Social Dialogue Council
(replacing the Tripartite Commission for Socio-
Economic Affairs), which preserves the existing
principles, has been prepared jointly by the employers
and trade unions.
In the Czech Republic the organisations that meet the
2008 criteria for participation in the country’s tripartite
organisation, such as a union having 150,000 members,
are fully supportive of it. Those that are excluded are
not and consider it discriminatory. A similar division
between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ has also been voiced by
some of the smaller trade unions in France, particularly
those likely to score lower than the ballot threshold in
elections, and by some of the smaller French employer
associations whose affiliations fall below the required
8% of businesses.
The low level of debate, as reported by the national
correspondents, may also reflect the limited capacity of
an existing system to accommodate new trends. Yet
concerns may still be expressed behind closed doors,
even in some of the most stable representative systems.
The correspondent from the Netherlands reported that,
‘On the employers’ side, there are some worries about
the representativeness of the union side’, while the
correspondent from Finland commented perceptively
about the potential impact of decentralisation:
One tendency that to some extent relates to the
concept of representativeness is, however, that the
employer organisations pursue the objective of more
local level negotiations, as the current system with a
focus on central and sectoral-level agreements has
not been seen to sufficiently respond to the needs of
flexibility for individual enterprises. Such a
development could in the long run have an impact on
the notion of ‘representativeness’, as it shifts the focus
to the local level and makes issues related to
workplace representation more topical.
The implications of representativeness for workplace
bargaining are also of concern to some Slovakian
employers. The Slovakian Association of Mechanical
Engineering has recently been arguing that higher
thresholds of trade union membership need to be
introduced in order to avoid the current anomaly
whereby a small number of trade unionists in a
workplace can represent all the employees and
conclude collective agreements that cover everyone.
In line with this awareness of a growing interest in the
structure of representativeness at workplace level,
developments were reported from Germany and Italy. In
Germany, the employer umbrella organisation BDA
supported new legislation that came into force in 2015
on collective bargaining. This permits employers to only
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implement agreements signed by the trade union with
the largest membership within each establishment. 
The BDA position has parallels with that of Fiat in Italy,
but with a very different outcome. Fiat’s decision to
leave the main Italian employer association,
Confindustria, in 2012, to avoid the constraints of the
sectoral collective agreement and to embark on plant-
level collective agreements, sparked a major public
debate. This eventually led to a new 2014 agreement
between Confindustria and the three main peak trade
unions, where the two sides recognised the need to
measure representativeness through membership
numbers and election results. The debate continues
today as to whether this collective agreement is
sufficient, or whether it will need to be transformed into
law, thus breaking with the traditionally very low levels
of legal involvement in industrial relations in Italy.
The Fiat case is also significant as the reasoning given
by the company for taking the largest Italian company
out of the major employer association was directly
related to its global strategy. The impact of the
presence of large transnational companies has also
been felt elsewhere as undermining national systems of
representativeness. The general secretary of the
Romanian trade union confederation, CNSLR Fratia, was
highly critical of the role of global firms: ‘The
multinational corporations are trying to influence the
political process with supranational means in an
attempt to avoid or minimize the role of social dialogue
at national level’. Another Romanian trade unionist, the
president of Cartel Alfa, was even more explicit: 
Legislative modifications that rendered the obtaining
of representativeness difficult were made under the
pressure of transnational corporations, without the
consent of trade union confederations and employers’
confederations. The consequence was the taking
away of collective labour contracts at branch level
and the collective contract at the national level. There
are no longer collective contracts at the sector level
(in the private sector) but only at company level, or at
the level of group of companies.
Most employer organisations and trade unions prefer to
refrain from openly discussing the failings or strengths
of the ways in which national rules and regulations
establish their credentials for participating in bipartite
or tripartite social dialogue. The Maltese Chamber of
Commerce, Enterprise and Industry, however,
represents employers in a country dominated by
workplace level collective bargaining. To the protests of
the trade unions, but to the silence of the other national
employer associations, it recently described the
country’s tripartite institution for social dialogue, the
Malta Council for Economic and Social Development
(MCESD), as ‘rudderless, irrelevant and
inconsequential’. The implication is that in some
countries tripartite arrangements may not deepen or
strengthen citizen involvement in democratically
influencing major decisions that affect peoples’ working
lives.
It was the emergence in 2004 of a third force in the trade
union movement in Malta, the confederation known as
Forum, which caused debates about representation.
Only in 2012, on the strength of representing 11% of the
unionised Maltese workers and the support given it by
the ETUC after it became one of its affiliates, was Forum
assimilated into the Maltese tripartite body at national
level.
The relatively low volume of discussions about
representativeness conceals, however, a significant
undercurrent of change, which has been demonstrated
in the findings outlined in the first part of this chapter.
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‘The legitimacy and effectiveness of the social-partner
consultation is based on their representativeness.’
(European Commission, 2002a)
The term ‘European social partners’ usually refers to all
those European social partner organisations that
participate in the European social dialogue on grounds
of Articles 154 and 155 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU).37 Since the Agreement
on Social Policy of 31 October 1991 and up to the
introduction of Articles 154 and 155 into the TFEU, the
European social partners have become corporate actors
in European politics and its polity. As actors, they have
even ‘obtained a status similar to legislators’ (Keller and
Sörries, 1997 . Their impact is quite tangible in some of
the cross-industry sectoral and multi-sectoral
agreements they have concluded and which were
subsequently either forged into European directives or
remained autonomous agreements. The European
social partners and the social dialogue have become
important elements of the social acquis itself, as
corroborated by Article 152 (1) TFEU:
The Union recognises and promotes the role of the
social partners at its level, taking into account the
diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate
dialogue between the social partners, respecting their
autonomy.
Under European social dialogue, the social partners
have become key players in a process that is sometimes
tagged as ‘negotiated legislation’ (Falkner, 2000) or
social partnership, and that has obtained the quality of
an idée directrice or Leitidee [main idea] as described by
Hauriou (1965). Yet, an important question remains
regarding the issue of representativeness, which has
been a conundrum of EU social policy since its inception
in 1993. According to the Court of Justice of the
European Union, it is the duty of the European
Commission to scrutinise the European social partners
and to identify those who are eligible to engage in
European social dialogue. Primary and secondary EU
law never recur to the notion of representativeness, and
the Commission first used this criterion in its 1993
Communication concerning the application of the
agreement on social policy (European Commission,
1993) in annex 3 entitled ‘Main findings of the social
partners’ study (Representativeness)’, where it defines
criteria for representativeness in the consultation phase
of social dialogue. Thus, ‘management and labour’ in
the sense of Article 154 TFEU are to be understood as
the European social partners, organised at cross-sector
or sectoral level. The Commission has drawn up a list of
organisations it consults under Article 154 TFEU. This
list, which is regularly revised, currently consists of 87
organisations (see European Commission, 2016b). This
number stood at 28 in 1993, at 44 in 1998, at 55 in 2002,
at 60 in 2004 and at 79 in 2010 (European Commission,
1993–2010). In the last 22 years, the total number of EU
social partner organisations to be consulted by the
European Commission under Article 154 TFEU has more
than tripled.
As early as the 1993 Communication, the European
Commission clearly identified those cross-sector
organisations that met the above criteria and
acknowledged the special status of a limited number of
EU-level social partner organisations: [T]he Commission
recognises that there is a substantial body of experience
behind the social dialogue established between the
UNICE (now BUSINESSEUROE [since 23 January 2007]),
CEEP and ETUC’ (European Commission, 1993). Despite
the fact that they are not the only social partner
organisations at EU cross-sector level representing
management and labour, BusinessEurope, ETUC and
CEEP are generally understood to be the European
social partners (Hecquet, 2007). A complaint by
UEAPME, representing craft and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), to the European Court of First
Instance (CFI) doubting the legality of Council directive
96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement
on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the
ETUC, and challenging their status as European social
partners in the UEAPME case, led to a strategic coalition
between UNICE and UEAPME.38 Over time, two social
partner organisations on the employee side (CEC and
Eurocadres), representing professional and managerial
staff, joined the ranks. In 2014, Eurofound analysed the
cross-sector social partners BusinessEurope, ETUC,
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CEEP, UEAPME, CEC and Eurocadres and took a closer
look at their structure, competences, national-level
affiliates, and internal decision-making processes
(Eurofound, 2014a). Against the above developments,
the European cross-sector social partners demanded in
1993 that, ‘in the light of the responsibilities conferred
on them by the agreement, the concept of ‘social
partners’ need(ed) to be defined more clearly’ (ETUC,
UNICE, CEEP, 1993).
International level
Is it a coincidence that the first advisory opinion issued
by the newly created Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) was on the topic of representativeness?
The issue of representativeness is a longstanding
conundrum of international labour law (Teyssié, 2005),
going back to this advisory opinion, rendered on 31 July
1922, which related to a question of trade union
representativeness that arose in the framework of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Franssen and
Jacobs, 1998; Béroud et al, 2012). It is in the ILO
Recommendation 91, which contains an international
definition of collective agreements, where we can find
an intimation being made to the notion of
representativeness: 
… all agreements in writing regarding working
conditions and terms of employment concluded
between an employer, a group of employers or one or
more employers organisations, on the one hand, and
one or more representative workers’ organisations,
or, in the absence of such organisations, the
representatives of the workers duly elected and
authorised by them in accordance with national laws
and regulations, on the other.
(ILO, 1951)
Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ)
As mentioned above, the very first advisory opinion the
PCIJ issued was on the concept of representativeness to
be applied at international level. In 1921, the Dutch
government had nominated Jos Serrarens, General
Secretary of the Christian trade union, as the
representative of the workers’ delegation to the ILO
conference. This nomination was fervently opposed by
the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU),
which first threatened to leave the conference and then
took the case to the Permanent Court of International
Justice. The Netherlands Confederation of Trade Unions
was a member of IFTU and claimed that it was the most
representative trade union in the Netherlands in terms
of numbers, and that, henceforth, the nomination of
Mr Serrarens of the Christian Trade Union was a
violation of Article 389 of the Treaty of Versailles
(now Article 3(5) of the ILO Constitution) since his
nomination did not take place in agreement with the
Confederation as the most representative interest
organisation.39 In July 1922, the PCIJ stated in advisory
opinion no.1 against IFTU that one of the main texts to
be considered in this case was the abovementioned
Article 389 (paragraphs 3 and 4) of the Treaty of
Versailles. Paragraph 3 argued:
The Members undertake to nominate non-
Government Delegates and advisers chosen in
agreement with the industrial organisations, if such
organisations exist, which are most representative
[authors’ highlight] of employers or work-people, as
the case may be, in their respective countries’. 
(PCIJ, 1922 B01, 17)
After the recourse to the relevant norms of the Treaty of
Versailles, the PCIJ then tries to fine-tune the criterion
of ‘most representative’:
There is no definition of the word ‘representative’ in
the Treaty. The most representative organisations for
this purpose are, of course, those organisations which
best represent the employers and the workers
respectively. What these organisations are, is a
question to be decided in the particular case, having
regard to the circumstances in each particular
country at the time when the choice falls to be made.
Numbers are not the only test of the representative
character of the organisations, but they are an
important factor; other things being equal, the most
numerous will be the most representative. 
(PCIJ, 1922 B01,19/21)
In the course of the deliberation, the PCIJ then had to
establish whether the plural used in paragraph 3
(‘chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations,
if such organisations exist’) was to be used in relation to
the two sides of industry taken together, and,
consequently, a national government needed to
nominate in agreement with the most representative
organisation of workers and employers only. The
alternative was if, by contrast, the plural referred to
each side of industry individually – trade unions and
employers – and a government had to take all relevant
interest organisation into consideration per side of
industry. The PCIJ went for the second option in his
advisory opinion and stated: 
If, therefore, in a particular country there exist several
industrial organisations representing the working
classes, the Government must take all of them into
consideration when it is proceeding to the nomination
of the workers’ delegate and his technical advisers. Only
by acting in this way can the Government succeed in
choosing persons who, having regard to the particular
circumstances, will be able to represent at the
Conference the views of the working classes concerned.
(PCIJ, 1922 B01, 23)
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The PCIJ then illustrated its argument with a
quantitative example.
In a given country there are six organisations of
workers, one with 110,000 members, and five others
each with a membership of 100,000. According to the
view of the objectors to the nomination made in the
present case, the candidate proposed by the five last
organisations jointly would have to be discarded in
favour of the candidate of the first. One hundred and
ten thousand workers would dictate to five hundred
thousand. 
(PCIJ, 1922 B01, 23)
Following on from the above, the PCIJ drew up the
following requirements for governments to comply with
the stipulation to select the most representative
organisation for representation at the ILO conference.
Where a government is not in a position to reach an
agreement with all industrial organisations that are
considered to be the most representative, the terms of
Article 389 (paragraphs 3 and 4) of the Treaty of
Versailles would apply provided that the nomination
took place ‘… in agreement with the organisations
which, taken together, included a majority of the
organised workers of the country’ (PCIJ, 1922 B01,
25/27).40 For these reasons, the PCIJ concluded in his
advisory opinion no. 1 from 1922 that Mr Serrarens had
been nominated in conformity with the provision of
paragraph 3 of Article 389 of the Treaty of Versailles.
This advisory opinion did away with the de facto
monopoly of the IFTU within the ILO as ‘the most
representative organisation’ (van Goethem, 2006, 143).
In a similar case in 1970, the International Court of
Justice decided that quantitative criteria, such as the
number of members, are important but are not the only
criterion to be taken into account in the assessment of
the representativeness of an interest organisation
(Casale, 1996, p. 1). In the framework of the ILO (2002)
research project on ‘la représentativité des
organisations de travailleurs et d’employeurs en Afrique
francophone dans un contexte comparatif’ [the
representativeness of workers’ and employers’
organisations in French-speaking Africa in a
comparative context], a tripartite working group under
the Presidency of Mr Aliou Oumarou (employer
representative) laid down the following criteria as being
objective in order to assess the representativeness of
trade unions:
L’importance numérique; la représentation sectorielle
et interprofessionnelle (secteurs public, parapublic et
privé); la représentation géographique c’est-à-dire
l’envergure nationale des organisations
professionnelles; la participation effective et
systématique à la négociation collective;
l’indépendance des organisations professionnelles
par rapport à toutes formes de pression; les résultats
aux élections des délégués du personnel. 41
(ILO, 2002, 126)
Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations
(CEACR) 
The Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) is
composed of 20 legal experts appointed by the
governing body, on a three-year term basis. It supports
the ILO via a preliminary technical examination of
compliance with ILO standards. The annual report of
the CEACR is tabled to the Committee on Application of
Standards (CAS). The CAS is a tripartite body made up of
government, employer, and worker representatives,
which examines the CEACR report and then introduces a
number of issues for general discussion. The CAS also
draws up conclusions and recommendations addressed
to governments and inviting them to take specific
actions (Eurofound 2005b). 
In 1956, the CEACR mentioned the concept of
representativeness for the very first time in a case on
the Union of South Africa; it stated that ‘the
representativeness of the parties must be substantial.
Non-parties are not consulted’ (ILC, 1956, p.35). The
CEACR continued to use this notion until 1969. From
1973 (ILC, 1973, p.30) until 1994 the CEACR, similar to
the ECSR of the Council of Europe (cf. below), started to
use the term ‘representativity’ (ILC, 1994, p.108.).42
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In 1982, the CEACR for the very first time claimed that
criteria to identify the most representative trade union
had to be objective and set by law: 
… on condition that the determination of the most
representative organisations is made on the basis of
objective criteria laid down in advance, so as to avoid
any possibility of partiality or abuse. The Committee
is of the opinion that the criteria fixed by law should
enable the trade unions which appear to be the most
representative of the workers in a given sector, or of a
given category of workers, to be associated in the
collective bargaining procedures so as to represent
and defend the collective interests of their members. 
(ILC, 1982, p. 113)
In 1985, the Committee added that these objective
criteria needed to be pre-established (ILC, 1985, p.240).
A slightly different wording was used in 1987, asking for
the criteria to be ‘laid down in advance’ (ILC, 1987,
p512). A first exhaustive list of criteria and their
underlying rationale was tabled by the CEACR in 1988,
while commenting on the Belgium National Labour
Council (Conseil National du Travail/National
Arbeidsraad, CNT/NAR) that had been established in
1952.
… the Committee on Freedom of Association
considers that the simple fact that the legislation of a
country establishes a distinction between the most
representative workers’ and employers’ occupational
organisations and other occupational organisations
is not in itself open to criticism. However, the
determination of the representative occupational
organisation must be based on objective and
predetermined criteria, so as to avoid any possibility
of partiality or abuse. In view of the absence of any
criteria in the legislation, the Committee of Experts, in
line with the Committee on Freedom of Association,
therefore invites the Government to adopt by
legislative means objective, predetermined and
detailed criteria to govern the rules for the access of
workers’ and employers’ occupational organisations
to the National Labour Council and to the various
public and private sector committees in which the
binding collective agreements are formulated, in
order to avoid any possibility of partiality or abuse in
the choice of organisations authorised to sit in these
bodies.
(ILC, 1988, p. 145)
In 1994, the CEACR then made the distinction between
different degrees of representativeness as well as
between optional and compulsory trade union
recognition and its link to the criteria of
representativeness. 
The recognition (by public authorities) of one or more
trade unions as partners in collective bargaining
immediately raises the question of their
representativity. During its discussion on Convention
No. 98, the International Labour Conference referred
to this question and to some extent accepted the
distinction sometimes made between the various
trade unions according to their degree of
representativity... Recognition of a trade union for the
purposes of collective bargaining is sometimes
optional, in which case the public authority should
encourage employers to recognize trade unions which
can prove their representativity. Recognition may also
be voluntary when provided for in a bipartite or
tripartite agreement or where it constitutes a well-
established practice. In many countries, however, the
legislation establishes a system of “compulsory”
(p.108) recognition where the employer, under certain
conditions, must recognize the existing trade union(s).
The Committee considers that it is important in such
cases for the determination of the trade union in
question to be based on objective and pre-established
criteria so as to avoid any opportunity for partiality or
abuse. 
(ILC, 1994, p. 108; see also ILC 1998, p. 165)
Furthermore, the Committee established that in the
case of compulsory trade union recognition a number of
safeguards had to be respected.
a) the certification to be made by an independent
body; (b) the representative organisation to be chosen
by a majority vote of the employees in the unit
concerned; (c) the right of an organisation, which in a
previous trade union election failed to secure a
sufficiently large number of votes, to request a new
election after a stipulated period; (d) the right of any
new organisation other than the certified
organisation to demand a new election after a
reasonable period has elapsed. 
(ILC, 1994, p.109)
In 1999, the CEACR claimed that representativeness
criteria needed to ‘be predetermined and impartial’
(ILC, 1994, p. 275) and that the parameters of
representativeness had to be ‘verified by the public
authority based on legal criteria’ (ILC, 1994, p.324). In
2007 and 2012, the CEACR again called ‘for a fair
determination of the representativeness of the highest
level based on objective and pre-established criteria
and for the composition of the negotiation board when
no trade union organisation represents 33 per cent of
employees or no employers’ organisation meets the
same requirement’ (ILC, 2007, p.164) in order ‘to avoid
any possibility of bias or abuse’ (ILC, 2012, 152).
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To sum up, the up-to-date list of criteria of
representativeness, as upheld by the CEACR from 2013
to 2016 is that an organisation must be: 
a) objective;
b) precise; and
c) predetermined (ILC 2013, p. 152; 2015, p. 59); 2016,
p.116).
The CEACR added that these criteria also came with the
stipulation that third parties were no longer able to
object to the status of most representative trade unions
in relation to those interest organisations having
fulfilled the aforementioned criteria (ILC, 2015, p.59.).
At the same time, the Committee concluded that the
criteria had to be assessed in light of the specificities of
the national industrial relations systems and whether
they were shared by the most representative social
partners (ILC, 2014, p. 90).
International Training Centre of the
International Labour Organization (ITCILO)
In 2013, the ILO Guide on National Tripartite Social
Dialogue stated that ‘one of the main challenges of
social dialogue relates to the determination of the
workers’ and employers’ organisations that will take
part in the consultation or negotiation process’
(ILO, 2013a, 103). This guide continues to explain that,
according to the ILO supervisory bodies, the
representativeness of the two sides of industry have to
be established on ‘precise, objective and
pre-established criteria to avoid any opportunity for
partiality or abuse. The lack of a clear procedure for the
determination of representativeness criteria involves
the risk of political bias (ibidem)’. Blanpain adds to this
that these representativeness criteria should be
statutory and their determination should not be left to
the governments in power (Blanpain, 2014, p. 213;
Ritschard et al, 2007). A more positive outcome is that
the label of being the most representative organisation
may lead to preferential rights of interest organisations
provided that this assessment took place according to
objective and pre-established criteria (Ritschard et al,
2007, p. 39).
Finally, the ITCILO distinguishes between quantitative,
qualitative and other criteria when it comes to assessing
the representativeness of management and labour.
Council of Europe
The European Social Charter of the Council of Europe is
referred to in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) as one of the sources inspiring the social
objectives of the EU. The Preamble to the TEU also
speaks of the Member States’ wish to confirm ‘their
attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in
the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18
October 1961’. The Council of Europe adopted the
European Social Charter in 1961; it was revised in 1996.
All EU Member States are members of the Council of
Europe and have ratified the European Social Charter.
The charter includes fundamental rights in the field of
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Table 4: Representativeness criteria according to the ITCILO
Quantitative criteria
Qualitative criteria
Other criteria
£ membership
£ geographical or industrial coverage
£ number of collective agreements concluded
£ result of professional elections
£ respect of democratic principles in the
functioning of the organisation
£ financial / organizational independence
£ numbers of years of experience
£ infrastructure for communication (website,
publications …)
£ affiliation to international organizations, in
particular ITUC and IOE
£ presence of the organization at the enterprise or
workplace level (for trade unions)
Source: ILO (2013a).
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social policy generally (health, social security, welfare)
and specifically in the fields of employment and
industrial relations, including the rights to work, to just
conditions of work, to a fair remuneration and to
organise and bargain collectively. It was the first
international treaty expressly recognising the right to
strike. States who ratify the charter accept at least five
of its seven core articles: the rights to work, organise,
bargain collectively, social security, social and medical
assistance; the rights of the family to social, legal and
medical protection; and the protection of migrant
workers. In addition, they undertake to be bound by at
least 10 of the 19 articles in Part II or by 45 of the 72
numbered paragraphs. The European Social Charter
relies on supervision of practices through scrutiny of the
regular reports submitted by the states to a committee
of independent experts, the European Committee of
Social Rights (ECSR). On the basis of the assessment by
the ECSR, a government committee proposes to the
Committee of Ministers to issue recommendations
requesting (particular) states to bring national law and
practice into conformity with the charter. Moreover, in
November 1995, an additional protocol was added to
the charter providing, when ratified, for a system of
collective complaints by international and national
organisations of employers and trade unions and
international non-governmental organisations. This
enforcement system does not depend on the
willingness or availability of resources of an individual
complainant; it is policy-oriented and might thus
provide a broader perspective than a case-based
procedure (Eurofound 2006).
Article 5 of the European Social Charter stipulates: 
Employers and workers have the right to form
national or international associations for the
protection of their economic and social interests With
a view to ensuring or promoting the freedom of
workers and employers to form local, national or
international organisations for the protection of their
economic and social interests and to join those
organisations, the Contracting Parties undertake that
national law shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it
be so applied as to impair, this freedom. The extent to
which the guarantees provided for in this article shall
apply to the police shall be determined by national
laws or regulations. The principle governing the
application to the members of the armed forces of
these guarantees and the extent to which they shall
apply to persons in this category shall equally be
determined by national laws or regulations.
Trade unions and employer organisations must be free
to organise without prior authorisation and initial
formalities should be simple. Fees, if charged for the
registration or establishment of an organisation, must
be reasonable and designed only to cover strictly
necessary administrative costs. Thresholds related to
membership figures comply with Article 5 if the number
is reasonable and presents no obstacle to the founding
of social partner organisations, which must be
independent (Council of Europe, 2008, p. 49). Trade
unions must be free to form federations and join similar
national and international organisations. National law
must guarantee the right of workers to join a trade
union and include effective sanctions where this right is
not respected. Trade union members must be protected
from any harmful consequence deriving from their trade
union membership. Where such discrimination occurs,
national law must cater for adequate and proportionate
compensation. Any form of legally compulsory trade
unionism is incompatible with Article 5. The same rules
apply to employers’ freedom to organise. Trade unions
and employers are entitled to perform their activities
effectively and devise a work programme.
Consequently, any excessive state interference
constitutes a violation of Article 5 (Council of Europe,
2008, pp. 49–51). 
The independence of the trade unions may take various
forms.
a) Trade unions are entitled to choose their own
members and representatives.
b) Excessive limits on the reasons for which a trade
union may take disciplinary action against a
member constitute an unwarranted interference in
the autonomy of trade unions inherent in Article 5.
c) Trade union officials must have access to the
workplace and union members must be able to
hold meetings at work in so far as employers’
interests and company requirements permit
(Council of Europe, 2008, pp. 50–51).
With regard to the concept of representativeness, the
impact of Article 5 as interpreted by ECSR are the
following. Domestic law may restrict participation in
various consultation and collective bargaining
procedures to representative trade unions alone. For
the situation to comply with Article 5, the following
conditions must be met:
a) decisions on representativeness must not present a
direct or indirect obstacle to the founding of trade
unions;
b) areas of activity restricted to representative unions
should not include key trade union prerogatives
(ECSR, Conclusions XV-1, Belgium, p. 74);
c) criteria used to determine representativeness must be
reasonable, clear, predetermined, objective,
prescribed by law and open to judicial review (ECSR,
Conclusions XV-1, France, p. 240).
Similar to the ILO, the wording of the concept changed
over time between representativity and
representativeness. First mentioned in 1979, the concept
was called representativeness (ECSR, FR, 1979), changed
to representativity in 2000 (ECSR, FR, 2000) and has been
again labelled as representativeness, ever since 2006
The concept of representativeness at national, international and European level
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(ECSR, HR, 2006). The ECSR has recalled at many
instance, from 2000 until 2014, that the concept of
representativeness is an autonomous concept which is
‘not necessarily identical to the national notion of
representativeness’ (ECSR, Complaint No. 9/2000,
Confédération Française de l’Encadrement ‘CFE-CGC’ v.
France, decision on admissibility of 6 November 2000,
paragraph 6).
With regard to the criteria of representativeness, the
opinions of the ECSR have also evolved over time. In
2000, the Committee stipulated that these criteria, in
particular when it comes to collective bargaining, have
to be pre-established, clear and objective (ECSR, FR,
2000). In the French case, the ECHR took particular note
of the fact that these criteria were subject to specific
two-fold legal control by the Conseil d’Etat and the
Court of Cassation (ECSR, FR 2000) and consisted both
of a quantitative and qualitative screening (ECSR, FR,
2000). In 2004, the ECSR considered with regard to a
case emanating from Bulgaria that the criteria
enshrined contained in Article 34 of the Labour Code
were ‘formally laid down and objective, and their
application is subject to oversight by an independent
body and must be regularly reviewed’ (ECSR, BG, 2004).
In 2006, the Committee considered that a national
system of industrial relation that did not contain any
criteria for representativeness was in conformity with
Article 5 of the charter (ECSR, DK, 2006).
From 2006 onwards, the ECSR argued that in order to be
compatible with Article 5 of the charter, criteria of
representativeness needed to be:
a) reasonable; 
b) clear;
c) predetermined; 
d) objective; 
e) laid down in law; and 
f) subject to judicial scrutiny (Council of Europe, 2008,
p. 51; ECSR, Conclusions XV-1, France, pp. 240-250;
LU 2006, BE 2010, BG, 2010, ES 2010, FR 2010, MT
2014, NL 2014). 
A slightly different wording for two of the criteria was
used from 2010 onwards, starting with a conclusion
related to Bulgaria when the ECSR stated that ‘criteria
used to decide on representativeness of employees’ and
employer organisations are pre-established, objective
and subject to review by an independent body (ECSR,
BG 2010.) In the same year the ECSR further specified
that:
a) decisions on representativeness must not present a
direct or indirect obstacle to the founding of trade
unions (ECSR, AD 2014, AM 2014, MT 2014, RU 2014); 
b) areas of activity restricted to representative unions
should not include key trade union prerogatives
(ECSR, Conclusions XV-1, Belgium, GE 2010, UA
2010, GE 2014, MT 2014, RU 2014);
c) the application of criteria of representativeness
should not lead to automatic exclusion of the small
trade unions or those not long formed, to the
advantage of larger and longer-established trade
unions (ECSR, UA 2010, NO 2013, AD 2014, AM 2014,
RU 2014).
In 2014, the ECSR was asked to give an opinion on the
French Act No. 2009-789 of 20 August 2008 on the
reform of social democracy and working time, in
particular the claim of several French trade unions that
the electoral thresholds prescribed by that law were not
reasonable. In April 2010, the Court of Cassation had
given a judgment (No. 899), arguing that they ‘had
considered that Article 5 of the charter did not prohibit
the existence of some kind of trade union
representativeness’ (ECSR, FR, 2014). The French
Constitutional Court had held that: 
the legislator is free to set criteria for the
representativeness of trade unions. The freedom to
join a trade union of one’s choice provided for by the
sixth paragraph of the 1946 Preamble does not
require that all trade unions be regarded as
representative regardless of their support; by setting
the threshold at 10% of the votes cast in the first
round of the last election of staff representatives,
regardless of the number of voters, the legislator did
not disregard the principles laid down in paragraphs
six and eight of the 1946 Preamble.
(ECSR, FR 2014)
The ECSR reserved its position on this issue and did not
come forward with an opinion in 2014. 
European Union
Both paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 154 TFEU specify that
the Commission ‘shall consult management and labour’
in the course of the two phases of the consultation
process. But who does ‘management and labour’
(Eurofound, 2005a) include? The TFEU remains silent on
the definition of these two actors. The only selection
criterion that may be drawn from Article 154(1) TFEU is
the reference to the ‘Community level’, which seems to
exclude the national social partners. Since the EU-level
social partners are numerous as well as heterogeneous,
the key concept developed by the Commission in order
to identify ‘management and labour’ is that of
representativeness. Management and labour in all three
phases of the European social dialogue under Articles
154 and 155 TFEU must be representative. That includes
first and second consultation (Article 154 (1 and 2)
TFEU); negotiations between the social partners
(Articles 154(4) and 155(1) TFEU); and implementation
of the European collective agreements (Article 155(2)
TFEU).
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Council of the European Union
In the UEAPME case of 1996, the Court of First Instance
stressed the duty of both the European Commission and
the Council of Ministers to assess the representativeness
of the European social partners as signatory parties to
any agreement, because the European Parliament was
absent in the legislative process under the European
social dialogue.
In two of the most recent directives implementing social
partner agreements, the Council of Ministers took the
following stance. With regard to the Commission
proposal for a Council directive implementing the
framework agreement on prevention from sharp
injuries in the hospital and healthcare sector concluded
by HOSPEEM and EPSU, the Council concluded that 
the Commission took account of the
representativeness of the signatory parties, having
regard to the scope of the Agreement, for the hospital
and healthcare sector, their mandate and the legality
of the clauses in the Framework Agreement and its
compliance with the relevant provisions concerning
small and medium-sized undertakings.
(European Commission, 2009a)
As for the Commission’s proposal for a Council directive
implementing the European agreement concluded by
the European Barge Union (EBU), the European
Skippers Organisation (ESO) and the European
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) concerning certain
aspects of the organisation of working time in inland
waterway transport, the Council considered that 
the Commission drafted its proposal for a Directive, in
accordance with its Communication of 20 May 1998
on adapting and promoting the social dialogue at
Community level, taking into account the
representative status of the signatory parties and the
legality of each paragraph of the Agreement. 
(European Commission, 2014)
On 16 June 2016, the Council of the European Union
adopted in Amsterdam the conclusions on ‘a new start
for a strong social dialogue’. The concept of
representativeness at European level also plays a role in
these conclusions.
£ ‘An effective social dialogue requires social partners
that are resilient, representative, autonomous,
mandated and equipped with all the capacities
needed. Social partners also need institutional
settings that allow their dialogue to be effective’
(Council of the European Union, 2016, p. 3).
£ ‘The Council of the European Union stresses … the
importance of capacity building of social partners
at national and sectoral level, which could
contribute – amongst others things – to improved
representativeness of European social partners in
negotiating their agreements’ (ibid., 2016, p. 4).
£ ‘The Council of the European Union calls on the
Member States to take the necessary steps to: …
promote the building and strengthening of the
capacities of the social partners through different
forms of support, including legal and technical
expertise. This should be ensured at all relevant
levels, depending on the needs of countries and
social partners, including to become solid and
representative organisations’ (ibid., 2016, p. 5).
£ ‘The Council of the European Union calls on the
European Commission to take the necessary steps
to: … continue to assess the representativeness of
Union social partners, based upon the analysis
carried out through Eurofound representativeness
studies’ (ibid., 2016, p. 6). 
£ ‘The Council of the European Union Invites the
social partners at the appropriate levels, and with
full respect for their autonomy, to take the
necessary steps to: … continue efforts to improve
membership and representativeness, and to ensure
that the capacity to enter into agreements exists
(ibid., 2016, p. 7).
European Commission 
Management and labour in the sense of Article 155(1)
TFEU designates those organisations that agree to
negotiate with each other. This principle of ‘mutual
recognition’ was expressed by the Commission in its
1993 Communication and confirmed by the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the UEAPME
case. Thus, in contrast to the consultation procedure
under Article 154 TFEU, the Commission does not apply
selection criteria to the autonomous negotiations of the
European social partners under Article 155 TFEU
(European Commission, 1993; Smismans, 2004; Reale,
2003; Lhernould, 2008).43 If, however, the EU-level social
partners act as a ‘substitute to the European
Parliament’ (Spiess, 2005) in the European social
dialogue, they have to be screened when they request
the extension of their European collective agreements
via Article 155 (2) TFEU. According to some academics,
this is a necessary prerequisite for a ‘functionally
democratic’ or ‘state democratic’ (Spiess, 2005, p. 168)
representativeness, legitimising a process that is in line
with criteria of accountability and democratic
legitimacy.
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Since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, 
a number of the organisations, which do not
participate in the existing social dialogue, have
submitted formal requests to the Commission to take
part directly in the social dialogue. To take a position
on this question in full knowledge of the facts, the
Commission carried out a study of European
employers’ and workers’ organisations so as to
enable the Commission to understand more clearly
the different mechanisms by which representative
social dialogues are established at national level, and
to assist in assessing how this process might best
operate at Community level. 
(European Commission, 1993)
Annex 3 of this 1993 communication summarised the
main findings of the study on the representativeness of
the social partners. The study identified the concept of
representativeness as a key criterion and comes to the
conclusion:
For collective bargaining, in most countries mutual
recognition is the basic mechanism, but additional
formal or legal requirements may have to be fulfilled.
In several countries there are mechanisms (for
example quantitative criteria established by law or
otherwise) to make a distinction between
organisations with (the most) substantial
membership and those which are less representative.
(European Commission, 1993)
Annex 3 then defined criteria for representativeness for
the consultation phase of the European social dialogue.
According to the 1993 Communication, ‘organisations
[that] are potentially eligible to be consulted’ under
Articles 154 TFEU must:
£ be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or
categories and be organised at European level;
£ consist of organisations, which are themselves an
integral and recognised part of Member State social
partner structures and with the capacity to
negotiate agreements, and which are
representative of all Member States, as far as
possible [emphasis added];
£ have adequate structures to ensure their effective
participation in the consultation process (European
Commission, 1993). 
In spite of some criticism from scholars and other EU
institutions regarding the criteria of representativeness,
the Commission, to date, has not elaborated on this
definition, to go beyond its existing scope and precision
(Barnard, 2012). According to Moreau, the Commission
justified this restraint in the past by the following
arguments. First, the structures of the European social
partners had not yet stabilised. The second argument
for not elaborating further on the criteria was the
respect of the autonomy of the social partners. In the
eyes of the Commission, the diversity of interpretations
given to the concept of representativeness at Member
State level, also constituted an insurmountable
obstacle for a common definition (Moreau, 1999). As we
have shown in chapter 1 of this report, this diversity is
still present in 2016 and probably has even increased
since 1993. Despite this, the research could identify two
main principles (mutual recognition and legal
conformity) and four different concepts (self-regulated
mutual recognition; mixed mutual recognition and state
regulation; state-regulated membership strength; and
state-regulated electoral strength), which are spread
across the EU 28 Member States. In particular, the
concept of ‘state-regulated membership strength’
builds on criteria and thresholds, which might help in
fine-tuning the application of the criteria stemming
from COM(93)600, COM(98)322, the decision annexed to
the later Commission Decision 98/500/EC.
In its 1996 communication (European Commission,
1996), the European Commission argued that 
participation in the Val Duchesse social dialogue is
based on the mutual recognition of the parties, not on
a decision of the Commission. Nevertheless, the
Commission has received a series of requests to
participate in the interprofessional social dialogue
from organisations who were not party to the original
initiative.44
(European Commission, 1996, p. 4)
In the same communication, the Commission also
stated a number of proposals and questions on which it
wished to hear the views of all interested parties. One of
the questions dealt with criteria of representativeness:
‘Do you agree with adapting the representativeness
criteria for organisations to be consulted?’ (European
Commission, 1996, p. 18).
In the second communication from 1998, the
Commission confirmed its 1993 criteria as regards the
consultation phase and reproduced these verbatim. In
the 1998 decision, however, the Commission slightly
varied the criteria with regard to the setting-up of
sectoral social dialogue committees.
Sectoral Dialogue Committees (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Committees’) are hereby established in those
sectors where the social partners make a joint request
to take part in a dialogue at European level, and
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where the organisations representing both sides of
industry fulfil the following criteria:
(a) they shall relate to specific sectors or categories
and be organised at European level;
(b) they shall consist of organisations which are
themselves an integral and recognized part of
Member States’ social partner structures and have
the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are
representative of several Member States [emphasis
added]; 
(c) they shall have adequate structures to ensure their
effective participation in the work of the Committees.
(European Commission, 1998b, p. 31)
In the 1998 communication, the Commission changed
the wording in criterion (b), from the 1993 version
‘which are representative of all Member States, as far as
possible [emphasis added]’ to ‘which are representative
of several Member States [emphasis added]’. 
In its communication from 2002 on European social
dialogue, a force for innovation and change, the
Commission repeated its former position (European
Commission, 2002a). The Commission announced,
however, that it would ‘launch a fresh study on
representativeness to cover further sectors reflecting
developments in the European economy and prepare
studies on the cross-sector and sectoral social partner
organisations in the candidate countries’. In its 2004
communication on social dialogue, the Commission
proposed Eurofound for this task (European
Commission, 2004b), and in 2006 the Dublin tripartite
EU agency commenced to conduct sectoral
representativeness studies.45 By mid-June 2016,
Eurofound has published 43 sectoral studies and
finished the cross-sector representativeness study on
which chapter 1 of this report is partly based. The
Commission also promised that it would present an
amended list of organisations consulted under Article
154 TFEU, and that it would adapt the list again in
function of the potential establishment of new social
dialogue committees and of the results of the studies on
representativeness. 
The Commission maintains and regularly updates a ‘list
of European social partners’ organisations consulted
under Article 154 TFEU’ which comply with these
criteria. The latest version of this list, accessed on 21
June 2016, includes 87 organisations which are divided
into five groups:
£ general cross-industry organisations
(BusinessEurope, CEEP, ETUC);
£ cross-industry organisations representing certain
categories of workers or undertakings (Eurocadres,
UEAPME, CEC);
£ specific organisations (Eurochambres);
£ sectoral organisations representing employers
(65 organisations); and
£ sectoral European trade union organisations
(15 organisations) (European Commission, undated).
Aware of the problems linked to the concept of
‘representativeness’, the Commission drew the
following two main conclusions from its 1993 study.
(a) the diversity of practice in the different Member
States is such that there is no single model, which
could be replicated at European level, and 
(b) the different Member States’ systems having all
taken many years to grow and develop, it is difficult to
see how a European system can be created by
administrative decision in the short term.
(European Commission, 1993, p. 22)
More recently, the concept of representativeness also
plays a role in the framework of the better regulation
agenda. In tool number seven (IA requirements for
social partner initiatives), the Commission states that
whenever the impacts of the agreement are likely to be
significant, before taking its decision, the Commission
will carry out a proportionate impact assessment, which
will focus in particular on the representativeness of the
signatories (European Commission, 2015). The
Commission also concludes that ‘the success of self-
and co-regulation depends in essence on several key
factors which include: representativeness,
transparency, legal compliance and effective
implementation and monitoring (ibid., 2015).
European Parliament 
A critical reflection came from the European Parliament,
which linked the issue of participation and consultation
to the necessity of democratic legitimacy of those
involved in the decision-making process:
‘organised civil society’ as ‘the sum of all
organisational structures whose members have
objectives and responsibilities that are of general
interest and who also act as mediators between the
public authorities and citizens’(22), whilst important,
are inevitably sectoral and cannot be regarded as
having its own democratic legitimacy (23), given that
representatives are not elected by the people and
therefore cannot be voted out by the people,
consultation of interested parties with the aim of
improving draft legislation can only ever supplement
and can never replace the procedures and decisions
of legislative bodies which possess democratic
legitimacy; only the Council and Parliament, as co-
legislators, can take responsible decisions in the
context of legislative procedures ….
(European Parliament, 2001)
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In April of 1994, the Committee on Social Affairs,
Employment and the Working Environment of the
European Parliament adopted a report on the
application of the agreement on social policy. In this
report, the Committee proposed to complement the
representativeness criteria of the Commission by the
following two conditions:
(a) eligible organisations should be composed of
organisations representing employers or workers
with membership that is voluntary at both national
and European level;
(b) eligible organisations should have a mandate from
their members to represent them in the context of
the Community social dialogue and are to
demonstrate their representativity (European
Parliament, 1994).
Both criteria – voluntary membership and mandate to
represent their affiliates in European social dialogue–
had also been identified by the social partners
themselves as key representativeness criteria in both
the consultation and negotiation phases (ETUC, UNICE
and CEEP, 1993).
European Economic and Social Committee 
In 1994, the European Economic and Social Committee
(EESC) issued a critical opinion in relation to the 1993
communication with regard to the use of the concept of
‘representativeness’ (EESC, 1994). The EESC claimed
that the criteria assessing the representativeness of a
social partner organisation should reflect the specific
context of the European social dialogue.
Consultation and social dialogue at European
Commission level should not be assumed to be the
same as collective bargaining within the Member States.
The processes and outcomes may be different; those
engaged in social dialogue at European Commission
level may also be identified with especially different
criteria. It is important to not simply extrapolate from
national experience to Commission level (EESC, 1994).
Furthermore, the EECS claimed that ‘the social partners
at EU level are to be selected having regard to the
nature of the process and of the outcome of EU social
dialogue. These would indicate transnational criteria
linked to national social partners, and organisational
capacity’ (EESC, 1994). With regard to the Commission
criteria of COM(93)600, the EESC criticised that these
were ‘ambiguous as to the need for a negotiating
capacity of the EC social partners’. The EESC proposed
to add an additional criterion – the capacity to
negotiate binding agreements: ‘Criteria should also
include capacity to negotiate for and bind national
structures’ (EESC, 1994, para. 2.1.12). The EESC
continued that:
Member State social partners comprising the EC level
organisations should be encouraged to grant
adequate bargaining mandates to the EC level social
partner organisations. Member States should be
encouraged to provide the procedures and
guarantees securing the general effect of EC level
agreements reached.
(EESC, 1994, para. 2.1.14).
In 1997, the ESSC issued the opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee on the Commission
communication concerning the development of the
social dialogue at Community level. In paragraph 1.8,
the EESC came up with its own list of criteria that
representative organisations should satisfy.
1. A European representative organisation must be
widely spread over the EU. This means that it must
have member organisations at the appropriate
relevant negotiation level in at least three-quarters of
the EU Member States and be seeking to be
represented in the others.
2. The European organisation must have a mandate
from its member organisations to negotiate at
European level.
3. All the organisations affiliated to the European
organisation, either in their own name or through
their member organisations, must be entitled to
negotiate in the Member States and must be able to
implement conventions concluded at European level
in accordance with national practices and usage.
4. The European organisation must be made up of
organisations that are considered in their Member
States as representative. 
(EESC, 1997, 1.8)
Thus, the main new criterion for representativeness of
the 1997 opinion is the quantitative threshold of a
required membership base in at least three-quarters of
the Member States. When it comes to the
implementation of European framework agreements by
Council decision, however, the EESC argues that ‘[t]his
question should not be answered using criteria based
on figures. What is essential when answering this
question is that every representative organisation which
fulfils the criteria set out in point 1.8.1 should be
admitted to the talks if it so wishes, at the appropriate
relevant negotiation level’ (EESC, 1997, 1.9).
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European cross-industry social partners
The European cross-sector social partners ETUC, CEEP
and UNICE reacted by issuing a position paper on the
European Commission’s first communication on social
dialogue from 1993 (European Commission, 1993). In
their proposals for implementation of the agreement
annexed to the protocol on social policy of the TEU of 29
October 1993, ETUC, CEEP and UNICE tabled a more
detailed and encompassing list of conditions to be met
by organisations to be consulted by the European
Commission.
In order to be regarded as such, the organisations
involved under Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement
should meet all the following conditions: 
       £ be organised horizontally or sectorally at
European level;
       £ be composed of organisations which are
themselves regarded at their respective national
levels as representative of the interests they
defend, particularly in the fields of social,
employment and industrial relations policy; 
       £ be represented in all Member States of the
European Community and, possibly, of the
European Economic Area or have participated in
the ‘Val Duchesse’ social dialogue; 
       £ be composed of organisations representing
employers or workers, membership of which is
voluntary at both national and European level; 
       £ be composed of members with the right to be
involved, directly or through their members, in
collective negotiations at their respective levels; 
       £ be instructed by their members to represent them
in the framework of the Community social
dialogue.
(ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, 1993)
In their subsequent chapter on negotiations, ETUC,
CEEP and UNICE then point to the importance of the
concepts of mutual recognition and the capacity to
negotiate, which have also been identified here as
important concepts and criteria at national level: 
[I]n the light of the spirit of the Agreement, ETUC,
CEEP and UNICE believe that the fact that
organisations meeting the criteria set out in point 4
above, mutually recognizing each other as social
partners and with an ad hoc mandate from their
members decide to open negotiations in the
framework of Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Agreement.
(ETUC, CEEP, UNICE, 1993)
In their analysis of European social dialogue, Franssen
and Jacobs (1998) pointed out that the Commission’s
criteria represent ‘a slim version of a suggested list of
criteria proposed to the Commission by UNICE, ETUC
and CEEP’. In its 1998 position paper on the Commission
communication on adapting and promoting the social
dialogue at Community level, UNICE regretted that a
weakening of the 1993 criteria had taken place: 
However, UNICE deeply regrets that this statement is
contradicted by the fact that the formulation of article
1.b of the Commission decision on the establishment
of sectoral social dialogue committees has weakened
these criteria as compared with COM(93)600 final.
Instead of requiring organisations to be
representative ‘in all Member States, as far as
possible’, the Decision only requires them to be
representative ‘in several Member States’. 
(UNICE, 1998)
Such an interpretation, however, does not clearly
distinguish between the scope of application of the
communications from 1993 and 1998 and the 1998
decision. As mentioned above, the two communications
set out criteria for organisations to be consulted under
Article 154 TFEU, whereas decision 98/500/EC
postulates criteria for the establishment of sectoral
social dialogue committees. Since not all sectors are
present in all EU 28 Member States, these criteria have
to be less exigent.
Court of Justice of the European Union
(UEAPME case)
At the peak of the parental leave dispute, UEAPME
drafted a complaint to the European Court of First
Instance (CFI) doubting the legality of Council directive
96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, and
challenged their status as European social partners (T-
135/96, 2335). The criterion of ‘sufficient collective
representativity’ became the bone of contention in the
so-called UEAPME case. Due to the fact that the
European social partners are not directly legitimised
democratic Community institutions, the question about
the source of their legitimacy in the framework of
European social dialogueis a crucial one. Since under
European social dialogue, management and labour
have developed into ‘co-legislators’ (Dufresne et al,
2006, p. 45) in the social policy field, the
representativeness and mandate checks exercised by
the European Commission are very important. Against
the background of the principle of democracy, it is an
essential condition that the signatory parties, which
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have concluded a European collective agreement, are
representative and have been properly mandated by
their national affiliates, and even more importantly, that
this mandate has been given in a democratic manner
(Welz, 2008; Franssen, 2002). Consequently, in a first
step, the CFI exposed the link between the principles of
democracy and representativity.
However, the principle of democracy on which the
Union is founded requires – in the absence of the
participation of the European Parliament in the
legislative process – that the participation of the
people be otherwise assured, in this instance through
the parties representative of management and labour
who concluded the agreement which is endowed by
the Council, acting on a qualified majority, on a
proposal from the Commission, with a legislative
foundation at Community level. In order to make sure
that that requirement is complied with, the
Commission and the Council are under a duty to verify
that the signatories to the agreement are truly
representative. 
(Case T-135/96, 2335)
The legitimacy of the European Union as such is said to
increase by the participation of citizens and other
parties, like the two sides of industry, in the decision-
making process (Føllesdahl, 2004, p. 9).
According to Bercusson, it follows from the above
paragraph that in the view of the CFI, ‘the European
social dialogue is equated with the EU legislative
process; as such, it must attain the equivalent degree of
democratic legitimacy’ (Bercusson, 1999, pp. 163–164).
Following on from this, the CFI argues that if a European
collective agreement is to be democratically legitimate,
that it needs to be assured ‘whether, having regard to
the content of the agreement in question, the
signatories, taken together [emphasis added], are
sufficiently representative’ (T-135/96, 2335, para. 90).
The CFI further claims that the representativeness of the
signatory parties has to be judged ‘in relation to the
content of the agreement,’ or ‘with respect to the
substantive scope of the framework agreement’
(T-135/96, 2335, para. 90/91). The consequence for the
European social partners is that agreements may be
democratically legitimate when signed by organisations
that are only representative in relation to the limited
content or scope of the specific agreement (Obradovic,
1998, p. 149). A sufficient cumulative representativeness
may be achieved, even if the signatory parties of either
side, taken separately, are not representative
individually, but taken together achieve a cumulative
representativeness (Hellsten, 2004; Bercusson, 1999,
p. 82). 
The CFI then held that legitimate employer and
employee representatives may challenge collective
agreements that are negotiated at the EU level between
social partners lacking sufficient cumulative
representativeness. The CFI stipulated that the criterion
of ‘sufficient representativeness’ had to be measured in
relation to the content of the agreement. If the
contracting parties, taken together, are not sufficiently
representative, the European Commission and the
Council must refrain from implementing the agreement.
Otherwise, the EU-level social partners who were
consulted, but were not signatories, and whose
participation in relation to the content of the agreement
was necessary for the cumulative representativeness to
be achieved, have the right of action of annulment
against the Union decision implementing the social
partners’ agreement (Even, 2008, p. 144). However, the
CFI was of the opinion that UEAPME was not in such a
position, where its level of representativeness is so
great that its non-participation in the conclusion of an
agreement between general cross-industry
organisations automatically means that the
requirement of sufficient collective representativeness
was not satisfied (T-135/96, 2335, para. 104). 
The CFI, rather adamant about the concept of collective
representativeness, was, however, less clear on the
question of the relevant and corresponding criteria. The
CFI only referred to the criteria as sketched by the
Commission in its 1993 communication, but did not
comment on these criteria. The Court only stressed the
duty of both the European Commission and the Council
of Ministers to assess the representativeness of the
European social partners as signatory parties to any
agreement. As regards the EU-level employers, UNICE,
the CFI concluded that this ‘body represented
undertakings of all sizes in the private sector, which
qualified it to represent the SMEs, and that it counted
among its members associations of SMEs, many of
which were also affiliated to the applicant’ (T-135/96,
2335, para. 98). The CFI took into consideration that the
numeric criterion of social partner organisations may be
validated, but concluded:
The applicant’s criticisms cannot be accepted. In the
first place, they are all based on a single criterion,
namely the number of SMUs represented respectively
by the applicant and UNICE. Even if that criterion may
be taken into consideration when determining
whether the collective representativity of the
signatories to the framework agreement is sufficient,
it cannot be regarded as decisive in relation to the
content of that agreement. Since the framework
agreement concerns all employment relationships…,
it is not so much the status of undertaking which is
important, but that of employer. 
(T-135/96, 2335, para. 102)
UEAPME’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI, and
UEAPME lodged an appeal to the CJEU, the next
instance in European judicial review. In the meantime,
however, new intra-associational developments had
occurred. On 4 December 1998, UEAPME and UNICE
signed a cooperation agreement. According to the text
of this agreement, UEAPME recognises UNICE as the sole
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European organisation representing businesses of all
sizes active in all sectors of the economy, and takes for
granted the fact that the vast majority of businesses
represented by UNICE are SMEs. UNICE recognises that
UEAPME is the main cross-industry organisation
representing the specific interests of SMEs at European
level, and that it therefore has a role to play in the social
dialogue and can make a useful contribution to
defending the interests of employers in negotiations
with ETUC, in cooperation with UNICE. In terms of the
agreement, the two employer organisations will strive
to ‘reach consensus on the positions to be defended in
the social dialogue while fully respecting the autonomy
of the two organisations’. Specifically, as leader of and
spokesperson for employees within the social dialogue
process, UNICE will consult UEAPME before taking
public positions on behalf of employers in negotiations
and in the social dialogue. For their part, the
representatives of UEAPME are to play a full part in
preparatory meetings of the employers’ group, and in
plenary meetings with the ETUC. UNICE is to take into
account, as much as possible, the views expressed by
UEAPME during preparatory meetings of the employer
group.
The issue of representativeness also played an
important role in relation to the other employer
organisation, CEEP, which also claimed to be
representative. The CFI acknowledged CEEP as an
essential social partner in the context of the agreement
on parental leave (T-135/96, 2335, para. 100) In contrast
to the non-involvement of UEAPME, the CFI concluded
that if CEEP had not participated in the parental leave
discussions ‘this alone would have fundamentally
affected the sufficiency of the collectively
representational character of those signatories in view
of the contents of that agreement, because then one
particular category of undertakings, that of the public
sector, would have been wholly without representation’
(T-135/96, 2335, para. 100). In short, the representative
status of CEEP was reinforced by the UEAPME judgment.
In summary, it seems correct to conclude that ‘the
judgment of the Court of First Instance does not seem to
have clarified the relevant uncertainties concerning the
“dogma” of representativity’ (Reale, 2003, p. 13). Many
points of detail have stayed unclear to date and a
number of scholars, such as Blanpain, ‘deeply regret(ed)
this judgement’: ‘when the criteria for
representativeness are not clearly spelled out at
European level, the Court has to look for inspiration in
the ILO Conventions. The ILO has repeatedly said that
the criteria for representativeness need to be objective,
precise and beforehand known’ (2014, p. 233). A number
of academics argue that the determination of objective
criteria of representativeness at EU level has not
sufficiently materialised, and henceforth speak of a
‘legal limbo’ (flou juridique) in this context (Rabier, 2007,
p. 118). In the polity, the European Union ‘the
Commission and the Council are under a duty to verify
that the signatories to the agreement are truly
representative’ (T-135/96, 2335, para. 89). Furthermore,
the CFI acknowledged the obligation of the Commission
and Council to refuse to implement an agreement
where a sufficient degree of representativeness of the
social partners, taken together, as signatories to an
agreement, was missing (T-135/96, 2335, para. 90).
As early as 1972, Lyon-Caen put it in these terms : ‘il est
manifestement nécessaire que les interlocuteurs en
présence soient dûment habilités par les entreprises et
les syndicats [it is clearly necessary that the speakers
present are duly authorised by the companies and
unions] (Lyon-Caen, 1972, 39). Some sociologists have
in the past invoked numeric criteria (‘épreuves’), in
order to assess the representativeness of social partner
organisations (Béroud et al, 2012, p. 6). 
The next section presents Eurofound’s methodology of
assessing representativeness since 1996, followed by a
discussion over whether some elements of this
approach should be revisited, refined or modified after
almost 10 years of application.
Eurofound’s methodology for
assessing representativeness
Following on from the European Commission criteria
discussed above, Eurofound methodology for
representativeness studies, at both cross-sector and
sectoral level has to address two main tasks. The first
one is to analyse the relevant European associations of
the two sides of industry. The second is to identify the
relevant national associations on both sides of industry.
For this purpose, a combined approach was used for
screening the relevant social partner associations.
Top-down screening: This starts with reference to the
current relevant cross-industry European interest
associations and then looks at their affiliate members at
national level. In the top-down approach, it should be
stressed that the analysis only focuses on affiliates in
the 28 Member States of the European Union. All
members and affiliated associations in other countries
are not considered in this study. Moreover, only social
partner organisations will be taken into consideration;
other kinds of member associations with no role in
industrial relations and individual companies are not
covered by the present representativeness study,
although they are important national affiliates of some
of the relevant cross-industry EU-level organisations
included here.
Bottom-up screening: This starts with reference to the
cross-industry national associations involved in cross-
industry collective bargaining and/or direct bipartite or
tripartite consultations, and then proceeds with the
collection of data on their affiliation to any European
associations.
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Via top-down and bottom-up screening, the cross-
sector study aimed to identify and analyse all the
relevant interest associations of cross-sector social
dialogue at EU and national level. In this context, a
European association is a relevant cross-industry
interest organisation if:
£ it is on the Commission’s list of interest
organisations to be consulted in matters of cross-
industry social dialogue under Article 154 TFEU;
£ and/or it participates in the cross-industry
European social dialogue;
£ and/or it has requested to be consulted under
Article 154 TFEU.
A national association is a relevant cross-industry
national interest organisation if it meets both the
criteria (a) and (b) below:
(a) The association is:
£ either regularly directly or indirectly (via its member
organisations) involved in cross-industry collective
bargaining (or employment regulation) or directly
involved in bipartite/tripartite consultations on
cross-industry labour market and industrial
relations issues (i.e. bottom-up screening); 
£ and/or affiliated to a relevant European interest
association (i.e. top-down screening).
(b) The association’s domain relates to:
£ either more than one sector of the economy (at
least two sections in terms of the NACE Rev.2
classification system – that is one-digit sectors),
thus including associations with a general
membership domain;
£ or a group of enterprises or organisations (such as
SMEs, cooperatives or public-owned companies)
across the economy, in the case of employer
organisations, or a category of employees (such as
white-collar workers, blue-collar workers or
academics) across the economy, in the case of
trade union confederations.
In the framework of its representativeness study on the
sectoral social partners, Eurofound uses the following
criteria in order to identify relevant European and
national associations.
European associations are analysed via the ‘top-down’
approach if they:
£ are on the Commission’s list of interest
organisations to be consulted on behalf of the
sector under Article 154 TFEU;
£ and/or participate in the sector-related European
social dialogue.
The Commission may decide to include other EU sector-
related organisations in the study, if relevant, such as a
sector-related organisation that has recently requested
to be consulted under Article 154 TFEU.
A national association is considered to be a relevant
sector-related interest association if it meets both
criteria A and B.
£ A: The association’s domain relates to the sector.
£ B: The association is either: affiliated to a European-
level organisation, which is analysed in the study
within the top-down approach (independent of
their involvement in collective bargaining); or, if
not, regularly involved in sector-related collective
bargaining.
Representativeness criteria
revisited 
Union recognition – or its extension by employers –
has usually depended either on the ‘economic’ power
of unions to induce employers to accept them as
legitimate employee representatives or on the
employers’ voluntary acceptance of collective
bargaining, and so of the unions as the legitimate
bargaining partners. 
(Casale, 1996, p. 3)
European social dialogue draws its legitimacy from a
sufficient functional representativeness of the EU-level
social partners, measured by the Commission against its
own well established criteria. When assessed against
the criterion of democratic legitimacy, some scholars
argue that the European social partners dispose of their
own reservoir of legitimacy: legitimacy on basis of
functional representation. 
Functional representation, when exercised through
fair representation and balanced with mechanisms
ensuring public control on the process, can reinforce
the democratic legitimacy of a system without
endangering or jeopardizing the rights of the
individual.
(Reale, 2003, p. 17).
According to the European Commission, the ‘social
partners are representative and accountable
organisations, which act on the basis of a mandate from
their members. Social partners draw their legitimacy
from a sufficient level of representativity’ (European
Commission, 2001a). On the grounds of its functional
representation, European social dialogue is portrayed
by some as a form of ‘associative democracy’ (Falkner et
al, 2002). 
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Following on from recommendations from the
European Parliament, EESC, the EU cross-industry
social partners and academics, there seems room for a
conceptual clarification of these criteria. In its 2002
communication, the Commission was very clear with
regard to the important role social dialogue plays in
democratic European governance:
As a driving force for modernisation of the European
economy and the European social model, the social
dialogue holds a crucial, unique position in the
democratic governance of Europe. The active
involvement of the social partners in the decision-
making process of the Union and its institutions needs
to be reinforced, as called for in the White Paper on
European Governance, through closer consultation on
the basis of the procedures included in the Treaty as
early as 1992. 
(European Commission, 2002a, p. 6)
Functional legitimacy, however, does not equal that of
the European Parliament, which, as the only actor of the
Community method, is directly elected by the European
citizens; yet, one also has to keep in mind that the
outcomes of European social dialogue to be
implemented by Council directive can only be in those
social policy fields that are covered by Article 153 of the
TFEU. For functional legitimacy to be acceptable, the
European social partners have to be representative of
their constituent affiliates. The EU-level social partners,
as a ‘substitute to the European Parliament’ in
European social dialogue, must be screened if they are
to legislate under Article 155 of the TFEU. This is a
necessary prerequisite for ‘functionally democratic’, or
as Spiess puts it ‘state democratic’ (2005, 168)
representativeness, legitimising a process that is in line
with accountability and democratic legitimacy (Welz,
2008).
These two concepts – legal conformity and mutual
recognition – have also been identified as the two main
principles guiding representatives at national level in
the EU28. In a number of EU Member States (such as
France), compliance to legal measures determines
representative status. Here, the state has taken on the
responsibility of deciding which organisations may
participate in collective bargaining, the mechanisms by
which collective agreements cover certain groups of
workers and employers, and which organisations may
participate in tripartite arrangements. The principle of
conforming to the law confers representative status and
the rules by which it is achieved on the partners or on
the agreements they reach. As an impact of the global
economic and fiscal crisis, some of the EU Member
States reviewed representativeness criteria and raised
certain thresholds to be met by the two sides of
industry; this is the case for example for Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain
(ILO, 2013; Eurofound 2013a, 2013b and 2013c).
At EU level, the consultation phase of the European
social dialogue under Article 154 TFEU largely
corresponds to this principle. The European
Commission only consults those EU-level social
partners that fulfil the criteria laid down in COM(93)600
and COM(98)322 (European Commission, 1993 and
1998b). The setting-up of the sectoral social dialogue
committees is also ruled by the legal conformity
principle, since it is subject to hard EU law in the form of
Commission Decision 98/500/EC. The negotiation phase
of European social dialogue on the grounds of Article
155 TFEU is embedded to a large extent in the same
principle of mutual recognition. Instead of the State
determining which organisations may negotiate and
sign binding agreements, mutual recognition involves
self-regulation by the social partners. Legitimate or
‘recognised’ trade unions and employer associations
create their own institutional fora, within which they
collectively bargain or consult on issues of mutual
interest in the employment field. As shown in chapter 1,
this principle is applied, among other things, in Cyprus,
Sweden and the UK. The autonomy of the social
partners, however, comes to an abrupt end, once the
consultations lead to agreements to be implemented by
Council decision on the request of the social partners
(Bercusson, 1999, p. 160). Now the criteria of the Court
of First Instance are applicable, which state that the
social partners, taken together and having regard to the
content of the agreement in question, are sufficiently
representative in light of the UEAPME judgment. In a
number of recent proposals for Council directives,
however, the Commission also used Commission
decision 98/500/EC as a legal frame of reference
(European Commission, 2005, p. 3; European
Commission, 2009a, p. 7; European Commission, 2014,
p. 7; and European Commission, 2016, p. 6).
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This section now goes on to revisit the three criteria
cited above, one by one, in order to assess if after 10
years of representativeness studies being carried out by
Eurofound, there is a need to fine-tune them in the
application of this important mapping exercise. This
need has been very recently acknowledged by the cross-
sectoral social partners themselves in their ‘Declaration
on a new start for a strong social dialogue’:
A more accurate and clearer picture of the situation
on the concept of representativeness at both national
and European levels needs to be developed and its
implications in terms of policy and law making at EU
level should be examined and clarified. In particular,
representativeness checks need to ensure that EU
social dialogue is based on recognised social partners
at national level across Member States. Likewise, the
mutual recognition between partners and the
existence of a dedicated mandate are important
elements to be taken into account. 
(ETUC, UNICE, CEEP, UEAPME, 2016, point 22)
Cross-industry or sector-related
Out of the three criteria to be applied to Eurofound
representativeness studies, this seems to be the least
controversial one as far as the cross-sector social
dialogue is concerned.
Representativeness at international and European level
The European Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker is committed to relaunching social dialogue. A
first step in this direction was taken with the organisation of a high-level conference in Brussels on 5 March 2015.
The aim of the conference was to discuss concrete ways to strengthen social dialogue with EU cross-industry
social partners and their national affiliates. What is the situation one year later? In order to breathe new life into
EU social dialogue to deal with past and future challenges, the commitment and cooperation of all actors on the
company, sectoral, national and European level would be a precondition. As a concrete outcome of the high-level
conference of last year, two thematic groups were created with the participation of the social partners (at EU and
national level and at cross-industry and sectoral level), the social affairs attachés from the past, present and
future presidencies (Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovakia), the Council Secretariat, the
European Commission and Eurofound.
Thematic group 1 focused on social dialogue, economic governance and capacity building. It assessed the
involvement and positions of the national and European social partner organisations in the European Semester.
Thematic Group 2 focused on social dialogue, policymaking and law-making. after six months of deliberations
and discussions, the EU social partners adopted a joint declaration in Brussels on 26–27 January 2016,
announcing a fresh start for a strong social dialogue at European level. To promote greater effectiveness and a
better functioning social dialogue the declaration stresses the importance of:
£ involving social partners in EU policymaking;
£ the functioning and effectiveness of social dialogue and the capacity-building of social partners at national
level;
£ involving social partners in the European economic governance and European Semester and in assessing,
designing, agreeing and implementing relevant reforms and policies;
£ clarifying the relation between social partners’ agreements and the European Commission’s better
regulation agenda.
Building on previous studies that were presented by Eurofound at the thematic working groups, the declaration
more specifically draws the following conclusions:
£ the involvement of social partners at EU level has significantly improved in recent years, but there is room for
further improvement at national level;
£ the involvement of national social partners in the preparation of the national reform programmes and in the
design and implementation of relevant policy reforms could be reinforced while respecting national
practices;
£ annexing the views of social partners to the national reform programmes was considered to be a good
practice;
£ the concept of representativeness at both national and European levels and its implications for policymaking
and law- making at EU level should be examined;
£ in particular, representativeness checks need to ensure that EU social dialogue relies on recognised social
partners at national level in all Member States.
A new start for social dialogue
Source: Eurofound (2016)
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On the trade union side, ETUC, Eurocadres and CEC
together represent almost 80% of all listed national
trade union organisations. 
Among the trade union peak-level organisations, ETUC
has, by far, the highest number of organisations that are
national (70 out of 108, or 65%), that have
comprehensive representational domains (48 out of 61,
or 79%) and that are most prominent in national cross-
industry industrial relations (38 out of 59 in collective
bargaining and 68 out of 97 in consultations,
corresponding to 64% and 70% respectively).
Member associations of Eurocadres comprise a
subsection of ETUC’s members and therefore are often
all-encompassing unions. CEC, which is independent of
ETUC although it participates in cross-industry social
dialogue within the ETUC’s delegation, only represents
sectional representational domains. On the employers’
side, BusinessEurope E, UEAPME, and CEEP are the EU-
level employer associations that affiliate most of the
national organisations involved in national cross-
industry industrial relations. BusinessEurope tends to
have a broader representational domain, whereas the
members of UEAPME and CEEP tend to have sectional
representation, focused on SMEs and public services
respectively (Eurofound, 2014a).
In the framework of the sectoral representativeness
studies, the criterion of sector relatedness is often much
more problematic. The first step in each
representativeness study is a discussion with the
relevant sectoral actors at European level, to agree on
the definition of the sector to be studied. The
introductory chapter of each study provides details of
the given sector definition, in terms of the ‘Statistical
classification of economic activities in the European
Community’ (Nomenclature statistique des activités
économiques dans la Communauté européenne, NACE)
to ensure that the findings can be compared cross-
nationally. However, the domains in which the national
trade unions and employer organisations work often do
not correspond exactly to the NACE demarcation. The
extent to which, and the manner in which, the bodies
and agreements relate to the sector differ. Eurofound
has identified four patterns by means of which an
organisation may make proof of its sector relatedness.
£ Congruence: The domain of the organisation or
scope of the collective agreement is identical to
that of the sectoral NACE demarcation.
£ Sectionalism: The domain of the organisation or
scope of the agreement covers only part of the
sector, as defined by the sectoral NACE
demarcation.
£ Overlap: The domain of the organisation or scope
of the agreement covers the entire sector as
demarcated by NACE, along with parts of one or
more other sectors.
£ Sectional overlap: The domain of the organisation
or scope of the agreement covers part of the given
sector as demarcated by NACE, as well as parts of
one or more other sectors (Eurofound, 2015c). 
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Previous studies based on the Eurofound sectoral
representativeness studies have identified a
considerable variety of sectoral domains within the
analysed sectoral social dialogue committees
(agriculture, postal services and electricity). 
… European sectoral committees may not even cover
similar socioeconomic situations across all Member
States. The definition of a given sector in a particular
country, from an industrial relations perspective,
results from its domestic institutional history and the
progressive constitution of the actors and the
industrial relations bodies in the sector. It does not
necessarily correspond to the economic demarcation
of the sector. Variations across the countries can also
reasonably be expected, and data on selected sectors
analysed for this study indicate that the variation can
be significant. 
(Eurofound, 2009a, 37)
The ideal type of congruence between the domains of
the organisations analysed and that of the NACE
demarcation of the sectoral social dialogue committee
has been a rare exception in all the sectors analysed to
date. This often occurring mismatch between forms of
sector-relatedness in terms of NACE demarcation and
domain patterns of sectoral social partners lead some
academics to question the adequacy of the level
linkages between the European and the national level of
sectoral social dialogue (Perin and Léonard, 2011;
Lafuente Hernández, 2015). Other issues that have
surfaced in the course of the representativeness studies
are the following. It is not only the actors of a given
sectoral social dialogue committee that sometimes do
not correspond to the sector NACE demarcation but
also agreements concluded, in particular agreements
concluded for sub-sectors or multi-sector agreements
(such as that for crystalline silica). Particular problems
arise when there is a need for shifting the boundaries of
a sector because of economic transformations or
mergers (such as merging telecom and the ICT sector).
Integral part of Member State industrial
relations and capacity to negotiate
Integral and recognised part of Member State
industrial relations
This second criterion which, at first sight appears more
straightforward, is also rather complex in its
application. There is, first of all, some discrepancy with
regard to Article 1b of Decision 98/500/EC between the
English and other language versions. 
They shall consist of organisations which are
themselves an integral and recognized part of
Member States’ social partner structures and have
the capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are
representative of several Member States.
Être composées d’organisations elles-mêmes
reconnues comme faisant partie intégrante des
structures des partenaires sociaux des États membres
et avoir la capacité de négocier des accords et être
représentatives dans plusieurs États membres.
Sie sollten aus Verbänden bestehen, die in ihrem Land
integraler und anerkannter Bestandteil des Systems
der Arbeitsbeziehungen sind, sollten Vereinbarungen
aushandeln können und in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten
repräsentativ sein. 
Siano composte da organizzazioni che, a loro volta,
formino parte integrante e riconosciuta delle
strutture delle parti sociali degli Stati membri, siano
abilitate a negoziare accordi e siano rappresentative
in più Stati membri.
In the English version, the criterion to ‘have the capacity
to negotiate agreements’ may be read as referring to
associations at national level, whereas in the French,
German and Italian versions, this requirement clearly
refers to the EU-level social partners only. If the latter
versions were to prevail, European social partners could
also consist of national affiliates – as an integral part of
their Member State industrial relations – which do not
have the capacity to negotiate and are, consequently,
mere business/trade associations.
The EECS had claimed, in the 1993 opinion, that ‘the
social partners at EC level are to be selected having
regard to the nature of the process and of the outcome
of EC social dialogue. These would indicate
transnational criteria linked to national social partners,
and organisational capacity’ (EESC, 1994, para. 2.1.9).
The EESC proposed to add an additional criterion  – the
capacity to negotiate binding agreements: ‘… [C]riteria
should also include capacity to negotiate for and bind
national structures’ (EESC, 1994, para. 2.1.12, 8). Thus,
according to the EESC, the European social partners
engaging in negotiations should dispose of the capacity
to negotiate agreements that are potentially binding on
the national industrial relations structures. 
Eurofound has applied the criterion of ‘capacity to
negotiate’ to both the EU-level partner associations
and, in the bottom-up approach, to the national
associations as well, in order to assess their relevance.
This interpretation is shared by the European
Parliament and the EESC, both arguing that the EU and
national social partners must have statutory capacity to
negotiate collective agreements. This view was also
expressed by the European cross-sector social partners
themselves in their 1993 proposal. ETUC, UNICE and
CEEP argued that in order to be able to participate in
European social dialogue, the relevant actors should ‘…
be composed of members with the right to be involved,
directly or through their members, in collective
negotiations at their respective levels’ (ETUC, UNICE,
CEEP, 1993; Mazuyer, 2007, p. 121). The above
interpretation is also explicitly shared by some of the EU
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sectoral social partners themselves, stipulating in their
statutes that only those national organisations are
eligible to become a member who have ‘capacity to
negotiate collective agreements if applicable and
existing in the country concerned’ (such as the
Confederation of European Security Services, Art. 8.2 of
the Articles of Association). 
Following the arguments above, the standard
Eurofound methodology for assessing the criterion
‘integral part of Member State industrial relations and
capacity to negotiate’ applies the ‘capacity to negotiate
agreements’ to both the EU and the national level. 
A national association is considered to be a relevant
sector-related interest association if it meets both
criteria A and B.
A. The association’s domain relates to the sector
(cf. above).
B. The association is either: affiliated to a European-
level organisation, which is analysed in the study
within the top-down approach (independent of
their involvement in collective bargaining); or, if
not, regularly involved in sector-related collective
bargaining.
If the national association in question is not affiliated to
a European interest association, it will only be regarded
as relevant in the sense of the study if it is regularly
involved in collective bargaining, that is, if it is not only
a trade association but a fully-fledged social partner
having the capacity to negotiate agreements. An
interesting example in this context can be drawn from
the electricity sector. On the workers’ side, of the 77
identified sector-related national interest organisation,
only three do not participate in any sector-related
national collective bargaining (3.9%), while 74 do
(96.1%). On the employers’ side, only 14 national
affiliates are involved in collective bargaining whereas
19 are not (57.58%) (Eurofound, 2012; Lafuente
Hernández, 2015).
In 1993, the cross-sector social partners ETUC, CEEP and
UNICE themselves claimed in their proposals for
implementation of the agreement annexed to the
protocol on social policy of the TEU that in order to be
recognised as a social partner, EU-level interest
organisations needed to ‘be composed of members
with the right to be involved, directly or through their
members, in collective negotiations at their respective
levels’.
Capacity to negotiate in practice
According to Elster, the concept of a mandate emerged
in Europe (France and the UK) and the USA around the
end of the 18th century. Political thinkers, such as
Edmund Burke, argued that deliberative assemblies
should not be bound by mandates of their constituents
(Elster, 1998, pp. 3–4). It was Lyon-Caen who, as early as
1972, in its reports to the European Commission,
brought the issue to the point: 
On a beaucoup embrouillé cette question; elle n’est
dans la réalité qu’une simple application du
mécanisme de la représentation dans les actes
juridiques. Cela signifie en premier lieu que la
personne qui parle et signe au nom d’une
organisation, doit disposer d’un pouvoir qui l’autorise
à parler et à signer au nom de celle-ci; et en second
lieu que la signature de ce représentant est donné au
nom et pour le compte de l’organisme ou des
organismes représentés de telle manière que les
effets de l’acte juridique se produisent directement à
leur égard.46
(Lyon-Caen, 1972, p. 40)
According to Hecquet, the concept of
representativeness is a ‘legal fiction’. The authentic
reflection of reality is translated by the legal instrument
of representation. The instrument used for this process
is the mandate (Hecquet, 2007, p. 64). 
At European level, it was in April 1994 that the
Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the
Working Environment of the European Parliament
adopted a report on the application of the agreement
on social policy. In this report, the Committee proposed
to complement the representativeness criteria of the
European Commission by the criterion of having a
mandate:
[E]ligible organisations should have a mandate from
their members to represent them in the context of the
Community social dialogue and are to demonstrate
their representativity. 
(EP, 1994)
As mentioned above, the criterion of ‘mandate’ was also
identified by the European cross-sector social partners
themselves in their 1993 proposal:
… be instructed by their members to represent them
in the framework of the Community social dialogue. 
(ETUC, UNICE, CEEP, 1993)
According to the first part of the report, ‘the capacity to
negotiate’ of a social partner organisation is considered
a very important element in the definition of their
representative status at national level. According to the
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46 [‘There has been much confusion over this question; in reality it is a mere application of the mechanism of representation in legal acts. This means first of all that
the person who speaks and signs on behalf of an organisation must be given the authorisation to speak and sign on behalf of the organisation; and secondly
that the signature of that representative is granted in the name and on behalf of the body or bodies represented in such a way that the effects of the legal act
impact directly on them.’]
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28 country reports analysed, the capacity to negotiate
applies to situations in which the two sides of industry
can authoritatively commit their affiliates, are
financially and organisationally independent of each
other, and have public visibility. The research identified
ten Member States  in which the capacity to negotiate is
explicitly recognised as an important element in the
conceptual framework defining representativeness at
national level: Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Latvia and
Spain. In particular, the German national report
highlighted the importance of the ‘concept of capacity
to negotiate in German industrial relations’:
In 1964 the Constitutional Court decided (BVerG, 1 BvR
79/62) that trade unions have to be capable of
collective bargaining (tariffähig) to be considered a
trade union from a juridical perspective.
Organisations not capable of doing so are termed
worker association (Arbeitnehmervereinigung) and
operate under the Basic Law. They may term
themselves trade union, but are not considered trade
unions from a labour law perspective. Considering
this, collective bargaining capacity is more than an
alternative concept of representativeness, it defines
trade unions. Associations of employers which are not
capable of collective bargaining are business
organisations or statutory employer organisations of
the social security system. 
(Kraemer, 2015)
A European association is only deemed to be
representative on the grounds of the 1998 decision if it
‘consist(s) of organisations, which are themselves an
integral and recognised part of Member State social
partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate
agreements’. The European Commission and Eurofound
have very recently tried to render this criterion more
precise by distinguishing between different kinds of
mandates. In order to fulfil the criterion of ‘capacity to
negotiate’, a European association must give proof of
the following. The European sectoral social partners
should be able to prove their capacity to negotiate on
behalf of their affiliates and to enter into ‘contractual
relations, including agreements’ (Article 155 TFEU) –
the capacity to commit themselves and their national
affiliates. This criterion does refer to the capacity to
negotiate agreements as provided for in Article 155
TFEU; negotiating other types of joint texts (such as
joint opinions, frameworks of action or guidelines),
however valuable they may be, is not considered to be
sufficient in this context. A European organisation has
the capacity to negotiate such an agreement if it has
received a mandate to do so from its affiliates, or if it
can receive such a mandate in accordance with a given
mandating procedure.
The mandate/mandating procedure can be either
statutory – laid down in the statutes (constitution) of
the organisation or annexed to them – or non-statutory
– laid down in secondary (formal) documents, such as
rules of procedures, memoranda of understanding or
decisions by the governing bodies of the organisation.
The mandate will be described in terms of the
conditions and procedure for the European social
partner organisation to be given the authorisation to
enter into a specific negotiation, as well as for the
ratification of a possible agreement. If no such formal
mandating procedure can be identified, it should be
considered that the condition concerned is not fulfilled.
European social partners will be asked to provide proof
of their statutes or any other written documentation,
describing their mandate and capacity to negotiate as
well as the ratification procedures in place (Eurofound,
2014a).
In application of the new distinction between different
forms of mandate, the situation with regard to the EU
cross-sector social partners is as follows.
BusinessEurope has a statutory mandate in Article 6.3
last indent of its statutes: according to Article 7.8 of
BusinessEurope’s statutes, 
the decision to enter into negotiations in the
framework of the dialogue between the social
partners … may be approved by the Association only
if at least four-fifths of the votes are cast in favour, the
members entitled to vote being only those having
voting rights and whose country is affected by the
decision in question. 
Once the Council of Presidents has approved the
mandate, the negotiations between the two sides of
industry may commence (Eurofound, 2014a; Welz,
2008).
CEEP has a non-statutory mandate, as specified in
Article 40 of its rules of procedure from 2011: 
During the first phase of the consultations, the opinion
to be produced on whether legislation should be
introduced or whether a European agreement should
be concluded between the social partners shall be
issued by the General Assembly after consulting the
Social Affairs Committee. If the opinion authorises the
subsequent quest for an agreement, the Social Affairs
Committee shall be given a negotiating mandate.
This mandate shall specify the purpose of the
negotiations. 
The precise procedures for the negotiation and
ratification of ‘European collective agreements’
(Article 39) are laid down in Articles 41 to 44 (Eurofound,
2014a; Welz, 2008).
ETUC has a statutory mandate in Article 13 of its
Constitution. In 1995, ETUC changed its constitution in
order to introduce the new mandate procedure. The
prime target of this reform was to render the bargaining
capacity of the confederation more effective, in order to
fully take advantage of the new procedures offered by
the 1991 agreement on social policy (Eurofound, 2014a;
Welz, 2008).
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UEAPME has a non-statutory mandate. UEPAME
participates in the European social dialogue on the
basis of the cooperation agreement with UNICE of
4 December 1998 (Eurofound, 2014a; Welz, 2008).
UEAPME is mandated in its procedures for negotiations
in the social dialogue from 6 December 1999. 
Eurocadres has a statutory mandate in Article 2 of its
constitution, adopted on 28–29 November 2013. 
Eurocadres is a not for profit organisation and shall
have the following tasks in particular to:  (… )
represent them vis-à-vis relevant institutions and
bodies, and in particular to take part, on their behalf,
at European level in social dialogue and collective
bargaining.
CEC has a de facto mandate. The organisation signed a
cooperation agreement, on the basis of which the
liaison committee was founded. It is via the liaison
committee that both Eurocadres and CEC participate in
the European social dialogue (Eurofound, 2014a; Welz,
2008).
At the date of 9 December 2016, Eurofound had
published 45 studies on 43 sectoral social dialogue
committees. Some of the studies had already been
carried out for a second time (such as those on
agriculture and personal services). The situation
regarding the capacity of the 43 EU sectoral social
dialogue committees to negotiate – provided that
relevant information was given – is much more
heterogeneous than in the cross-sector social dialogue.
In its work programme for 2016, Eurofound proposed a
new project aimed at a mapping exercise of the
mandates given to the European social partners in their
statutory or non-statutory documents. In the
preparation of this project proposal, the mandate of the
European social partners was provisionally mapped by
analysing their statutes in as far as they are publicly
available or transmitted to Eurofound (the list of the
European Commission includes 69 employer
organisations and 18 trade union organisations). Up to
mid-November 2016, the statutes and rules and
regulations of the vast majority of EU-level social
partner organisations listed by the European
Commission as organisations to be consulted under
Article 154 TFEU were checked (see European
Commission, undated; European Commission, 2015, p.
4). In line with the methodology set out on the
Representativeness studies section on Eurofound’s
website, organisations were only considered to have a
‘statutory mandate’ when a specific formal mandating
procedure for the purpose of negotiations in European
social dialogue (Articles 154 and 155 TFEU) were
contained in its statutes.47
As a first step, it was possible to map all 87  EU-level
social partners organisations in a preliminary step. As
Table 7  shows, at least nine employer organisations
and 10 trade union organisations have a statutory
mandating procedure.
£ Employer organisations with a statutory mandating
procedure: BusinessEurope, EBF, via the Banking
Committee for European Social Affairs, European
Broadcasting Union (EBU), European Club
Association (ECA), ECEG, EFEE, Eurociett, HOSPEM
and UEPG).
£ Trade union organisations with a statutory
mandating procedure: ETUC, Eurocadres, EAEA,
EFBWW, EFFAT, EPSU, ETF, FifPRO, IndustriAll and
UNI-Europa.
In addition, the statutes of at least seven employer
organisations and three trade union federations also
remit to non-statutory rules – internal rules of
procedure, guidelines, or any other kind of secondary
(formal) documents – containing or completing
mandating procedures. 
£ Employer organisations that follow non-statutory
rules: CEEP, UEAPME, CEEMET, GEOPA-COPA, ECEG,
EFEE, IMA and Insurance Europe.
£ Trade union federations that follow non-statutory
rules: Eurocadres, EFBWW, EFFAT and ETF.
In total, at least 19 European social partner
organisations (9 employers and 10 trade unions) out of
the 87 for which data is available dispose of a statutory
mandate. At least 10 European social partner
organisations (seven employers  and three trade unions)
dispose of an non-statutory mandate. Three trade
unions and two employers dispose of a statutory and
non-statutory mandate. In sum, at least 24 European
social partner organisations have a statutory and/or
non-statutory mandate. At least 42 employer
associations and seven trade unions seem to be in a
position to obtain an ad hoc mandate of their affiliates
or dispose of other procedures, e.g. rules of procedures
of the committee. Some of these organisations have
signed European framework agreements on the
grounds of Article 155 TFEU in the past. Eurofound
hopes to be able to provide more complete information
on the EU-level social partners’ mandate by the end of
2016.
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Representative of ‘all Member States, as far
as possible’ / ‘of several Member States’
Geographical coverage as a criterion of defining
representativeness evidently plays a much less
important role at national than at European level. The
national correspondents identified only four Member
States in which this was the case: Bulgaria, Hungary
(trade unions only), Poland (employer organisations
only) and Slovakia (employer organisations only). The
territorial dimension, however, also plays a certain role
in countries like Belgium and Spain, in which regional
elections are held for trade union representation.
With regard to the geographical coverage that European
associations must have in order to be regarded as
representative, there is also a distinction made between
the COM(93)600, COM(98)322 and the decision annexed
to the latter COM: 98/500/EC. In relation to geographical
coverage, the two communications require the EU-level
social partners to be ‘representative in all Member
States, as far as possible’ [emphasis added], whereas
the decision only requires the sectoral social partners to
be ‘representative of several [emphasis added]
Members States’. 
The differences between the 1993 and 1998
communications and the 1998 decision may be
explained by the fact that the two communications and
the decision spell out criteria for different phases of the
European social dialogue. According to the European
Commission, the criteria of COM(93)600 are set out for
organisations that are ‘potentially eligible to be
consulted’ (European Commission, 1993, p. 5). The
same criteria, which are reproduced in COM(98)322, are
aiming at the organisations’ ‘participation in the
different form of social dialogue’ (European
Commission, 1998a, p. 6). When it comes to the setting-
up of social dialogue committees, Commission decision
COM(98/500/EC) applies. Once the social partners start
their negotiations, experts propose proposes that the
principle of ‘mutual recognition’ is now applicable and
the Commission stresses the ‘autonomy of the social
partners’ in this phase (European Commission, 1993,
p. 15). The autonomy of the social partners, however,
comes to an abrupt end, once the consultations lead to
agreements to be implemented by the Council decision
on the request of the social partners (Bercusson, 1999,
p. 160). At this point, the criteria of the Court of First
Instance are applicable, stating that the social partners,
taken together and having regard to the content of the
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Table 7: Overview of mandates of the EU social partners to negotiate     
Source: Eurofound data on the basis of statutes/non-statutory rules and regulations submitted or representativeness studies
(as of 13 December 2016).
Mandate Statutory Non-statutory Ad hoc/other procedures
Employers BusinessEurope
EBF
European Broadcasting Union
European Club Association
ECEG
EFEE
Eurociett/World Employment
Confederation-Europe
HOSPEM
UEPG
CEEP
UEAPME
ECEG
EFEE
GEOPA-COPA
IMA Europe 
Insurance Europe
AER
CANSO
CEC
CEEMET
CEI-Bois
CER
CoESS
Coiffure EU
Confederation of European
Paper Industries
Cotance
EACB
EBF
ECSA
EFCI
EPFL
ERA
ESBG
ESO
ETNO
ESPO
Euracoal
Euratex
Eurelectric
EuroCommerce
Eurofer
Eurogas
Euromines
European Barge Union
European Coordination of
Independent Producers
Europêche
FEPORT
FIAPF
FIEC
FoodDrinkEurope
FoodServiceEurope
HORTREC
Intergraf
IRU
PEARLE*
Posteurop
SEA Europe
UEA
Total employers 9 7 42
Trade unions ETUC                         EPSU
Eurocadres        ETF
EAEA                  FifPRO
EFBWW                 industriALL 
EFFAT             UNI
EFBWW
EFATT
ETF
CEC
Eurocadres
ECA
CESI
EFBWW
FIA
FIM
Total trade unions 10 3 7
Total 19 10 49
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agreement in question, are sufficiently representative in
light of the UEAPME judgment. In a number of recent
proposals for Council directives, however, the
Commission also cited Commission decision 98/500/EC
as a frame of reference (European Commission, 2005,
p. 3; 2009a, p. 7; 2014, p. 7; and 2016, p. 6). 
In the explanatory memorandum of its 2000 proposal
for a Council directive concerning the European
agreement on the organisation of working time of
mobile workers in the civil aviation sector, the European
Commission assessed the representativeness of the
signatory parties for the first time as regards a sectoral
agreement, yet in very brief terms: 
The Commission has drafted its proposal for a
Directive, in accordance with its communication of 20
May 1998 on adapting and promoting the social
dialogue at Community level, taking into account the
representative status of the signatory parties and the
legality of each clause of the Agreement. 
(European Commission, 2000, p. 169)
It is interesting to note that this is the only Commission
proposal for which the frame of reference was the 1998
Communication and not Decision 98/500/EC. 
In its 2005 proposal for a Council directive on the
agreement between the Community of European
Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’
Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working
conditions of mobile workers assigned to interoperable
cross-border services, the Commission assessed the
representative status of the signatory parties in great
detail, since three organisation of the sector were
claiming that they had not been invited to participate in
the negotiations. Here again the frame of reference for
assessing the representativeness of the actors in
question was the Commission decision of 20 May 1998.
In its 2009 proposal for a Council directive
implementing the framework agreement on prevention
from sharp injuries in the hospital and healthcare
sector, concluded by HOSPEEM and EPSU, the European
Commission drew the following conclusion with regard
to the signatory parties:
The European social partners’ ability to be consulted
and to negotiate agreements depends on their
representativeness. One of the criteria defining that
ability in Commission Decision 98/500/EC of 20 May
1998 on the establishment of Sectoral Dialogue
Committees promoting the Dialogue between the
social partners at European level states that they
‘shall consist of organisations which are themselves
an integral and recognised part of Member States’
social partner structures and have the capacity to
negotiate agreements, and which are representative
of several Member States. 
(European Commission, 2009a, p. 7)
In its 2016 proposal for a Council directive
implementing the agreement concluded between the
General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in
the European Union (Cogeca), the ETF and the
Association of National Organisations of Fishing
Enterprises (EUROPÊCHE) of 21 May 2012, the European
Commission states, ‘In accordance with Article 1 of
Commission decision 98/500/EC of 20 May 1998, social
partners at the European level should fulfil the following
criteria’ (European Commission, 2016a, p. 6).
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1. Setting up of the European sectoral social dialogue committees (legal conformity): on the basis of
Commission decision 98/500/EC and on the basis of the Eurofound representativeness studies.
2. Consultation based on legal conformity: representativeness by accreditation of the Commission on the basis
of the representativeness criteria as elaborated in the COM(93)600 final and COM(98)322 final and on basis of
the Eurofound representativeness studies.
3. Negotiation based on mutual recognition/bargaining autonomy: representativeness by mutual recognition
as described by academics (Lhernould, 2008, pp. 36–37; Mazuyer, 2007, p. 128; Reale, 2003, p. 12; Hecquet,
2007, p. 63) and based on the bargaining autonomy of the social partners (European Commission, 1993,
p. 15).
4. Implementation of European framework agreements by Council decision: representativeness assessed in
light of the UEAPME judgement: ‘whether, having regard to the content of the agreement in question, the
signatories, taken together, are sufficiently representative (T-135/96, 2335, para. 90), in light of COM(98)322
(only for European Commission, 2000, p. 169), decision 98(500)EC (European Commission, 2005, p. 3; 2009a,
p. 7; 2014, p. 7 and 2016a, p. 6)’ and on basis of the Eurofound representativeness studies.
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A more precise definition of the terms ‘all Member
States, in as far as possible’ and ‘several Member States’
could possibly foster the democratic legitimacy of the
EU sectoral social dialogue. What follows is a discussion
of the arguments in favour of and against having a more
precise definition of the criteria ‘all Member States, in as
far as possible’ (COM(93)600 and COM(98)322 and
‘several Member States’ (in Commission Decision
98/500/EC).
On the one hand, the criterion of membership is one of
the most important criteria to establish
representativeness at national level, according to the
principle of legal conformity. As mapped in the second
chapter of this report, the legislation of 23 EU Member
States contains one or more criteria of
membership/density/coverage figures for employer
associations and/or trade unions at different national
levels (see Table 3). Casale remarked, rightly, that in
practice these membership figures are often not so
important, as they are ‘usually not officially verifiable’
(1996, p. 11). It is also interesting to note that statutes of
at least five Member States (Finland, Germany, Latvia,
the Netherlands and Portugal, see Figure 1) contain
provisions subjecting the extension of social partner
agreements by the national governments to majorities
of between 50% and 55%. As early as 1922, the
Permanent Court of International Justice concluded
that the most representative organisations for this
purpose were those that best represented the
employers and the workers respectively and that the
national governments had the duty of deciding what
organisations were the most representative. Eighty
years later, the High Level Group on Industrial Relations
and Change in the European Union, under the lead of
Maria João Rodrigues (in the role of Chair), proposed a
list of indicators by means of which the quality of
industrial relations could be benchmarked. Indicator 12
reads, ‘highly-representative social partners, i.e.
partners able to represent most [emphasis added]
employers and employees, either through direct
membership or via other channels (e.g. support in
industrial action)’ (European Commission, 2002d, p. 39).
As shown above, both the CEACR and the ECHR have
postulated that criteria of representativeness need to
be objective, precise and predetermined. If European
social dialogue was governed by more precise
thresholds on the above, this would contribute to more
objective, transparent and predictable processes. At the
same time, more concrete thresholds might incentivise
the existing as well as new actors to strive for a larger
membership basis. Applying certain thresholds (such as
having members in 50% of Member States in which the
sector is present or each side of industry taken together
representing via its affiliates at least 50% of the sectoral
employment), a European representative organisation
should be largely present across the EU. This means
that it must have member organisations at the
appropriate, relevant negotiation level in at least three-
quarters of the EU Member States and be seeking to be
represented in the others’ (EESC, 1997, 1.8; Franssen,
2002, p. 91) might lead to more objectivity, precision
and transparency of the assessment. In the past, the
Commission has on occasion, for example, recurred to
employment data in order to distinguish between the
most representative social partners and less
representative ones in a given sector. 
In its 2005 proposal for a Council directive on the
agreement between the CER and the ETF on certain
aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers
assigned to interoperable cross-border services, the
Commission assessed the representative status of the
signatory parties in great detail, since three
organisations of the sector were claiming that they had
not been invited to participate in the negotiations. In
the assessment of the representativeness of the actors
in this sector, the Commission took the employment
figures of the concerned organisations into account. 
According to the Court, the Commission and the
Council are obliged to ascertain whether, having
regard to the content of the agreement in question,
the signatories, taken together, are sufficiently
representative (point 90). It should be emphasised
that the three organisations in question are not, so
far, regarded as representative of the sector and are
therefore not consulted by the Commission under
Article 138 of the Treaty. … [I]t can be estimated that
the total number of mobile workers in the sector
constitutes approximately 20% of the total workforce,
i.e. approximately 210,000 persons, of whom about
12% are assigned to interoperable cross-border
services (25,000 persons). As regards the employers,
the CER employs almost 95% of the entire workforce.
The ETF represents some 80% of the workers who are
members of trade unions. The total number of train
drivers in the EU of 25 Member States is estimated to
be around 133,000.
(European Commission, 2005, pp. 3–6)
In its 2016 proposal for a Council directive
implementing the agreement concluded between the
General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in
the European Union (Cogeca), the ETF and the
Association of National Organisations of Fishing
Enterprises (EUROPÊCHE) concerning the
implementation of the Work in Fishing Convention, the
Commission, again, took employment figures into
account for its assessment.
Considering the membership of both Cogeca and
Europêche, it means that on the employers’ side,
altogether 16 Member States are represented in the
committee. On the workers’ side, ETF has membership
related to sea-fisheries in 11 Member States. This
leaves fishermen in 11 Member States not
represented. However, according to the employment
figures for the sector, for most of these countries the
numbers of employees are around 1,000 workers (in
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most of these Member States, employment is
considerably lower). While Ireland, Greece, Romania
and Sweden have more than 1,000 fishermen, a very
large share of them are self-employed. In conclusion,
with the exception of Portugal and Romania, there
are no Member States where employer organisations
active in sea-fishing are not represented at European
level, taking into account that the sector is relatively
small in Romania. The eight Member States which
make up 84% of the sector in total employment terms
and 87% in terms of full-time equivalent are
represented within the EU social dialogue. This leads
to the conclusion that the social partners who have
signed the Agreement are representative of the sector
and can therefore request the Commission to
implement it in accordance with Article 155 of the
TFEU.
(European Commission, 2016a, p. 6)
Finally, some authors, such as Hecquet, also argue in
terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of European
social dialogue. The prerogative of the social partners to
step in as legislators under Article 155 TFEU should only
belong to the most representative organisations, those
able to prove their sufficient degree of
representativeness: ‘Il serait contraire à la finalité de la
représentativité d’admettre un nombre très large
d’organisations aptes à engager une négociation. En
effet, l’objet de la fiction juridique que constitue la
représentativité est la recherche de l’efficacité
decisionelle’ (Hecquet, 2007, pp. 62–63.).48
On the other hand, more concrete thresholds with
regard to the membership criterion also bear certain
risks. First of all, one might argue that every threshold is
arbitrary to some extent. Should one distinguish a
presence in large Member States from one in smaller
ones? Some sectors are only present in a limited
number of Member States. Should one take
employment figures into account? What about sectors
with a high level of self-employment? Too strict criteria
might exclude a number of actors, especially new ones,
from the process. This might lead to less effective
European social dialogue committees in terms of scope
and output.
When more restrictive criteria were introduced at
Member State level in the wake of the economic crisis,
this was often criticised by international organisations,
such as the ILO and the Council of Europe. In 2014, for
example, the CEACR issued its opinion towards
Hungary.
The Committee previously requested the Government
to indicate in its next report any measures taken or
contemplated so as to lower the 65 per cent
requirement set out in the Labour Code, as well as to
ensure that, where no union represents 65 per cent of
the employees in a bargaining unit, collective
bargaining rights are granted to all unions in the unit,
at least on behalf of their own members. The
Committee notes the Government’s indication that
trade unions will no longer need to represent 65 per
cent of the workforce in order to be able to engage in
collective bargaining. 
(ILC, 2014, p. 122)
Finally, the reliability and validity of the indictors, as
well as the quality of the data used, might not always be
given. In the UEAPME case, for example, the CFI argued
the following. 
In the first place, they are all based on a single
criterion, namely the number of SMUs represented
respectively by the applicant and UNICE. Even if that
criterion may be taken into consideration when
determining whether the collective representativity of
the signatories to the framework agreement is
sufficient, it cannot be regarded as decisive in relation
to the content of that agreement. … [A]mong the
SMUs represented by the applicant … (5,565,300
according to the table set out in Annex I to the reply;
4,835,658 according to the table set out in Annex I to
the rejoinder, supplemented by the applicant’s replies
to the written questions put by the Court of First
Instance; and 6,600,000 according to the applicant’s
oral statements at the hearing), a third (2,200,000 out
of 6,600,000, according to the applicant at the
hearing), perhaps as many as two-thirds (3,217,000
out of 4,835,658, according to the table set out in
Annex I to the rejoinder) of those SMUs are also
affiliated to one of the organisations represented by
UNICE. 
(T-135/96, 2335, para. 102/103)
Following on from the above, a number of scholars
argue that quantitative criteria were not used by the
Court of First Instance in its assessment of the
representativeness of the signatory parties of the
parental leave agreement in the UEAPME case. The
Court had given more space to the assessment of
whether the interest of small-and-medium enterprises
had been taken into account than to the actual number
of members represented by the signatory parties
(Hecquet, 2007, p. 71; Bercusson, 1999, p. 57, Moreau,
1999, p. 58). 
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As demonstrated in chapter 1 of this report, there is also
still a large variety of legal frameworks and elements
defining the concept of representativeness at national
level. As far back as its first Communication in 1993, the
Commission echoed this variety in the following terms:
a) The diversity of practice in the different Member
States is such that there is no single model, which
could be replicated at European level, and …; 
(b) The different Member States’ systems having all
taken many years to grow and develop, it is difficult to
see how a European system can be created by
administrative decision in the short term. 
(European Commission, 1993, p. 22)
In the declaration on a new start for a strong social
dialogue of 26–27 January 2016, the EU-level social
partners claim that, ‘social dialogue requires social
partners that are strong, representative, autonomous,
mandated and equipped with the capacities needed’.
The issue of representativeness and the question of
whether or not more precise criteria are needed might
be a topic of discussion for the two sides of industry in
the future.
Cross-sector social dialogue
With regard to cross-sector social dialogue, the
European Commission criterion related to geographical
coverage claims that the relevant EU-level social
partners have to ‘consist of organisations, which … are
representative of all Member States, as far as possible’.
On the basis of the analysis of representativeness of the
EU cross-sector social partner in this paper, it can
certainly be claimed that this criterion is fulfilled and,
for the time being, does not need any further
specification. 
The European social partners currently involved in
cross-industry social dialogue affiliate the great
majority of national organisations that have a role in
cross-industry industrial relations in the EU28 Member
States and cover about 90% of member employees and
firms. Specifically, the national members of ETUC,
Eurocadres and CEC organise 91% of all employees and
the national affiliated organisations of BusinessEurope,
UEAPME and CEEP organise 85% of firms, which employ
89% of workers. It should be noted that ETUC and
BusinessEurope are the only organisations with
affiliated members in each of the 28 Member States
under scrutiny. Together, ETUC, Eurocadres, CEC and
BusinessEurope, UEAPME, CEEP cover three-quarters of
the national social partner organisations that
participate in cross-industry industrial relations across
the EU. They also affiliate, through their national
members, the great majority of unionised workers and
firms affiliated to employer associations. With their
specificities in terms of representation, according to the
result of this Eurofound study, they are to be regarded
as the most important EU-wide representatives of
labour and management at cross-industry level that are
also present in all Member States, as far as possible
(Eurofound, 2014a). 
Sectoral social dialogue
In sectoral social dialogue, the picture is much more
varied and complex. As of June 2016, there are 43
sectoral social dialogue committees. On the
management side, there are 65 sectoral organisations
representing employers, while 15 sectoral European
trade union organisations represent the interests of
workers. In a few sectors, for which Eurofound
conducted representativeness studies very recently,
some of the actors only have a limited geographical
coverage; for example, with affiliates in eight to 10 EU
Member States. Thus, a question may be raised. If these
organisations fulfil the European Commission criterion
that the relevant EU-level sectoral social partners must
‘representative of several [emphasis added] Members
States’, what does ‘several Member States’ mean in the
context of European sectoral social dialogue? If a
sectoral organisation is to be present in several Member
States, from which geographical coverage onwards is
this criterion fulfilled? Does one have to take the size of
the sector or the number of members in these States
into account? What if certain sectors are hardly present
in some Member States, such as shipbuilding and sea
fisheries in Austria and Luxembourg, or railways and
textiles in Cyprus and Malta? 
Academia has long called for a stricter application of
quantitative criteria for some time: ‘[I]t might be better
to have recourse to quantitative criteria, and verify the
number of enterprises (or of workers) which are
represented by the signing organisations’ (Adinolfi,
2000, p. 176). Milman-Sivan forwarded the idea that
‘membership of the European organisations should be
spread as equally as possible with members in at least
three-quarters of the EU Member States’ (Milman-Sivan,
2009, p. 313, footnote 5). 
Analysis of the criteria of representativeness, as laid
down by both the ILO and the Council of Europe, reveals
that the following set of criteria is used by both
organisations. Criteria of representativeness as upheld
by the CEACR from 2013 until 2015 consists of the
elements; they need to be:
a) objective;
b) precise; and
c) predetermined (ILC 2013, p. 152; 2015, p. 59).
From 2006 onwards, the ECSR argued that in order to be
compatible with Article 5 of the charter, criteria of
representativeness need to be:
a) reasonable; 
b) clear;
c) predetermined; 
d) objective; 
e) laid down in law; and 
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f) subject to judicial scrutiny (Council of Europe, 2008,
p. 51; ECSR, Conclusions XV-1, France, pp. 240–250;
Luxembourg, 2006; Belgium, 2010; Bulgaria, 2010;
Spain, 2010; France, 2010; Malta, 2014; the
Netherlands, 2014). 
These criteria are common to both the CEACR and the
ECSR; that they must be:
a) objective; and 
b) predetermined.
A third category is 
c) precise / clear. 
The ECSR goes beyond the criteria of the CEACR with
the following:
a) laid down in law; and 
b) subject to judicial scrutiny.
In 2010, the ECSR further specified that:
a) decisions on representativeness must not present a
direct or indirect obstacle to the founding of trade
unions (ECSR; AD, 2014; AM, 2014; MT, 2014; RU,
2014); 
b) areas of activity restricted to representative unions
should not include key trade union prerogatives
(ECSR, Conclusions XV-1 Belgium; GE, 2010; UA,
2010; GE, 2014; MT, 2014; RU, 2014);
c) the application of criteria of representativeness
should not lead to automatic exclusion of the small
trade unions or those not long formed, to the
advantage of larger and longer-established trade
unions (ECSR, UA, 2010; NO, 2013; AD, 2014; AM,
2014; RU, 2014).            
On the basis of the above findings, in particular those of
the Eurofound representativeness studies, the UEAPME
case T-135/96, the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ 1922 B01),
conclusions of the Committee on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (ILO) and of the
European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) (Council of
Europe), Eurofound may want to make a better
distinction, in the conclusions of its future
representativeness studies, between the most
representative and representative social partner
organisations. It may also want to more clearly identify
the actors whose status as representative organisation
might give rise to doubts in light of the European
Commission criteria. 
Organisational capacity 
The last criterion of the 1998 decision stipulates that
relevant EU-level social partners must ‘have adequate
structures to ensure their effective, in the consultation
process’ (European Commission, 1993; 1998). Scholars
argue that representativeness not only depended on
quantitative criteria (such as density rates) but also on
the internal functioning and capacity of the two sides of
industry involved (Milman-Sivan, 2009, p. 330). The
Commission is calling for adequate financial and human
resources. This is a criterion which is currently not
assessed at all in the Eurofound representativeness
studies and, henceforth, could be integrated in future
analyses. In 1995, some academics proposed that an
independent secretariat of the EU social partners or an
autonomous department within ECOSOC be created
(Bercusson and van Dijk, 1995, pp. 20–23). In times of
tight public finances, both at national and EU level, this
does not appear to be a viable solution. In addition, for
the sake of the autonomy of the EU-level social
partners, it is far preferable for the respective interest
associations to raise their own financial resources in
order to strengthen their financial capacity. This funding
can be complemented by subsidies and programmes
stemming from the budget of the European Union.
Conclusion and outlook
Towards better links between levels?
A crucial element for effective European social dialogue
is the articulation between the European and the
national levels. One dimension of this issue concerns
the relationships between the national affiliates of
European trade unions and employer organisations and
developments at EU level, viewed from a ‘bottom-up’
perspective. To what extent are national players aware
of the European social dialogue, and what is their
degree of interest in European affairs? What positions
and strategies do they take on these subjects, and what
resources do they have or not have for European issues?
What kind of relationships do national players have with
the European social partners? 
If the legitimacy of European social dialogue and the
role of autonomous processes in the Europeanisation of
industrial relations are to be improved, top-down
approaches that focus too strongly on institutional and
technical dimensions at the EU level and neglect vertical
and horizontal dynamics between the national and the
European players should be avoided. The future of all
forms of social dialogue at EU level is above all
dependent on the social partners’ capacity to increase
the articulation between their EU-level organisations
and their rank-and-file at the national, local and
company levels. Degryse and Clauwaert conclude that
‘if European social dialogue is to operate to the full,
therefore, the EU and its Member States must support
not only European social dialogue itself but also the
national players and structures pursuing social
coordination’ (2014). The most effective way by which
the European Commission could fulfil its task of
promoting the horizontal dialogue between
management and labour at EU level is to provide
balanced support for the vertical dialogue between
their organisations at EU and national levels
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(Eurofound, 2007). The European Commission
recognised in 2010 ‘that there is a direct correlation
between the effectiveness of national social dialogue
and effectiveness at European level, and that each
energises the other’ (European Commission, 2010). 
Towards more institutional support and
capacity building?
In the field of social dialogue, the number and scope of
policy proposals also depends on whether the European
Commission considers these initiatives to be a priority
in the Union’s interests, and whether the administration
is willing and able to use its political, human and
financial resources to promote such an agenda. The
European Commission’s progress in the field of social
dialogue and industrial relations is also contingent on
the degree of support from the other EU institutions and
Member States, and on the position of the social
partners. A survey carried out by Voss et al (2011)
identified the need to strengthen the capacity and
competence of European social dialogue structures, as
well as the need for capacity building, mutual learning
and exchange of experience of national social dialogue
institutions. According to the report, numerous
respondents from central and eastern European
countries emphasised the positive effects and the
added value of the European social partners’ initiatives
to strengthen social dialogue and support the capacity-
building process. Autonomous agreements constitute
the biggest challenge for the social partners, as they
have to ensure their timely and adequate
implementation and subsequent monitoring at national
level. Some actors and experts argued that the
European social partners did not live up to their
expectations in this respect and the question on how to
impact on the affiliates in the course of the
implementation process was one of the most
challenging of the European social dialogue. In 2005,
some scholars also expressed the view that a relaunch
of social dialogue ‘involve(d) strong initiatives from the
Commission. Without the driving force of the
Commission’s initiatives, the European social dialogue
(was) reduced to a study and discussion, in which the
lack of interest (would) quickly dissuade people from
taking part’ (Didry and Mias, 2005). This is why
Bercusson interpreted the European social dialogue as
an industrial relations process, characterised by
‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (1996). As shown
in the box on page 53 ‘A new start for social dialogue’
the European Commission under President Jean-Claude
Juncker is committed to the relaunch of social dialogue
and a number of initiatives have already been started
since the high-level conference in Brussels on 5 March
2015.
Towards more mutual trust?
Social dialogue is based on arguing and learning, which
may lead to an aggregation and transformation of
interests and preferences. The Val Duchesse origins of
social dialogue created a dynamic by building up a trust
relationship between the actors through better
information about each other’s capacities as well as
intentions and a commitment to engage in negotiations
at EU level (see P. de Buck and B. Segol in European
Commission, 2006). Past interviews with protagonists of
EU-level social partner organisations have corroborated
the thesis that ‘mutual learning’ is a key factor in the
process of European social dialogue: the close
involvement with policy networks results in a revised
definition of interests and preferences. Thus,
socialisation is an important factor in understanding EU
social dialogue, as a multi-level and multi-actor polity.
The European social dialogue not only fosters
deliberation at EU level, but also at national level. This
effect was empirically corroborated by Falkner’s
analysis of the implementation of the directives on
parental leave, part-time and fixed-term work in
selected Member States. According to this study, the
European social dialogue did impact positively on social
dialogue at national level. In some cases, the European
social dialogue even led to autonomous negotiations
between the national social partners (Falkner et al,
2002; Welz, 2008). In the aftermath of the 2008
economic crisis, it may be time to revisit the spirit of Val
Duchesse and rebuild a relationship of trust between
the two sides of industry (Welz and Foden, 2015).
Towards more representativeness?
‘La représentativité est une fiction juridique’ (Hecquet,
2007, p. 64). 49
At European level, the issue of representativeness has
been a conundrum of EU social policy since its inception
in 1993. According to the Court of Justice of the
European Union, it is the duty of the European
Commission and the Council to verify the
representativeness of the signatories to an agreement.
Primary EU law never reverts to the notion of
representativeness, and the Commission first used this
criterion in its 1993 communication concerning the
application of the agreement on social policy (European
Commission, 1993) in annex 3 entitled ‘Main findings of
the social partners’ study (Representativeness)’, where
it defines criteria for representativeness in the
consultation phase of social dialogue. Thus,
‘management and labour’ in the sense of Article 154
TFEU are to be understood as the European social
partners, organised at cross-sector or sectoral level.
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The Commission has drawn up a list of organisations it
consults under Article 154 TFEU. This list, which is
regularly revised, consists, at time of writing, of 87
organisations. This number amounted to 28 in 1993, at
44 in 1998, at 55 in 2002, at 60 in 2004 and at 79 in 2010
(European Commission, 1993–2010). Over the last 22
years, the total number of EU social partner
organisations to be consulted by the European
Commission under Article 154 TFEU has more than
tripled. The European Commission only consults those
EU-level social partners that fulfil the criteria laid down
in COM(93)600 and COM(98)322. The setting-up of the
sectoral social dialogue committees is also ruled by the
legal conformity principle, since it is subject to hard EU
law in the form of Commission Decision 98/500/EC. The
negotiation phase of European social dialogue on the
grounds of Article 155 TFEU is embedded to a large
extent in the same principle of mutual recognition.
Instead of the State determining which organisations
may negotiate and sign binding agreements, mutual
recognition involves self-regulation by the social
partners. Legitimate or ‘recognised’ trade unions and
employer associations create their own institutional
fora within which they collectively bargain or consult on
issues of mutual interest in the employment field. The
autonomy of the social partners, however, comes to an
abrupt end, once the consultations lead to agreements
to be implemented by a Council decision on the request
of the social partners (Bercusson, 1999, p. 160). At this
point, the criteria of the Court of First Instance are
applicable, stating that the social partners, taken
together and having regard to the content of the
agreement in question, are sufficiently representative in
light of the UEAPME judgment. In a number of recent
proposals for Council directives, however, the
Commission also used Commission decision 98/500/EC
as a legal frame of reference (European Commission,
2005, p. 3; 2009a, p. 7; 2014, p. 7 and 2016a, p. 6).
The study identified different frames of reference for the
assessment of the representativeness of the EU social
partners, as follows.
Setting-up of the European sectoral social dialogue
committees (legal conformity): on the basis of the
Commission decision 98/500/EC and on the basis of
representativeness studies by Eurofound.
Consultation based on legal conformity:
representativeness by accreditation of the Commission
on the basis of the representativeness criteria as
elaborated in the COM(1993) 600 final and COM(1998)
322 final and on basis of representativeness studies by
Eurofound. 
Negotiation based on mutual recognition/bargaining
autonomy: representativeness by mutual recognition as
described by academia (Lhernould, 2008, pp. 36–37;
Mazuyer, 2007, p. 128; Reale, 2003, p. 12) and based on
the bargaining autonomy of the social partners
(European Commission, 1993, p. 15).
Implementation of European framework agreements
by Council decision: representativeness assessed in
light of the UEAPME judgment: ‘whether, having regard
to the content of the agreement in question, the
signatories, taken together, are sufficiently
representative’ (T-135/96, 2335, para. 90), in light of
communication (98/322) (only for European
Commission, 2000, p. 169), decision 98/500/EC
(European Commission, 2005, p. 3; 2009a, p. 7; 2014, p. 7
and 2016, p. 6) and on the basis of representativeness
studies by Eurofound.
The Commission first used the concept of
representativeness in its 1993 communication on the
application of the 1992 agreement on social policy.
Representativeness became the key issue of dispute in
the UEAPME legal case in 1996. The European Court of
First Instance (CFI) asserted that agreements reached
through social dialogue – which are then transposed
into directives – may be challenged on grounds of their
democratic legitimacy. The CFI deemed this necessary,
since the directive was not subject to scrutiny by the
European Parliament (Eurofound, 2015c). 
Due to the fact that the European social partners are not
directly legitimised democratic European actors, the
question about the source of their legitimacy in the
framework of European social dialogue is a crucial one.
Since under European social dialogue, management
and labour have developed into co-legislators in the
social policy field, the representativeness and mandate
checks exercised by the European Commission are very
important. Against the background of the principle of
democracy, it is an essential condition that the
signatory parties, which have concluded a European
framework agreement, are representative and were
adequately mandated by their national affiliate.
Democratic legitimacy is, of course, more at stake when
it comes to agreements to be transposed by Council
decision than in relation to autonomous agreements. In
light of the different legal frameworks for
representativeness (COM(93)600, COM(98)322,
COM(98)/500/EC), UEAPME Judgment (T-135/96, ECR II,
1998, p. 2,335)) for the different junctures of the
European social dialogue, the question arises as to
whether the transparency of EU social dialogue polity
could be improved by harmonising these frameworks.
Echoing the quadripartite statement ‘New start for
social dialogue’ of 27 June 2016, the European social
partners could discuss advantages and inconveniences
of having a more precise, predictable and transparent
concept of representativeness at European level.
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The representativeness of social partners provides
legitimacy for their various roles in industrial
relations, whether through the vehicle of social
dialogue, collective bargaining or involvement in
government policymaking or implementation.
This report compares the different ways in which
the representativeness of social partners is
defined at national, European and international
levels. It shows that representativeness has
various meanings across the 28 Member States
and Norway, with most countries featuring a
combination of legal conformity and mutual
recognition. Based on information provided by
national correspondents in the 28 EU Member
States and Norway, the report analyses the
concept of representativeness at national level by
reviewing key elements such as electoral success,
organisational strength in terms of membership,
and the capacity to negotiate. The final section
turns to the methodology used by Eurofound to
assess representativeness since 1996 and raises
the question as to whether this approach should
be refined or modified after 10 years of
application. 
The European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a
tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is to
provide knowledge in the area of social and
work-related policies. Eurofound was established in
1975 by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75,
to contribute to the planning and design of better living
and working conditions in Europe.
